Decennial Déjà Vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North Korea on the 1995 Supply Agreement’s Ten-Year Anniversary

Abstract

Ten years ago, North Korea, in exchange for promises of security and economic aid, agreed
to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and suspend its
nuclear weapons program. Today, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, has removed
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and is flaunting its development of a nuclear
arsenal.
Although the political grounds are clear, the United States has failed to provide a coherent
legal rationale for its decision not to perform its obligations under the 1995 Supply Agreement, the
compromise that defused the 1994 crisis.
Part II of this Article summarizes the history and politics behind the current stalemate. Part
III surveys and assesses several legal justifications for the United States’ refusal to proceed with the
Supply Agreement. Ultimately, I advocate for the Supply Agreement’s “discontinued
performance.” This approach would accommodate the need for flexible policy-making without
sacrificing fundamental tenets of international law.