LEGAL EDUCATION IN A “MIXED JURISDICTION”: THE QUEBEC EXPERIENCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

That legal education plays an important role in the shaping and flourishing of a given legal system is undeniable. The law students of today will be the legal players of tomorrow, and, like any game, the legal one is only as dynamic as its players are skilled.

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Perhaps underestimated, however, is how particularly crucial the role of legal education becomes where the legal systems concerned fall into the category of so-called “mixed jurisdictions.”¹ For in such systems, legal players must be capable of playing two games at once, which requires that they be trained to juggle with, and yet never confuse, two distinct sets of rules. Only if legal players can properly accomplish this will the integrity of the various games being played be preserved. In mixed jurisdictions, therefore, it is the very identity of the legal games, not just their respective dynamism, that is at stake for legal education.

As one such mixed jurisdiction, Quebec is faced with a singularly onerous educational challenge. Because all matters of private law are governed in Quebec by a system of rules rooted in the continental tradition of civil law,² law students in Quebec must be trained as civilian jurists. At the same time, Quebec’s membership in the Canadian federation³ entails its endorsement of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of


2. By the Treaty of Paris of 1763, France ceded to England what was then referred to as “Lower Canada”—a territory covering roughly that of the current Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, but extending further south to Louisiana. A decade later, the Quebec Act of 1774 was enacted whereby the province of Quebec was allowed to return to the French tradition of civil law that had ruled it before the conquest of 1759. Indeed, Section 8 of the Quebec Act provided that:

all his Majesty’s Canadian Subjects within the province of Quebec, the religious Order and Communities only excepted, may also hold and enjoy their Property and Possessions, together with all customs and usages thereto, and all other their civil rights, in as large, ample, and beneficial manner, as if the said Proclamation, Commissions, Ordinances, and other Acts and Instruments had not been made, and as may consist with their Allegiance to the Majesty, and subjection to the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain.

Quebec Act, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 83 (1774) (Eng.); R.S.C., app. II, no. 2 (1970) (Can.). In this provision, the phrase “laws of Canada” was understood as referring to the French civil law which governed Quebec before 1759. For detailed studies of the Act, see H. Neatby, THE QUEBEC ACT (1972), and THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER THE QUEBEC ACT (1937).

3. The Canadian Confederation was born out of the British North America Act of 1867, 30-31 Vict., ch. 3 (Eng.), which succeeded the Quebec Act of 1774. The BNA Act proceeded to allocate constitutional powers between the federal and the provincial governments as follows:

Before Confederation, each province bore the traits of sovereignty; but in joining the federal union each province gave up this sovereignty in its entirety, and with it gave up the revenues to be derived from the exercise of concomitant privileges, prerogatives and attributes. By virtue of the B.N.A. Act, the central power returned to the provinces some of these rights.
common law with respect to matters of public law,\textsuperscript{4} with the result that Quebec law students must also be educated as common lawyers. In this sense, “the Quebec jurist has had a split personality.”\textsuperscript{5}

The task of properly integrating two distinct legal traditions within the same educational program is not an easy one, if only because legal traditions that differ in important ways are likely to present different philosophies of education and thus are also likely to require different educational agendas. Indeed, if this is the case, their integration cannot be successful unless such difference are accommodated in the process.

It is now widely acknowledged that the civil-law and common-law traditions differ fundamentally\textsuperscript{6} and that this fundamental difference extends to their respective perspectives on legal education.\textsuperscript{7} Their concurrent teaching in Quebec faculties\textsuperscript{8} would therefore ideally entail

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4. Quebec Act, supra note 2, § 11.
8. The term “law faculties,” as distinct from the term “law schools” is important here, for, as will be shown infra, text accompanying notes 57-66, one significant difference between the evolutions of the common-law and the civil-law traditions is that they emerged from, and were
the coexistence—in one and the same learning environment, university curriculum, and teaching body—of two different forms of teaching methods, styles, and tools. Otherwise, the chances that Quebec law students will master the art of juggling with, while not confusing, the two sets of rules are rather dim.

In this respect, Quebec bears no more than the lot immediately expected of a mixed jurisdiction that combines two nontrivially different legal traditions. But the difficulty of its educational challenge is further compounded by the fact that for complex reasons having to do in part with the structure of Canadian legal institutions, the two sets of rules are not nearly as clearly delineated as they would be in a healthy mixed jurisdiction.

I indeed argue elsewhere9 that what had been planned in 1867 as the peaceful and mutually respectful alliance of two distinct legal traditions under the common roof of Canadian federalism evolved into the bleak tale of a largely unsuccessful struggle by civilian elements to preserve their distinctive juridical identity. The tale ends unhappily, I concluded, since it appears that beyond the skeletal remnants of some conceptual foundations, little of Quebec’s contemporary private law qualifies as truly civilian. At best, the current legal scene in Quebec can be described as a hodge-podge of civilian and common-law instruments, at both the level of substantive rules of law, and that of juridical logistics and methodology.10

If such a depiction of the history of Canada’s biphism is accurate, the mission of legal education in Quebec is more onerous than that of your average mixed jurisdiction. For then, it is not enough that law students be capable of playing two games competently. Before any game-playing can even begin, it is necessary to reconfigure the games to be played, that is, to sort out from Quebec’s hodge-podge of legal rules accordingly also taught as, professional and academic disciplines, respectively. R. Stevens, Law School—Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (1983); Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 146; Geck, supra note 7, at 86.


10. While such a hodge-podge need not be problematic for the common law, where juridical authoritativeness is canonical, it is problematic for the civil law, where juridical authoritativeness derives from conceptual unity. This difference between the common law and civil law is briefly described infra, text accompanying notes 40-56. On the unity of the civil law in particular, see C. Valcke, The Clash of the Titans: When the Civil Law Tradition Meets the Welfare State, U. Toronto L.J. (forthcoming 1996).
which are civilian and which are of common law, and to reconstruct the distinct set of rules which each legal game requires. Beyond training competent legal players, therefore, Quebec’s system of legal education must aim to form individuals capable of undoing years of unskilled playing. As such, the educational mission of Quebec is far weightier than what it bargained for as just another mixed jurisdiction.

I argue here that Quebec has fallen short of discharging this onerous mission, for its typical law graduate cannot be described as a solid civilian jurist. If anything, law graduates from Quebec may in fact be better trained at playing the game of common law. At the very least, they are, from academic and professional standpoints alike, barely indistinguishable from their common-law peers. One can only conclude, therefore, that the civilian game has been neglected in Quebec law faculties.

The reasons behind this state of affairs are, as with most social phenomena, hard to pinpoint with certainty. Three factors can nonetheless be singled out, which have been especially instrumental in shoe-horning Quebec’s legal education into the mold of the common law. The description of these three factors, which I label the “financial,” the “Bar Association,” and the “psychological” factors, is the object of Part II. In Part III, I show how these factors’ combined influence particularly affected three major aspects of legal education, namely, the profile of curricula, the nature of scholarship, and the method of instruction.

II. THREE FACTORS DESCRIBED
A. The Financial Factor

As expected, the “financial factor” refers to a state of financial strain. More specifically, the reference is to the state of financial strain which has befallen all universities in Quebec since the provincial government decided, back in 1963, to follow the recommendations of the Parent Commission,11 and undertake what was to become the most comprehensive process to democratize higher education in Quebec’s history. Indeed, since the adoption of the Parent Report, education in

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11. QUEBEC MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION ROYALE D’ENQUÊTE SUR L’ENSEIGNEMENT DANS LA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC (1963-66) [hereinafter PARENT REPORT].
Quebec is virtually user-free at all levels, and nowadays almost exclusively state-financed.\textsuperscript{12}

Law faculties suffered greatly in this democratization process, for they were made to bear more than their proportional share of the costs generated by this process at the university level. The great variation in costs-per-graduate ratios across university departments afforded an opportunity for financing through cross-subsidization, which was quickly seized by Quebec’s Ministry of Education. As law studies are, like most other social studies, practically costless in comparison with, say, scientific studies,\textsuperscript{13} they stand to offer the greatest profit potential. Thus intent on increasing enrollment in law studies, the Ministry determined that while the amount of tuition fees charged to law students would be fixed at a province-wide uniform standard, government subsidies to law faculties

\textsuperscript{12} Students in Quebec usually go through thirteen years of schooling before entering university. After six years of elementary school, and five years of high school, students wishing to pursue their education may, depending on their elected field of studies, choose to do so at a College of General and Professional Education [hereinafter CEGEP] for two or three years. Born in the aftermath of the PARENT REPORT, these CEGEPs were initially established with a view to provide high school students with the kind of general advanced education which university programs were deemed already too specialized to properly dispense. All three levels of pre-university education are entirely free. Even among private schools and colleges, very few institutions are privately subsidized at more than 20\%. At the university level, fees are minimal. Statistics for the years 1981 to 1991 reveal that, among the ten Canadian provinces, Quebec has maintained the lowest percentage of tuition fees to general operating income of universities (around 9\%) and the highest percentage of provincial operating grants to general operating income of universities through that period. STATISTICS CANADA, UNIVERSITY FINANCE TRENDS ANALYSIS, No. 81-260 (1990-91).

Tuition fees for the year 1992-93 were on average $750 per semester, as appears from the 1992-93 catalogues of Quebec’s five civil-law faculties, McGill, Montreal, Laval, Sherbrooke, and UQAM [hereinafter CATALOGUES]. Brierley notes that Quebec has always maintained the lowest fee schedules in the country. J.E.C. Brierley, Quebec Legal Education Since 1945: Cultural Paradoxes and Traditional Ambiguities, 10 DALHOUSSIE L.J. 5, 9 (1986).

\textsuperscript{13} The Conseil des universités of Quebec estimated that for the school year 1975-76, the average cost per law student was $2,038, as compared to a cost per student of $12,614 in medicine, $3,334 in mathematics, and $2,420 in literature. CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS, AVIS AU MINISTRE DE L’ÉDUCATION SUR DEUX RAPPORTS RÉALISÉS PAR LE CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN DROIT PUBLIC DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL: LA PLACE DU JURISTE DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ QUÉBÉCOISE. L’ADÉQUATION DES FACULTÉS DE DROIT AUX FONCTIONS DE TRAVAIL DEUR DIPLOMÉS 11 (1979) [hereinafter CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS]. The proportions, almost identical three years earlier, see André Poupart, A lue et a dia... ou les changements dans la filière à suivre pour devenir avocat, 7 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS [R.J.T.] 273, 275 (1972), are comparable today according to a recent study commissioned by Quebec’s Ministry of Education. In the 1991-92 school year, the average cost per student were $4,253 in law, $10,216 in medicine, $7,054 in pure sciences, $4,615 in literature, and $4,710 in the humanities. QUÉBEC MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, MÉTHODOLOGIE DU CALCUL DES COÛTS MOYENS DISCIPLINAIRES 15 (1994).
would be set in proportion of the number of full-time admissions each year. As Quebec law faculties are almost entirely dependent upon their provincial government for funding, they took the bait. Hence firmly determined to fill their classrooms to a maximum, law faculties proceeded—as any maximizing enterprise would have—to assemble service packages likely to please the average consumer, that is, to offer educational packages molded to the preferences of the average Quebec law student.

In and of itself, such a marketing policy bears no obvious implication for the issue of the ideal form of legal education in a world of two distinct legal cultures, given that, other things being equal, there is no reason to assume that the average Quebec law student would prefer noncivilian law studies. If anything, there would be reason to assume the contrary, given the chosen locus of study. But other things were far from equal, owing in part to the second of the three factors listed above: the "Bar Association" factor.


15. See supra note 12. One major difference between continental and Anglo-Saxon systems of legal education concerns their financing structure: the strong alumni tradition present in the latter system is simply nonexistent in the former. See Merryman, supra note 7, at 863. From telephone conversations with the alumni officials of various Quebec universities, it appears that money gifts from graduates create more embarrassment than satisfaction among administrators. Because of the fear that such gifts may be mistaken for bribes, gifts of tangible objects are commonly substituted for money gifts. Sadly, Quebec university libraries need more Harrap dictionaries than they do Riopelle paintings. McGill is an important exception to this rule. See R.A. Macdonald, The National Law Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, Prospects, 13 DALHOMIE L.J. 211, 329-31 (1990).

16. According to the latest annual statistics compiled by the Committee of Canadian Law Deans on Canadian law schools, student-teacher ratios for Quebec law faculties have been among the worst in the country for many years. COMMITTEE OF THE CANADIAN LAW DEANS, REPORT CONCERNING THE SIXTH CANADIAN LAW TEACHING CLINIC 34 (1985) (The statistics are for 1984-85 and earlier years; more recent statistics are unavailable due to confidentiality requirements.); see also M. Cohen, The Condition of Legal Education in Canada, 28 CAN. BAR REV. 267, 271-74 (1950).

17. As would be explained in a basic economics textbook, see, e.g., R.H. PALGRAVE, DICTIONARY OF MICRO-ECONOMICS § 397 (1982), this policy contrasts with that of enterprises in a private market, which usually seek to reach what amounts to the optimal—rather than maximal—number of consumers, as determined by reference to the preference curve of the marginal—as opposed to the average—consumer. The standardization of tuition fees chargeable by law faculties makes it impossible for them to adjust prices in the way necessary to reach marginal consumers, however.
B. The Bar Association Factor

That the Quebec Bar Association mostly retains the last word in all matters relating to the licensing of legal professionals in Quebec\textsuperscript{18} clearly was destined to have a major effect on the condition of civilian legal education in that province. A major adverse effect has been that the average law student in Quebec has come to prefer—and thus obtain from law faculties—educational packages of questionable quality from the perspective of forming competent civilian jurists. Like the “financial” factor described above, therefore, the Bar Association’s contribution to legal education in Quebec has been detrimental.

The story of the role of the Quebec Bar Association in legal education is one of relentless confrontation with the universities.\textsuperscript{19} It begins with this Association, created as a professional corporation in 1849,\textsuperscript{20} ostensibly with a view to provide a form of quality control mechanism that would serve the public interest by double-checking on the competence of law graduates entering the provincial market.\textsuperscript{21}

The professional corporation took its mission very much to heart. Although its intervention was discrete at first, merely requiring that new recruits write qualifying examinations and/or undergo a period of internship with a corporate member,\textsuperscript{22} it quickly became more daring.\textsuperscript{23}

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\textsuperscript{18} The Quebec Bar Association is only one of Quebec’s two professional corporations in law. The Chambre des notaires is the other. Act for the Organization of the Notarial Profession in that part of this Province called Lower Canada, S. Prov. C., ch. 21 (1847) (Can.). Although the Chambre des notaires has obviously also had influence over legal education in Quebec, see Macdonald, supra note 15, at 217-96, this influence has been neither as important (largely due to the fact that notaries are not nearly as numerous as advocates in Quebec), nor as perverse, as that exerted by the Bar Association. See generally J. Mackay, La loi sur le notariat, son évolution et son histoire, 91 Revue du Notariat 421 (1989). For this reason, it is not discussed here.

\textsuperscript{19} See generally H. Le Bel, Formation juridique et formation professionnelle: Quelques réflexions, 7 R.J.T. 305 (1972); E. Colas, Le Barreau, les facultés de droit et le stage, 33 Revue du Barreau [R. du B.] 1 (1973); Macdonald, supra note 15; J. Moisan, Barreau et universités, 7 R.J.T. 287 (1972); M. Nantel, L'étude du droit et le barreau, 10 R. du B. 97 (1950); G. Pépin, La formation professionnelle et les facultés de droit: quelques éléments d'un volumineux dossier (1981); Poupart, supra note 13.

\textsuperscript{20} Acte pour l'incorporation du Barreau du Bas-Canada, S. Prov. C., 12 Vic., ch. 45-6, § 325 (1849) (Can.).

\textsuperscript{21} See Barreau du Quebec, Guide des archives institutionnelles du Barreau de Quebec (1994).

\textsuperscript{22} Bar Act, S.Q., ch. 27, § 44 (1881) (Can.); Bar Act, S.Q., (1st Sess.) ch. 5 (1936) (Can.). The period of apprenticeship is referred to as \textit{le stage} in Quebec, and as the period of “articles” in the other Canadian provinces. Between 1944 and 1947, one could be admitted to the practice of
Before long, strict standards of university education were edicted, and aspiring new entrants in the profession were required to attend eight months of courses administered and documented by the Bar Association prior to writing the qualifying examinations and undertaking the mandatory period of professional internship. While the Bar Association recently modified the format of its professional training program with a view to emphasize professional skill training over legal knowledge testing, the checklist of licensing criteria has, in substance, remained unchanged.

Although the Bar Association claims that such professional training is the necessary complement to the universities’ academic agenda, many have questioned the purity of its motives. Purity of law either by writing the required qualifying examinations or by undergoing a longer stage. An Act Modifying the Bar Act, S.Q., ch. 41 (1944) (Can.).

23. For a general description of the Quebec Bar Association’s increasing intervention in university education, refer to 28 R. du B. at 276-77 (1968).

24. In 1886, the Bar Association was given the legislative power to monitor the content of university studies in law in the province. See BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, supra note 21. In 1947, university studies in law became mandatory prior to writing the professional entrance examinations. Bar Act, S.Q., ch. 62 (1947) (Can.); see W. Meredith, A Four-Year Course of Theoretical and Practical Instruction, 13 R. du B. 878 (1953).


27. For the current standards of admission to the Bar Association’s training program, see R.R.Q., ch. C-26, r. 1, § 1.03 (1981) (Can.), enacted under § 43 of An Act Respecting the Barreau du Québec, R.S.Q., ch. B-1 (Can.). Concerning the content of this program and the details of the mandatory period of professional internship, see Règlement sur la formation professionnelle des avocats, supra note 26.

28. See BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, supra note 21. In March of 1978, Mr. Viateur Bergeron, then Head of the Quebec Bar Association, delivered an address at the Faculty of Law of the University of Montreal in which he declared:

I always considered that three distinct and separate stages, three essential stages moreover, are needed to form a competent advocate. There must be a solid juridical preparation at the university level. The faculties are in charge of it. There must be a professional formation well designed and well taught. The Bar . . . is in charge of it. Finally, there must be an internship . . . to learn the essential rudiments of professional practice. It is the concrete training, it is the
motives aside, however, the Bar Association’s intervention into legal education in the province has clearly been, and still is, largely seen by the universities more as trespass than as collaboration.30

As I show in Part III, this enduring dispute has had two notably detrimental effects with respect to the preservation of the civil-law tradition in Quebec. The first is the polarization of what could have been allied forces in redressing the structural defects noted above.31 The second is the partial erosion of Quebec’s academic base. While much of the ammunition against assimilation that is most valuable in a mixed jurisdiction lies in academia, particularly when the besieged is the civil-law tradition, Quebec law faculties have been instilled with an overpowering preference for professional training over academic schooling.

essential experience. These three periods seem to me essential to the formation, at any rate, of all future advocates.

The address appeared as V. Bergeron, La valeur de l’enseignement dispensé face au présent et à l’avenir de la fonction juridique, 9 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 430 (1978).

29. Drawing on contemporary economic writings on professional licensing, see, e.g., T.G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, J.L. & ECON. (1961); B.P. Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1977); M. Spence, Entry, Conduct and Regulation in Professional Markets (Working Paper #2 prepared for the Professional Organizations Committee, Ministry of the Attorney General, Government of Ontario) (1978); D. Stager & P. Foot, Lawyers’ Earnings under Market Growth and Differentiation, 1970-80, XXII CAN. J. ECON. 150 (1989), many have likened the Bar Association’s dealings in legal education to a form of market monopoly, claiming that behind the notions of public protection and quality control heralded by the Bar Association as justifications for its interventionist policy lie truly protectionistic intentions. See Brierley, supra note 12, at 8; Le Bel, supra note 19, at 313; Nantel, supra note 19; Poupart, supra note 13, at 276; G. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). These critics argue that one of the Bar Association’s purposes in regulating the legal profession is to create barriers to entry so as to shelter its current members from potential competition. The Bar Association’s apparently fading interest in a classic civilian legal education could also be explained in part as an exercise in political self-preservation. Indeed, if the arguments presented in Valcke, The Clash of the Titans, supra note 10, to the effect that a codal tradition clashes with the proliferation of state control are sound, then it would surely be in the interest of the Bar Association, itself an agent and beneficiary of state control, to steer Quebec’s legal scene away from its civil-law lineage and towards an ideology that would better match the political aspirations of the modern welfare state.

30. The resentment felt by the Association des Professeurs de Droit du Québec is clear from the reading of its Mémorie submitted in 1964 to the Committee for the Revision of the Act and Regulations of the Quebec Bar Association. The Mémorie was subsequently published as Association des Professeurs de Droit du Québec, Mémorie de l’Association des Professeurs de Droit du Québec, 1964 (No. 51) ThÉMIS 179.

31. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
C. The Psychological Factor

The last of the three factors, which contributed significantly to the impoverishment of civilian legal education in Quebec, is what I call the "psychological" factor, in loose reference to a psychological form of parochialism, or some kind of inferiority complex, that would strike the members of a given minority group merely by reason of their membership in that group.

Among the many denominations used to describe this apparently widespread psychological phenomenon,32 the one encountered most frequently in the field of social psychology is that of "alienation syndrome."33 Borrowing from earlier anthropological studies,34 Steinberg gives the following description of the symptoms of this syndrome, as they were observed among the economically disadvantaged:

[T]he poor, by virtue of their exclusion from the mainstream of the societies in which they live, develop a way of life all their own, one that is qualitatively different from that of the middle-class societies in which they live. Like all cultures, the culture of poverty is a "design for living" that is adapted to the existential circumstances of the poor. The pressure of coping with everyday survival leads to a present-time orientation; the lack of opportunity, to low aspirations; exclusion from the political process, to feelings of powerlessness and fatalism; disparagement of the poor on the part of the society at large, to feelings of inferiority; ... unrelenting poverty, to passivity and a sense of resignation. Thus . . .

32. Chestang refers to the same phenomenon in the context of African-Americans as the "black experience." L.W. Chestang, Character Development in a Hostile Environment (Occasional Paper No. 3, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, November 1972), reported in W. Dahlstrom & D. Lachar, MMPI Patterns of American Minorities 201 (1986). In the context of disadvantage which is specifically socio-economic, this phenomenon has been labeled "the culture of poverty." See, e.g., S. Steinberg, The Ethnic Myth—Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America 106-09 (1989).
34. O. Lewis, Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (1959); O. Lewis, La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York (1966).
the culture of poverty comes into existence as a reaction 
and adaptation to conditions of poverty.35

While the specificity and vehemence of this description would seem to 
preclude its transposition to contexts other than that of socio-economic 
relations, some scholars have not hesitated to do just that. Dahlstrom and 
Lachar, for example, contend that any minority group acting in a hostile 
social context is vulnerable to this syndrome of alienation,36 and Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau himself has decried what he calls Quebec’s “ghetto 
mentality.”37

If such a sweeping prognosis is warranted, it may be that some of 
the puzzles about legal education in Quebec, which the discussion of the 
financial and Bar Association factors leaves unsolved, could be explained 
as the manifestations of some sort of juristic syndrome of alienation. This 
is the case, I propose in Part III, specifically with respect to the nature of 
Quebec legal scholarship.38

Probably due to the factual volatility and causal indeterminacy 
that inheres in all things psychological, this last factor is more difficult to 
define than the financial and Bar Association factors, and its import for 
legal education thus will necessarily remain somewhat unclear. Given the 
lack of analytical constraints, there is great potential for indulging in 
exaggeration and caricature, and ascribing to the psychological factor 
more explanatory power than it deserves. In order to guard against this 
possibility—and avoid falling into the trap of over-medicalizing what 
could be just a normal, yet undesirable, feature of the human psyche—it 
is here treated as residual: it is invoked only where other satisfactory 
explanations are unavailable.

The three factors just described have thus contributed in different 
ways to the impoverishment of civilian legal education in Quebec. While 
the financial and Bar Association factors clearly have actively participated in 
bringing about this state of impoverishment, the contribution of the psychological factor has been more subtle. This last factor seems to have merely reduced the chances that the disturbing

35. STEINBERG, supra note 32, at 107.
36. DAHLSTROM & LACHAR, supra note 32.
the same as Quebec’s “mentalité de survivance” [“survival mentality”]. C. ATIAS, SAVOIR DES 
38. See infra Part III.C.
situation be redressed through some concerted efforts on the part of Quebec law faculties.

It is this combination of financial strain, pressure from the Quebec Bar Association, and psychological parochialism which, I argue in Part III, most likely steered Quebec legal education away from its due civilian course and into an avenue that a mixed jurisdiction true to this title would have taken care to avoid.

III. THE THREE FACTORS AT PLAY

Because no social process quite resembles that of the emergence of positive law through an accumulation of human decisions, it is often said of common-law reasoning—understood in the traditional sense of instrument, product, and object of such process—that it differs from any other kind of reasoning. In contrast, it is questionable whether the same can be said of legal reasoning in the continental tradition, for it has often been associated with nonlegal forms of reasoning, in particular with scientific reasoning.

39. This traditional understanding of common-law reasoning has been criticized by both left and right. The normative significance of the very cornerstone of this traditional view, the doctrine of precedent, has been questioned by natural law theorists, usually described as sitting on the right of the ideological spectrum. See, e.g., M. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 1061 (1982). On the left, Critical Legal Scholars have charged that the rule of precedent is a legal fiction devoid of any actual power to constrain judicial reasoning. See generally The Politics of Law (Kairys ed., 1982). See in particular D. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979) and D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. (1976).


41. P. Rémy, Les civilistes français vont-ils disparaître? 32 McGill L.J. 152, 154 (1986) ("[The juridical order] remains and changes of its own; it is given to me, the civilist, in the same way that nature is given to the physicist who observes it."); see also F. Gény, Science et Technique en droit privé positif (1914); R.P. Roubière, Théorie générale du droit (2d ed. 1951); P. Stein, Historical Development of Civil Codes, in Cambridge Lectures 280, 282 (1983); H.F. Jolowicz, Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Studies, 65 L.Q. Rev. 322 (1949). From these references, it is clear that the analogy being drawn is between civilian legal reasoning and mathematical reasoning, not experimental scientific reasoning, for the latter is clearly inductive. See F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit 254-57 (1967).
If only because the form of reasoning characteristic of a given discipline naturally will inform this discipline's educational objectives, the question of whether reasoning at civil law can properly be described as \textit{sui generis} has important educational ramifications. Accordingly, the alleged connections between civilian legal reasoning and scientific reasoning deserve deeper scrutiny.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{A. Civilian Legal Reasoning}

Like scientific reasoning, legal reasoning in the continental tradition is said to be deductive, in the sense of being a process of rational deduction from coherent first principles through which the right answers to concrete cases can be discovered.\textsuperscript{43} The following statement of Yiannopoulos concerning legal reasoning at civil law is, in this regard, particularly revealing:

A rational judicial process involves always determination of issues in accordance with the requirements of formal logic. The judicial decision is a conclusion reached on the basis of syllogism: rules of law furnish the major premise, rules of logic the intermediate premise and the rule of law furnishing the minor premise.

\textsuperscript{42} For a more elaborate account of these connections, see Valcke, \textit{supra} note 9.

\textsuperscript{43} “Codification presupposes a carefully thought-out rational framework for the law, consciously chosen, consistently followed and logically inter-related ... in which all the concepts relating to a given area of the law are logically derived from first principles, meticulously developed and systematically ordered.” R.A. Macdonald, \textit{Comments, LVIII CAN. BAR REV.} 185, 189 (1980); J.M. Trigeaud, \textit{Le processus législatif: éléments de philosophie du droit}, 30 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT [ARCH. PHIL. DRT.] 245, 254 (1985) (“To legislate, according to Montesquieu, is to ‘tie.’”). \textit{See generally} Watson, \textit{supra} note 6, at 23-39. Max Weber thus summed up civilian legal reasoning by way of the following five postulates:

[F]irst, that every concrete legal decision be the ‘application’ of an abstract legal proposition to a concrete ‘fact situation’; second, that it must be possible in every concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a ‘gapless’ system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be ‘construed’ rationally in legal terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human beings must always be visualized as either an ‘application’ or ‘execution’ of legal propositions, or as an ‘infringement’ thereof, since the ‘gaplessness’ of the legal system must result in a gapless ‘legal ordering’ of all social conduct.

This vision of legal reasoning follows directly from the civilian’s traditional vision of both the nature of law and the judicial function. In accordance with the philosophical teachings of medieval Scholasticism and eighteenth-century Rationalism,45 civilians traditionally have viewed positive law as the materialization of some higher moral order that is inherently rational, universal, and immutable,46 somewhat similarly to the way scientific laws reflect an immanent physical order. In the opening chapter of De L’Esprit des lois (1748), Montesquieu wrote indeed that “[b]efore laws were made, there were relations of justice antecedent to the positive law which establishes them.”47 The main difference between

44. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System 89 (1977); see also J. Hilaire, Histoire du droit et des institutions 317 (1975).
45. G. Ripert, LE RÉGIME DÉMOCRATIQUE ET LE DROIT CIVIL MODERNE 50 (1936). On the influence of Scholasticism and Rationalism on the development of the civil law generally, see J.M. Kelly, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992); Lawson, supra note 6, at 1-44; J. Maillet, The Historical Significance of French Codification, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 681 (1970); Merryman, supra note 6, at 6-25; Watson, supra note 6, at 83-98; Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 6, at 76-87.
46. J.L. Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 La. L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (1988) (“[P]ositive law is based on the postulate of the school of natural law according to which there existed a legal system of permanent and universal value, founded on human reason.”); Trigeaud, supra note 43, at 246 (“[T]he legislative process becomes the means to decipher and to interpret this [the natural] law. It is a reading process. The law has no other purpose than to posit the natural law; it delimits and fixes the concrete modalities of the application of the natural law.”); see also J. Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel § 1 (1689); Prévault, Les fondements philosophiques du Code Napoléon, 64 Studi urbinati di scienze giuridiche ed economiche 143 (1975-76); S. Herman, From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods: The French Civil Code as Secular Scripture, U. Ill. L. Rev. 597 (1984). The influence of Immanuel Kant, which pervades civil law generally, Goyard-Fabre, Kant et l’idée pure du droit, 26 Arch. Phil. DRT. 133 (1981), is here palpable. Kant wrote:

Obligatory laws for which there can be an external lawgiving are called external laws (leges externae) in general. Those among them that can be recognized as obligatory a priori by reason even without external lawgiving are indeed external but natural laws, whereas those that do not bind without actual external lawgiving (and so without it would not be laws) are called positive laws. One can therefore conceive of external lawgiving that would contain only positive laws; but then a natural law would still have to precede it, which would establish the authority of the lawgiver.

law and science in this respect is that, in law, this materialization is effected partly through codification, partly through doctrinal analysis and partly through adjudication: broad principles of law are embodied in the civil code, while the more detailed rules that derive from these principles are articulated by scholars and finally applied by judges.48

On this view, the formulation of positive law, be it by way of codification, doctrinal analysis, or adjudication, is not a creative process, but rather one of collective and gradual discovery, just as what we know as the law of gravity is no human invention, but rather an explanation of the way things are, which came about through the combined efforts of several generations of scientists. Legal reasoning is, like scientific reasoning, the deductive process by which such discovery can be operated, given the necessary coherence of the orders being discovered. As one of the French codifiers explained:

When what is established or known offers no guidance, when at issue is a fact which is entirely new, one must go back to the principles of natural law. For if the foresight of the legislators is limited, nature in contrast is infinite; it applies to all that may interest mankind.49

In addition to suitting the Cartesianism of the civilian mind,50 such a vision of positive law squares neatly with the civilian political ideal of a strict separation of powers. Since the political struggle that culminated in the Revolution of 1789, civilians have remained highly distrustful of their

48. Cie Immobilière Viger v. Lauréat Giguère Inc., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67 (Beetz, J.) ("The Civil Code does not contain all of the civil law. It rests upon principles which it does not always explicit and whose life it is left to jurisprudential and doctrinal analysis to perpetuate."); G. Timsit, Pour une nouvelle définition de la norme, 1988 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique 267, 268 (Fr.) ("[The code is] an open system . . . a loose, dialogic whole, whose constitutive norms even are loose, leaving to its designated readers much liberty in decoding.").

49. J. Portalis, Discours préliminaire prononcé lors de la présentation du projet, in 1 P. Antoine Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil 466 (1827) ("Quand on n’est dirigé par rien de ce qui est établi ou connu, quand il s’agit d’un fait absolument nouveau, on remonte aux principes du droit naturel. Car si la prévoyance des législateurs est limitée, la nature, elle, est infinie; elle s’applique à tout ce qui peut intéresser les hommes."). In a similar vein, Tronchet and Jaubert relate that the French codifiers considered the organization of the code to be "née de la nature des choses" ["born from the nature of things"] and "conforme . . . à la marche naturelle des idées" ["in conformity . . . with the natural course of ideas"]. Id. at ix, cxi, cxii.

50. Louis Baudouin described this spirit in the following, very evocative, terms: "But the need to codify comes in its deepest roots from this love of order typical of the Cartesian spirit fond of perspectives, of plans, of logic, of the aesthetic beauty of the edifice even." L. Baudouin, Originalité du droit du Québec, 10 R. du B. 121, 125 (1950).
judges, and have accordingly insisted on a strict delineation of judicial powers. From this perspective, the suggestion that the judicial task might be limited to the quasi-mechanical application of extant legal rules—the grand lines of which would have been crystallized into a code, and analyzed by scholars—and might not extend as far as creating these rules, seems particularly appealing. And so did Montesquieu also insist that "[t]he judges of the nation are but the mouths that pronounce the words of the law, inanimate beings devoid of the power to temper its force or rigour."

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51. Because judges had traditionally belonged to the landed aristocracy, they were prime targets of the revolutionary movement that was to seal the fate of feudalism in France. Lawson, supra note 6, at 31; Merryman, supra note 6, at 17. In addition, French judges had by then come to be known for actively protecting the interests of the aristocracy against the insurrection of the proletariat. Such overt partiality from state officials was deemed a most offensive violation of France's newly-found aspirations of equality in the eye of the law. See generally F. Deak & M. Rheinstein, The Development of French and German Law, 24 Geo. L.J. 551 (1936); R.C. Van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History 152-55 (1987); P. Issalys, Loi dans le droit: tradition, critique et transformation, 33 Cahiers de Droit [C. de D.] 663, 675-82 (1992).

52. The typical continental judgment is accordingly a bare, dry, categorical, one-paragraph conclusion: "[Continental] judicial decisions are published, if they are published at all, in a form that appears emasculated to an American lawyer: the facts are omitted or sharply reduced and the process of judgment is made to seem abstract, mechanical, and inhuman. The civil lawyer could respond that his system of reporting judicial decisions represents greater objectivity, provide less temptation to succumb to the human aspects of the case and to endanger the purity and objectivity of the law." Merryman, supra note 7, at 874. An example of a continental judgment is reproduced in R.A. Macdonald, Understanding Civil Law Scholarship in Quebec, 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 573, 583 (1985).

53. Indeed, judicial decisions are not a primary source of law at civil law, and judges are accordingly free to disregard precedents. On the absence of rule of precedent at civil law, see 1 C. Aubry & C. Rai, Droit civil français 55-59 (7th ed. 1964); 1 A. Colin & H. Capitant, Traité de droit civil 113-14 (1957); Dawson, supra note 40, at 416-31; P. Esmein, La jurisprudence et la loi, 50 Rev. trim. dr. civ. 17 (1952); G. Gorla, Civilian Judicial Decisions—An Historical Account of Italian Style, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 740 (1970); Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 14; P. Malaurie, La jurisprudence combattue par la loi, in Mélanges Savatier 603 (1965); 1 G. Marty & P. Raynaud, Droit civil 215-19 (2d ed. 1972); 1 G. Ripert & J. Boulangier, Traité de droit civil 241-43 (1957).

54. R. David, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains § 21 (8th ed. 1982). Similarly, Portalis suggested that the best that could be hoped for was that judges apply rules to facts while remaining "penetrés de l'esprit général des lois" ['"imbued with the general spirit of the laws"). Portalis, supra note 49; see also Stein, supra note 41, at 284.

55. Montesquieu, supra note 47, at 178 ("Les juges de la nation ne sont que les bouches, qui prononcent les paroles de la loi, des êtres inanimés, qui n'en peuvent modérer ni là force ni là rigueur.").
It is in this sense that legal reasoning in the continental tradition is arguably analogous to scientific reasoning. If this is right, civilian legal reasoning cannot be described as *sui generis*, and as such differs significantly from common-law reasoning. For the hallmark of common-law reasoning is allegedly that unlike any other form of reasoning, it proceeds inductively to extract rules from an inordinate accumulation of concrete judicial decisions.\textsuperscript{56} One might conjecture accordingly that while learning to "think like a lawyer" is, at civil law, presumably no different from learning to think, mastering the art of common-law reasoning, in contrast, ought to require a form of training that is specifically legal.

It seems that the history of legal education in the two traditions bears out such conjectures, as I attempt to show next. In particular, I propose to outline this difference in didactic philosophies as manifested in three major components of legal education, namely, the profile of curricula, the nature of scholarship, and the method of instruction. These were chosen because of their pivotal place in the study of law, but also, and most importantly, because these are the three educational components which, I believe, are most representative of the difference between the two legal cultures and yet are also the components which, in Quebec legal education, are most "uncivilian." This, I argue, came about as a result of the combined influence of the three factors described in Part II.

\textsuperscript{56} ATIAS, supra note 37, at 45-51; J. Dainow, *The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison*, 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 419, 424-26 (1967); DAmALSKA, supra note 7, at 1365-67. Many common-law scholars have suggested that, like the rules which ground the civilian deductive process, those produced by the inductive process of the common law form a coherent conceptual structure instilled with immanent rationality. Most notoriously, such was William Blackstone's endeavor in writing his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765). More recently, see P. Benson, *External Freedom According to Kant*, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 559 (1989); Brudner, *The Unity of Property Law*, IV Can. J. L. & Jur. 3 (1991); S.R. Perry, *The Moral Foundations of Tort Law*, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449 (1992); E.J. Weinrib, *Right and Advantage in Private Law*, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283 (1989). It may be that the common law rests, like the civil law, upon an internally coherent moral system. I would argue however that, while the coherence of the legal system is, at civil law, a necessary consequence of its process, similar coherence at common law, if it exists, can only be incidental. For the structure of common-law institutions gives no reason to assume that the rules which they produce will be coherent. At any rate, an adequate treatment of this argument would take me beyond the purpose of the present Article, which is devoted to legal education at civil law.
B. The Profile of Law Curricula

The traditional profile of law curricula in civil-law jurisdictions is described immediately below; that of Quebec law faculties is explored thereafter.

1. Traditional Law Curricula at Civil Law

Historical accounts of legal education at civil law and at common law are commonly prefaced by a restatement of the well-documented fact that “[w]hile the common law of England and America was essentially shaped by judges, the civil law of the Continent of Europe was built by university professors.” 57 The difference in the educational objectives which have historically been pursued in civil-law and common-law jurisdictions follows directly from the difference between the two cultures’ views of the role of legal institutions.

The fact that the common law emerged from judicial practice suggests that its teaching would similarly be best effected through practice, and so professional apprenticeship was once the only form of legal education available in common-law jurisdictions. 58 Institutional schools of law were eventually established, but their purpose remained similar to that of the apprenticeship. The traditional school of common law was not designed to dispense a general form of higher education; rather, its main purpose was to train professionals, experts at “reading the law,” specialists in the technique of legal argumentation. 59 This narrow view of legal education still prevails today, at least in North American

57. M. Rheinstein, Law Faculties and Law Schools: A Comparison of Legal Education in the United States and Germany, 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1938); see also G. Casper, Two Models of Legal Education, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 13 (1973); Lawson, supra note 6, at 69-70; Merryman, supra note 6, at 56-57; J.M. Perillo, The Legal Profession in Italy, 18 J. Legal Educ. 274 (1966); Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 146.

58. Stevens, supra note 8. Until recently, it was still possible in a number of U.S. states to write the qualifying bar examinations without prior formal legal schooling. See M. Loey, Become a Legal Apprentice, 4 Student Law, 40 (January 1976).

59. See generally Stevens, supra note 8. Milsom explains that the “art of lawyering” at common law was at one time even more strictly technical. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 40-41 (1981). It seems that the task of assisting litigants was, in medieval England, discharged by “counters”—individuals known for their ability to speak quickly and clearly—for a slip of the tongue in the pronunciation of one’s statement of claim or defense was then deemed incontrovertible evidence that the speaker was lying. How it is that the litigating parties eventually came to be allowed to appoint “counters” to speak on their behalf is still unknown.
common-law jurisdictions, where general university education is considered a requirement for admission to law school and thus presumably not one of its features.

The educational mission of the typical continental law faculty was defined more broadly. It was in the halls of the first European universities that, throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, the civil-law tradition grew from the Roman law that it had been into the pan-European *Jus Commune* of romanist inspiration that it became. Its study was there considered a preeminent academic discipline and thus devoid of any immediate practical purpose. In the pure fashion of fifteenth-century Humanism, legal studies were indeed deemed a noble form of intellectual enlightenment, whose ultimate and only design was to form well-rounded intellectuals, disciples of arts and culture, masters of logic and rational

60. The case of England is peculiar in this respect. As in the continental tradition, law is in England a first university degree, and it is my understanding that, largely for this reason, it has also traditionally been more general than its North American counterpart, at least at Oxford and Cambridge. This may be the result of continental influence. Unlike in the continental tradition, however, it appears that English universities have played a very limited role, if that, in the elaboration of English law. See, e.g., E. Jenks, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (2d ed. 1913); Merryman, supra note 6, at 53; Milson, supra note 59; Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 256-57; Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 6, at 11. The significance and consequences of this apparent disjunction between England's legal system and English legal education are unclear, and beyond present purposes to explore.

61. It is now widely acknowledged that the civil-law tradition developed from what one historian has called the "two lives of Roman Law." B. Nicholas, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 1-54 (1962), the first life ending with Justinian's consolidation of Roman private law into the *Corpus Juris Civilis* in 534 A.D., and the second life beginning with the medieval rediscovery and revival of this work, after its loss and consequent fall into oblivion during the Barbarian invasions of the Dark Ages. H.J. Berman, THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN LAW, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 490, 492 (1975). It is indeed the *Corpus Juris Civilis* which several generations of academics proceeded to analyze, purify, revamp, and synthesize into what came to be known as the "common law of Europe," or *Jus Commune*, which in turn formed the basis of the great European civil codes enacted in the nineteenth century. H.J. Berman, THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN LEGAL SCIENCE, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894, 908-30 (1977); Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 263-68. For this reason, Walton wrote of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* that "[w]ith the exception of the Bible, there is no book which has so profoundly affected western civilisation." F.P. Walton, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW (1920). Most notorious among the generations of academics who participated in the collective formulation of the *Jus Commune* were the Glossators, the post-Glossators, the Scholastics, and the School of Secular Natural Law. On the history of the civil-law tradition generally, see J.C. Coing, THE ROMAN LAW AS JUS COMMUNE ON THE CONTINENT, 89 LAW Q. REV. 505 (1973); Kelly, supra note 45; Lawson, supra note 6, at 10-16; Merryman, supra note 6, at 6-33; Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 262-68. On the history of Roman law generally, see W. Kunkel, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 178-80 (1973); 1 F.H. Lawson, Selected Essays, Many Laws, in 5 EUROPEAN STUDIES IN LAW 85-175 (1977); F. Schulz, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (1946); Walton, supra.
discourse. Consequently, on the continent legal education has always been the exclusive province of universities, designed to cater to individuals with very diverse, if at all determined, professional ambitions and constituted a first, thus general and wide-ranging, university degree.

The curriculum of the typical continental law faculty was designed accordingly. While its details have varied across faculties and over time, it has found a steady core in a loose amalgam of law and nonlaw courses. The nonlegal component of this curriculum has consistently included courses in philosophy, history, theology, mathematics, and the classic languages, as these were deemed to provide the basic analytical skills, judgment, mental agility, and intellectual maturity, which students would require, in the short term, to carry out the legal component of the curriculum.

The profile of this latter component has become more variable over time. Before the turn of the nineteenth century, the only forms of

62. Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 16 ("[T]he continental law faculties [tend to be transformed] into mixed schools of social science and of law, and to obtain . . . for the law students, a general culture appropriate to their professional tasks, more than an immediate preparation for practice, preparation which cannot be fully acquired save in the office of a practitioner."); see also Damaska, supra note 7; Geck, supra note 7; Merryman, supra note 7, at 865-66; Rheinstein, supra note 57; Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 146.

63. See supra note 8.

64. See Merryman, supra note 7, at 865. Vedel notes that in France only 20-25% of law graduates enter law careers. Half of the remaining 75-80% work in the public sector; the other half end up in the private sector, in such diverse occupations as journalism, corporate management, and politics. G. Vedel, Le droit vit-il à l'heure de la société?, 13 R.J.T. 234, 237 (1978).

65. Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 16 ("[T]he curriculum of the French faculties of law is today composed of approximately equal parts of instruction in economics, legal history, and social science and of instruction which prepares more immediately for the practice of the legal profession."); see also REPORT OF THE LAVAL UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW, GROUPE SUR LES ORIENTATIONS DU DROIT À LAVAL 15 (1972); CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS, supra note 13, at 6; Coing, supra note 61.

66. Y. Caron, Gilt-Edged Legal Education: A Comparative Study, 14 McGill L.J. 371 (1968). Poupart's following remark in this respect is typical of the continental spirit:

Not so long ago, classic humanities, preferably Greek and Latin, could alone provide, it was thought, a formation true to its name. It is admitted today that sciences and modern humanities also contribute to form the mind. Jurists must accept that, if studying traditional positive law: private law, commercial law, administrative law, and constitutional law, remains the foundation of a legal formation, it must be complemented, in a dynamic society, with the study of disciplines which aim at grasping the legal phenomenon as it becomes concrete throughout time and space.

Poupart, supra note 13, at 278.
law sufficiently systematized and sophisticated to present an academic interest were those constitutive of the *Jus Commune* (Roman private law, canon law, and the *Jus Gentium*, precursor of modern “international law”67) and the selection of law courses which appeared in the curriculum of the typical continental faculty was restricted accordingly.68 Courses in constitutional, administrative, and procedural law were added to this list only later, when “public law” in its institutionalized form69 emerged along with the modern nation-state.70 From that time onwards, Roman private law and canon law were no longer the only law courses taught in continental universities, but they nonetheless retained a position of prominence in the curriculum, as they, more than the courses of public

67. The fathers of the School of Secular Natural Law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose philosophical teachings have been most influential upon the civil-law tradition, were indeed internationalists. E. Bodenheim, *Jurisprudence* 31-59 (1974); C.J. Zepos, *The Legacy of Civil Law*, 34 LA, L. REV. 895 (1974). In particular, Grotius’s (*De jure belii ac pacis libri tres* (1625)) and Pufendorf’s (*De jure naturae et gentium libri octo* (1625)) writings on the *Jus Gentium*—or “law of the peoples”—are among that school’s most important works.

68. J.C. Bonenfant, *L’enseignement du droit roman*, 14 R. DU B. 71, 84 (1954); Brierley, supra note 12, at 18; Coing, supra note 61; R.W. Lee, *The Place of Roman Law in Legal Education*, 1 CAN. BAR REV. 132 (1923); Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 265.

69. Before the emergence of institutionalized public law, matters of public law were ruled by an assortment of imperial or royal decrees and local customs. Merryman, supra note 6, at 12, 14; Weacker, supra note 41, at 83-85.

70. Merryman gives an insightful account of the ideological tensions that attended the advent of the French nation-state and subsequent enactment of the Napoleonic Code. Merryman, supra note 6, at 14-25. On the one hand, embracing the European *Jus Commune*—a body of law billed as universal and ahistorical, applicable to all human beings equally—as the law of France meshed well with the revolutionary drive to eliminate feudalism on French territories once and for all. At the same time, however, strong nationalistic sentiments pointed in the way of supplying France with a juridical identity that would mark it off from the rest of Europe. As it happened, both the anti-feudalist and nationalistic undercurrents of the revolutionary spirit found institutional materialization at the turn of the nineteenth century. The former, in the Napoleonic Code of private law of 1804, whose larger part was drawn directly from the European *Jus Commune*; the latter, in the emergence, following 1789, of a body of public law that was distinctively French. See Herman, supra note 46; A.D. de Groot, *European Legal Education in the 21st Century, in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education* 7, 15 (B. de Wite & C. Forder eds., 1992); L. Miraglia, *Comparative Legal Philosophy Applied to Legal Institutions* 421 (1921); Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 300. A similar debate took place within the codification movement. The nationalists among the codifiers objected to the civil code being modeled exclusively upon the *Jus Commune*, and insisted that its larger part be devoted to French customary law, a position which the universalists opposed strenuously. See A.J. Arnaud, *Les origines doctrinales du Code civil français* (1969); Gutteridge, supra note 6, at 77-79.
law, exemplified civilian legal reasoning and were thus considered the real strongholds of the civil-law tradition.\textsuperscript{71}

2. Law Curricula in Quebec
   a. Description

   By continental standards, the typical law curriculum in Quebec is inadequate in at least two ways. The first concerns the absence of a solid nonlegal component to that curriculum; the second relates to the poor civilian content of its legal component.

   The problem concerning the nonlegal component of Quebec's law curriculum is that there is very little of it, despite the fact that law studies are a first university degree. While some form of liberal arts education, including "a regular course in philosophy," was once a requirement for admission to a Quebec law faculty,\textsuperscript{72} this is no longer the case.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, very few of the students currently being admitted to Quebec law schools have had the benefit of prior higher education; most

\textsuperscript{71} See supra note 68. Indeed, the civil-law tradition is a tradition of private law. See Nicholas, supra note 61, at 2; Watson, supra note 6, at 2. Public law, as the law of public institutions, was viewed as contingent and eminently practical, as a body of law that would necessarily vary from nation to nation, along with the national institutions from which it would derive. It has traditionally been considered by civilians as less interesting intellectually. For the same reason, civilians have always maintained a very tight line between public and private law. See Watson, supra note 6, at 144-46.

\textsuperscript{72} Bar Act, S.Q., (1st Sess.) ch. 5 (1936) (Can.). The study of philosophy was at the time considered "the very basis of legal education." Ledain, supra note 7, at 36. Siméon Pagnuelo, then Secretary of the General Council of the Bar, wrote that this Council "believes in the necessity of teaching philosophy to those who intend to enter the Bar, as law is essentially a science." S. Pagnuelo, Universities and the Bar: A Criticism of the Annual Report of McGill, from a French-Canadian Standpoint 2-3 (1887), quoted in D. Howes, The Origin and Demise of Legal Education in Quebec (or Hercules Bound), 38 U.N.B.L.J. 127, 127-28, n.6 (1989); see also Brierley, supra note 12, at 9-10. At its inception in 1848, the Bachelor of Civil Law at McGill consisted of one year in Arts and two years studying law. Macdonald, supra note 15, at 218.

\textsuperscript{73} The 1936 provisions of the Bar Act to that effect were repealed in 1944, S.Q., ch. 41 (1944) (Can.), and no mention is made of such requirements in the Catalogues, supra note 12. The McGill Catalogue is particularly informative in this respect, given that McGill offers two distinct Bachelor's programs in civil law and in common law. While some form of general university education is required for admission to the common-law degree, but not for admission to the civil-law degree, for which a DEC (Diplôme d'études collégiales) is deemed sufficient. The DEC is obtained in satisfaction of one of the mainstream programs offered in Quebec's CEGEPs, supra note 12. For criticisms of this modification in the admission requirements to the study of law in Quebec, see Boucher, supra note 14; Brierley, supra note 12, at 10; Colas, supra note 19, at 6.
of them come to law straight out of CEGEP. Yet, the task of providing general university education to these students has not been assumed by the law faculties. Quebec’s law curriculum is far from wide-ranging; if anything, resembles that offered in North American jurisdictions of common law.

To begin with, general nonlaw courses simply are not to be found in the curriculum of Quebec law faculties. Almost all of the courses that appear on the curricula of these five faculties, be they mandatory or optional, are either courses in law (standard doctrinal law courses) or courses about law (interdisciplinary, usually more theoretical “perspective” or “law and”-type courses). General arts, humanities, and science courses have no place in Quebec’s law curriculum.

Among the courses that do appear in that curriculum, moreover, courses about law are very few in comparison to courses in law. Admittedly, courses about law are no more ubiquitous in the Quebec curriculum than they are in the more specialized curriculum of North American schools of common law. Furthermore, some serious attempts

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74. See supra note 12. This is not the case for McGill students. See supra note 73. But McGill is exceptional in this regard.


76. Catalogues, supra note 12. This situation is not new. In 1915 already, Professor Lee, then Dean and Gale Professor of Roman Law at McGill, had declared:

The course at present prescribed for the [Bachelor of Civil Law] degree, while excellently adapted to its professed object of providing for the needs of students who intend to practise at the Bar of the Province, makes no direct appeal to students who do not intend to practise at the Bar of the Province, and even as regards those who do so intend, leaves something to be desired in respect of the more abstract and theoretical branches of legal science, which are pre-eminently fitted to form part of a course of study in a University.

Minute Submitted to the April Meeting of the University Senate, published in McGill University, Annual Report for 1914-15, and quoted in Macdonald, supra note 15, at 249. Concerning the law curriculum at Laval University for the years 1945-1965, Normand reports that nonlaw courses were generally rare (only three are reported: religion, political economy, and accounting), and courses in philosophy, sociology, and political science were entirely absent. S. Normand, Tradition et modernité à la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval de 1945 à 1965, 33 C. de D. 141, 150 (1992). See also his account of the resistance met by one professor when attempting to implement his “dream of a juridical formation suffused with humanism.” Id. at 170-76.

77. A cursory look at the catalogues of Canadian schools of common law suggests, in fact, that these schools offer a greater number of more theoretical and interdisciplinary courses about law than do Quebec faculties of civil law. A similar comparison with common-law schools in the United States is difficult to conduct, given the high degree of diversity among these latter schools.
to promote a broader interdisciplinary and theoretical perspective on law have been made in recent years.\textsuperscript{78} On the whole, nonetheless, the curriculum of Quebec’s five law faculties has consistently, and particularly since the 1960s, been filled with doctrinal courses proper.\textsuperscript{79}

This heavy emphasis on legal doctrine over more theoretical and interdisciplinary courses has brought Quebec’s law curriculum in line with the traditional, specialized and professionally-oriented curriculum of North American schools of common law.\textsuperscript{80} To be sure, this departure from the continental tradition of legal education would have been unproblematic if Quebec law schools had also adopted the admission and curricular policies of their common-law counterparts. But in this last respect, Quebec law faculties have remained continental: the study of law is in Quebec a first university degree, and prior university education is therefore unnecessary.

In sum, Quebec law faculties have succeeded at drawing upon two models of legal education to produce a third that is inferior to both. While the continental law curriculum is wide-ranging partly because law studies are a first university degree, and, conversely, the North American curriculum of common law is more specialized partly because entering law students have already completed some years of general university education, the law curriculum in Quebec is both specialized \textit{and} the object of a first university degree. This policy has resulted in a majority of Quebec law graduates having had no opportunity to develop the basic analytical skills, judgment, mental agility, and intellectual maturity, which it is the purpose of general university education to afford and

\textsuperscript{78} Some faculties have recently shown interest in the sociology of law. \textit{See} H. Dumont, \textit{Une science à construire: La sociologie du droit}, 12 R.J.T. 51 (1982) (sociology); \textit{CATALOGUES, supra} note 12 (law and economics). In addition, most faculties begin their programs with a series of introductory lectures on somewhat theoretical topics in order to give students a general perspective of law and society. At McGill, this informal introduction was upgraded to a full first year course a few years ago. \textit{See} McGill University, \textit{Catalogue for Foundations of Canadian Law}.

\textsuperscript{79} The \textit{CATALOGUES, supra} note 12, show that most interdisciplinary or theory courses \textit{about} law are now optional. Although some such courses are mandatory in all five faculties ("Critical Education," "Economic Analysis of Law," "Philosophy of Law," "Legal History," "Law and Sociology," "Sources and Origins of the Law," "Introduction to the Study of Law," are a few examples), they are very few: on average, they represent 3-5\% of the total number of credit-hours required for graduation. It is therefore possible to graduate from a Quebec law faculty with a transcript showing 95-97\% standard doctrinal courses.

which the above description of civilian legal reasoning suggests is particularly important for the civilian.\textsuperscript{81} Instead of jurists, it is "legists" that Quebec faculties have been forming.\textsuperscript{82}

The second problematic feature in Quebec’s law curriculum is the poor civilian content of this curriculum’s legal component. Within this component, the relative importance of traditional civilian private law has been declining steadily.\textsuperscript{83} And while the eventuality of such decline had long been foreseen,\textsuperscript{84} its steepness, particularly in the last decade, surprised everyone.\textsuperscript{85} Once occupying almost half of the law curriculum in certain faculties,\textsuperscript{86} traditional private law courses currently represent on average no more than a third, and sometimes as little as a fifth, of mandatory courses in the Quebec curriculum. The remaining two-thirds, or four-fifths, consist of public law courses and courses of “extra-codal” law, that is, courses such as labor law, poverty law, consumer protection law,\textsuperscript{87} which are statutory in nature and hence not as distinctively civilian, even though they fall within the category of private law.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{81} See supra text accompanying notes 40-56.

\textsuperscript{82} P. Henry, \textit{Vers la fin de l’état de droit?}, \textit{6 Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et a L’Étranger} (Rev. Dr. Pub.) 1211, 1215 (1977) (“This specialization of education progressively generates, among other things, a dangerous incommunicability to the extent that each discipline witnesses the development of a particular and esoteric language. Such an evolution, eminently detrimental because of the divisions it introduces, produces legists, not jurists.”).

\textsuperscript{83} Brierley & Macdonald, supra note 3, at 64.

\textsuperscript{84} Cohen had foreseen it as far back as in 1950. Cohen, supra note 16, at 284.

\textsuperscript{85} Brierley, supra note 12, at 27.

\textsuperscript{86} See the cases of Laval University and University of Montreal, as reported in Normand, supra note 76, at 146-49, and in A. Lajoie & C. Parizeau, \textit{La Place du Juriste dans la Société Québécoise} 31-32 (1976) [hereinafter Lajoie Report]. This last study was commissioned by Quebec’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

\textsuperscript{87} See Catalogues, supra note 12.

\textsuperscript{88} Much debate has surrounded the question of whether the form of reasoning involved where a traditional civil code shares a given conceptual and jurisdictional space with statutory materials can properly be described as civilian. It is generally agreed that codal interpretation differs from statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Bergel, supra note 46, at 1076, 1088-89; Bergel, \textit{Spécificités des codes et autonomie de leur interprétation}, in \textit{Le Nouveau Code Civil: Interprétation et Application} 3 (proceedings from the Journées Maximilien-Caron) (1992); E. Bodenheimer, \textit{Is Codification an Outmoded Form of Legislation?}, 30 Supp. Am. J. Comp. L. 15 (1982); F. Geny, \textit{Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif} § 52 (1954); H.R. Hahl, \textit{Codifying the Common Law, Protracted Gestations}, 38 Mod. L. Rev. 23 (1975); C. de la Vega Benayas, Judicial Method of Interpretation of Codes, 42 La. L. Rev. 1643, 1647 (1982); 1 A. Weill & F. Terré, \textit{Droit Civil: Introduction Générale} § 142 (4th ed. 1979). More controversial is the question of whether the conceptual centrality of a civil code as paramount
Canon law and Roman law are among the traditional civilian private law courses that have entirely disappeared from Quebec’s law curriculum. This is puzzling, given the great historical and conceptual significance of canonist and romanist thought for the civil-law tradition. The disappearance of Roman law from Quebec’s law curriculum is particularly perplexing. Unlike the promulgation of the Code Napoléon in 1804, the Civil Code of Lower Canada in 1866 did not effect the repeal of the law in force in the jurisdiction prior to that date, with the result that Roman law can, at least technically, still be invoked in

interpretive referent is sufficient to retain the civilian character of legal reasoning in a setting where this code coexists with statutes. For the suggestion that it may not be, see J.M. Brisson, Le Code civil, droit commun?, in LE NOUVEAU CODE CIVIL: INTERPRETATION ET APPLICATION 293 (1993); S. Normand, Le Code et la protection du consommateur, 29 C. DE D. 1063, 1081 (1988); Rémy, supra note 41, at 153; and Valcke, supra note 10.

89. See supra notes 46, 61 & 67. Maximilien Bibeau, founder of Quebec’s first École de droit in 1851, in affiliation with Montreal’s Collège Ste-Marie, believed Roman law to be “the chef d’oeuvre of human prudence, the reason for this being that the Roman jurists were first and foremost philosophers.” Roman law, according to Bibeau, “was an enduring template of and for all law, hence the authority it achieved among all civilized nations of Europe and America, as could be told from the extent to which their laws approximated the Roman example.” Howes, supra note 72, at 133-34.

90. See CATALOGUES, supra note 12. Roman law was once a prominent part of Quebec’s legal curriculum. Lee notes that until the 1960s, three or four hours of Roman law were taught each week throughout the first year of law studies in all Quebec faculties. See Lee, supra note 68, at 139; see also Howes, supra note 72; Normand, supra note 76.

91. See Bonenfant, supra note 68; S. Garson (former Justice Minister of Canada), Speech to the Inter-American Bar Association in Dallas, Texas (April 16, 1956), published in 17 CAN. BAR REV. 4, 6 (1957); Howes, supra note 72, at 134; Lee, supra note 68.

92. While the nationalists’ insistence that the Code Napoleon be made of less Jus Commune and more local customary law was largely fruitless, supra note 70, they obtained the guarantee that the enactment of this Code would effect the official repeal of all law predating it. As such, the Code Napoleon served as an institutional reiteration of the French’s repudiation of their prior history, which they had already expressed in 1789. On the “code system’s break with the past,” see M. Amos, The Code Napoleon and the Modern World, 10 J. COMP. LEG. & INT’L L. 222, 224 (1928) (relating one of the early commentators, Bugnet, declaring: “I know nothing of civil law; I only teach the Code Napoleon.”); SCHLEISINGER, supra note 6, at 283.

93. An Act respecting the Codification of the Laws of Lower Canada relative to Civil Matters and Procedure, S.C., ch. 41 (1865) [hereinafter CCLC].

94. See J.E.C. Brierley, Quebec’s Civil Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed, 14 McGill L.J. 518 (1968); H.P. Glenn, Droit québécois et droit français: communauté, autonomie, concordance, in DROIT QUÉBÉCOIS ET DROIT FRANÇAIS: COMMUNAUTÉ, AUTONOMIE, CONCORDANCE 577, 585 (H.P. Glenn ed., 1993); R. Taschereau, Le siècle de la renaissance et son influence sur le droit civil du Québec, 1962 (No. 41) THÉMIS 7, 16. Article 2613 of the CCLC accordingly allows reference to the “old law” to clarify the interpretation of a code provision. See also 1 P.B. MIGNAULT, LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 52 (1895) (“[I]l n’y a pas, à proprement parler, de droit
Quebec courts as a suppletive source of legal materials for interpreting the code.\footnote{95} Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why none of Quebec’s five law faculties offers Roman law as part of its curriculum.

Brierley’s general conclusion that “private law has lost the pivotal place it once had in western legal systems generally and in the nature of the practice of law itself”\footnote{96} thus seems fitting with regards to Quebec’s law curriculum. Given such large-scale curricular transformation over the years, today’s Quebec law graduate cannot be expected to be an expert at traditional civilian legal reasoning.

b. Explanation

As expected, this phenomenon of increasing discrepancy between Quebec’s law curriculum and that typical of the continental tradition is more easily observed than it is explained. Those who have ventured to attempt explanations have converged on “the increased place given to a whole range of new . . . concerns.”\footnote{97} Indeed, the legislative proliferation which attended the rise of the welfare state in most, if not all, Western nations over this century has raised numerous questions concerning “the new importance of the role of the state and its agencies and, in jurisprudential terms . . . a concern for the values of a system of distributive rather than corrective justice.”\footnote{98}

Such fundamental political questions are bound to have significant implications for education in general, and legal education in particular. And it may well be—although I am not prepared to argue

\footnote{ancien et de droit nouveau en cette province.” [“Properly speaking, there is no old and new law in this province.”]}

\footnote{95. The privileged status of “old law” in Quebec is readily explained by the historical context in which the CCLC was enacted: unlike some of the French codifiers, supra note 51, the authors of the CCLC coveted no revolutionary ambitions. While it is clearly the case that “the Quebec codification . . . has represented for some an instrument of legal nationalism,” this nationalism was driven by an opposition to English, not European, rule. Brierley, supra note 94, at 528; see Glenn, supra note 94, at 586. Indeed, the CCLC was enacted partly in reaction to the Durham Report of 1839, in which it had been recommended to the British government that French Canadians be “assimilated” at all levels, including that of legal institutions. G.M. CRAIG, LORD DURHAM’S REPORT 69 (1963). In the circumstances, the way for Quebec to express its own form of nationalism was precisely by affirming, rather than obscuring, its ties to the European Jus Commune, over and beyond English rule.}

\footnote{96. Brierley, supra note 12, at 27.}

\footnote{97. Id. at 28.}

\footnote{98. Lajoie Report, supra note 86, at 585.}
here— that the preemption of traditional civilian courses by new courses of distributive justice in the law curriculum is just one such implication, as several Quebec scholars and governmental officials have argued. Another possible explanation which relates to Quebec legal education more immediately lies in the Bar Association factor. For it seems that the Quebec Bar Association has been highly, and at times deliberately, instrumental in causing the above-described curricular transformation.

It played this mediating role both directly and indirectly. As already explained, the Bar Association had been using its regulatory power directly until 1967, by imposing a given curriculum content on universities. In response to persistent protest from the Association des Professeurs de Droit du Québec, however, the Bar Association decided that year to relinquish this power. Its intervention would henceforth be limited to accrediting programs independently designed by the universities. Yet, while this new policy from the Bar Association was widely acclaimed at the time as marking “a new belief in the importance of university law studies,” its liberating power did not

99. I discuss the problems involved in attempting to accommodate concerns of distributive justice through a civilian legal system elsewhere, in Valcke, supra note 10.


101. See COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE SUR LA FORMATION DES JEUNES AVOCATS (1973) [hereinafter GUÉRIN REPORT]; LAJOIE REPORT, supra note 86; CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS, supra note 13. Interestingly, each of the first two reports “drew upon the experience of other jurisdictions, notably English and American, for its formulation of a philosophy of legal education,” while the CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS quotes directly from E. SCHEIN, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: SOME NEW DIRECTIONS 8 n.2 (1973), an American book, when suggesting that law studies in Quebec should be more professionally oriented. Brierley, supra note 12, at 37.

102. See supra note 24.

103. See supra note 30.

104. Bar Act, S.Q., ch. 77 (1967) (Can.).

105. Brierley, supra note 12, at 16. Brierley goes on to describe the intellectual atmosphere in Quebec university following the implementation of the Bar Association’s new policy as follows: “[A] new self-image . . . emerged in the world of Quebec legal education. This movement in ideas is demonstrated, in the case of a number of institutions, by their own feeling of having passed from the perceived inferior status of a law school (école de droit) to the superior one of a faculty of law (faculté de droit).” Id.
extend to the *indirect* control that the Bar Association had been exerting upon the content of university curricula.

Unlike traditional continental-law faculties, the majority of students in Quebec law faculties have had professional ambitions that are specifically legal. Just like their other North American peers, Quebec law students by and large have been historically more concerned to pass the requisite professional entrance examinations than to become well-rounded intellectuals. Not surprisingly, it is they who exerted the strongest pressure upon Quebec universities to set aside grand academic ambitions and focus their educational agenda upon preparing students for the writing of these examinations. Given the scarcity of university funding at the time—the presence of the “financial factor”—Quebec law faculties quickly yielded to this pressure in the hope that the new curricula would increase student enrollment and, more importantly, the corresponding amount of government subsidies.

One way for the universities to satisfy student demands was to mold their curricula upon that of the Bar Association’s own professional training program. University curricula soon became packed with courses of public and statutory private law, as these were the courses that formed the bulk of the Bar Association’s program until 1987. So much so that one author wrote of law faculties at the time that they had

106. See supra note 64.
108. In 1984, the following comment was made concerning all Canadian law schools: “There is little doubt that the curriculum orientation is related to the anticipated occupational demands for law school graduates, namely, the practice of law based on functional rather than theoretical knowledge.” Arthur’s *Report*, supra note 100, at 34.
110. See supra notes 10-16, and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
113. See Arthur’s *Report*, supra note 100, at 33.
114. Traditional civil-law subjects covered less than one quarter of the Bar Association’s course materials for the year 1989-90. *Quebec Bar Association, Course Materials* (1989-90). This is to be compared with a proportion of a little less than half in 1972. See Poupart, supra note 13, at 277.
become "little more than the 'ante-chambers' of the professional corporations." 115

Another way for the universities to cater to student preferences involved modifying the format of their law curriculum. As the Bar Association had abandoned its legislative power to monitor law studies in the province directly, 116 faculties were no longer officially required to force upon students the traditional, entirely mandatory curriculum. In the circumstances, making this curriculum partly optional seemed a sensible, even if markedly uncivilian, 117 strategy: it would enable law faculties to offer a wider variety of courses and empower students to choose their own courses, which was sure to please them highly. Elective courses hence began to appear in the curriculum of all universities, although to varying degrees. 118

As an added benefit, it was hoped that this newly-found flexibility and diversity in the format of curricula would partly offset the indirect control which the Bar Association had been exerting upon the content of university curricula via student pressures for Bar-like courses. This hope was to subside quickly, however, for it soon became clear that curricular diversity does not guarantee a broadening of students' academic horizons. From the moment that Quebec's law curriculum became part-optional and more diverse, 119 students began systematically to select among

115. Gagnon, supra note 109, at 262.
116. See supra note 104.
117. "[A] breaking up of the body of the law in membra disjecta among which the student choses [sic] a limited number of examination subjects" is one way to cope with the time constraint posed by the use of the Socratic method in common-law teaching. J. Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada 327 (1928). Furthermore, elective curricula allow students to concentrate their education within certain fields of the law, and obtain a form of specialized training which, as explained above is highly atypical of civilian legal education. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
118. For example, by the year 1989-90, the Bachelor's program had become 60% semi-elective at UQAM ("semi-elective" in the sense that the selection must respect certain proportions among pools of courses grouped by kind) and 50% fully elective at Laval University, while that at the University of Sherbrooke remained almost entirely mandatory (two courses in the second term of the third year curriculum were elective). Three years later, the proportions of fully- and semi-elective to mandatory courses at four of Quebec's five law faculties were as approximately follows: Laval University—50%; University of Montreal—50%; University of Sherbrooke—30%; McGill University—30% to 50% (UQAM did not disclose this information in its 1992-93 Catalogue). See Catalogues, supra note 12.
119. It seems that this tendency of students might actually have predated the said curricular transformation in Quebec law faculties. Howes reports that the demise, in 1867, of Quebec's first Ecole de droit was due in part to a decline in student population caused by its founders' "very lack
university offerings courses that matched those appearing on the curriculum of the Bar Association's own professional training program. In 1979, the Conseil des universités reviewed the situation of legal education in Quebec and concluded as follows:

[T]he situation of law faculties in Quebec is ... very clear: after graduation, 90% of law students go to the École du Barreau or the Notariat; a large majority of them tend, when selecting university courses, to privilege subject matters that are beneficial for the professional courses and examinations to come; which has the effect of largely eroding the goal of a general formation promoted by the faculties.

In sum, the official repeal of the Bar Association's legislative power directly to monitor university curricula achieved little in the way of relieving Quebec universities from the Association's indirect influence. Largely because of the financial strain that had befallen all universities in the province, this influence continued to cause law curricula to be primarily devoted to public and statutory private law courses, to the detriment of traditional civilian private law courses and hence also of civilian educational objectives.

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120. See Brierley, supra note 12, at 31; Poupard, supra note 13, at 620. But see the reports of student demands for an academic, as opposed to professional, university legal education at the University of Montreal and at Laval University. Gagnon, supra note 109, at 262 (University of Montreal); Normand, supra note 76, at 183-84 (Laval University). It must be noted that Gagnon was then speaking in his administrative capacity, as President of the Association of Law Students of the University of Montreal. It would be interesting to see Gagnon's own schedule of chosen courses as a student.

121. CONSEIL DES UNIVERSITÉS, supra note 13, at 9 (footnotes omitted).

122. The "psychological factor" may also have come into play here, although very indirectly. I argue in the next Part that this last factor has been most influential in causing Quebec legal scholarship to be both narrowly "legal" (in the sense of not interdisciplinary) in content, and only mildly critical in tone. Insofar as the profile of a faculty's curriculum is determined by the scholarly expertise of its teaching body, the psychological factor would, by influencing scholarship, also influence the profile of curricula. That such a close connection exists between faculty members'
It may be that this situation is on the way to redress with the revision of the Bar Association's professional training program, which took place in 1987. The decision to reorient the Bar Association's program towards practical skill training and away from legal knowledge testing could be read as the long-demanded recognition of a clear division of tasks between the professional corporation and the universities, namely, the recognition that legal education has two distinct components—one academic, the other professional—and that, while the latter component naturally falls to the Bar Association, "evaluating legal knowledge [is] really an academic matter best left to the universities."

Such clarification and deepening of the divide between academic and professional education could act as an incentive on universities to reinstate in their curricula a greater proportion of traditional civilian courses. For, with the disappearance of all forms of substantive law courses from the Bar Association's program, the students' reason for choosing certain courses over others at the university level also disappeared. As all university courses are now on the same footing with respect to preparing students for the Bar Association's professional examinations—none of them do—students will have to turn to a different standard for course selection. What this new standard will be is uncertain, but it clearly no longer will be the content of the Bar Association's program.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the 1987 revision will have the opposite effect. The universities will feel pressured to offer students the kind of "professional" law courses that appeared on the pre-1987 Bar Association curriculum precisely because the Bar Association no longer teaches these courses, and students believe that law firms want

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research and teaching may be doubted, however. Indeed, the general, as opposed to field-specific, hiring policy of law faculties suggests that many professors will end up teaching at least some courses in which they have no initial expertise. In addition, it is questionable whether professors who would fail to be critical in their writing due to this psychological factor would necessarily adopt the same attitude in person, that is, in the classroom. Finally, the lack of interdisciplinarity in Quebec's law curriculum could well be remedied by requiring students to take courses in other university departments, or by hiring professors from these other departments to teach in the law program, quite apart from law professors' own fields of expertise.

123. See supra note 26.
124. Morissette, supra note 26, at 7.
125. Id. at 12.
them to have had those courses somewhere. In a perverse way, therefore, the 1987 revision of the Bar Association's program would cause university curricula to become even more professionally-oriented than they were before 1987.

The first eight years of the Bar Association's new training program have failed to confirm either of these conjectures, because the profile of Quebec's law curriculum has remained largely unchanged through that period. Its content is generally no more and no less strictly legal and doctrinal than it was prior to 1987. This suggests one of three conclusions.

Perhaps the adjustment of the university curriculum one way or the other has yet to be made. Perhaps both of the above conjectures have in fact materialized to some extent, with the effect of having largely canceled out one another. Finally, perhaps what has been described above as the Bar Association factor is not a factor after all, and university curricula are entirely unaffected by the Bar Association's involvement, or lack thereof, with regards to legal education in the province. The above discussion clearly points away from the third, and towards one of the first two of these possible conclusions; which of these, only the future can tell.

C. The Nature of Legal Scholarship

Since those who teach are usually also those who write in any given system of higher education, the scholarship generated by that system can be expected closely to mirror the profile of its curriculum. Quebec's system of legal education is no exception in this regard.

Quebec's legal scholarship generally has followed a course similar to that taken by its law curriculum. I propose to show in this Part that the contribution of legal scholarship to the development and furtherance of the civil-law tradition in Quebec has been of little importance in comparison to that of continental legal scholarship. Like Quebec's law curriculum, Quebec's legal scholarship by and large has

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126. Students clearly believe this. Verge, supra note 107, at 897. What is less clear is whether they are right in this belief. Although the practice of law has indeed expanded to a wider array of fields of the law over the years, it appears from numerous conversations with those in charge of student hiring in law firms in Quebec and elsewhere that this belief of law students is widely exaggerated.

127. This is clear from a comparison of the universities' respective catalogues for the years 1989-90 and 1992-93. See CATALOGUES, supra note 12.
been seriously lacking in critical, theoretical and interdisciplinary insight. In recent years, moreover, it has moved further away from traditional fields of civil law and favored public and extra-codal law.

But, while the courses of Quebec’s law curricula and legal scholarship have paralleled one another, the reasons underlying these developments likely differed. For one, legal scholars are free from the influence which the upcoming writing of professional entrance examinations exerts on law students. Nor are they prey to the pressure which these students in turn exert upon university administrators. Indeed, one would think that the principle of academic freedom affords scholars sufficient protection from administrative and market pressures to allow them to orient their research as they like.\textsuperscript{128} Hence, if Quebec’s legal scholarship has in fact adopted the technical and narrowly professional profile described in what follows, it is more likely for reasons of individual and institutional psychology than for the kind of economic and political reasons that were argued in Part B to have underlain the similarly uncivilian course taken by Quebec’s law curricula.

However, before delving into the whats and whys of civil-law scholarship in Quebec, it is essential to grasp that discussion’s implications for the viability and flourishing of the civil-law tradition in Quebec. For I intimated above\textsuperscript{129} that, while a shortcoming in quality scholarship should naturally be cause for concern in any legal system, regardless of its cultural roots, such a shortcoming is particularly alarming in civil-law systems. This is so because the place of scholarship among formal and informal sources of law traditionally has been more prominent in civil-law systems than in common-law systems.

\begin{footnote}{128} Arguably, there may be an incentive for aspiring law professors to favor, among various possible graduate research topics, those topics which are deemed most marketable on the academic scene at any given time. Insofar as student preferences determine the profile of university curricula, they would also determine which kinds of expertise universities will be demanding from teaching applicants. Hence, academic freedom only partly offsets the impact of market pressure on the profile of research interests: its protection does not extend to pre-hiring research. This incentive is unlikely to be very compelling however, given the protracted period of the supplier’s investment (the number of years required for any kind of academic specialization), the high volatility of the demand (the rapidly changing needs of universities in terms of fields of expertise), and, most importantly, the fact that, in Quebec as elsewhere, expertise is not nearly as important a hiring factor as in other academic disciplines, where hiring is usually field-bound.\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{129} See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.\end{footnote}
1. The Importance of Scholarship at Civil Law

Historically, legal scholarship has played a crucial role at all stages of the development of the civil-law tradition. It largely is to legal academics that the civil law owes its formulation, interpretation, and transmission across ages, peoples, and territories.

The great Western civil codes all were compiled by small groups of academics drawing on the writings of their peers. Justinian’s declared ambition in compiling the *Corpus Juris Civilis* (534 a.d.), acknowledged to be the first civil code upon which all subsequent ones were modeled, was “to select and preserve the best of classical literature.” The “commission” appointed for that purpose was composed of seventeen jurists and headed by the most eminent among them at the time, Tribonian. Justinian claimed that nearly two thousand “books” were read and synthesized in the compilation process. Similarly, the codifiers of the French *Code Napoléon* of 1804 were neither judges nor legislators. They were four of France’s most prominent jurists charged by Napoleon with the task of reducing existing

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131. See Bergel, supra note 46, at 1075; Von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 6, at 7; Walton, supra note 61, at 1.
132. Nicholas, supra note 61, at 34. What came to be known as the “classical literature of Roman law” consists of the writings of the “Roman jurists,” of whom Nicholas wrote that they were men from the leading families who undertook the interpretation of the law as part of their contribution to public life. They were men of affairs, interested in practical rather than theoretical questions, and yet not immersed like the modern professional lawyers in the details of daily practice. To English eyes they have some of the characteristics of both the academic and the practising lawyer. For on the one hand they built up a great legal literature and also undertook what legal teaching there was, and on the other hand they influenced the practice of the law at every point.

*Id.* at 28-29.
133. *Id.* at 40.
134. *Id.* Excerpts from the writings of thirty-nine authors appear in the final version of the Digest, the principal of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*’ three parts. Among these, the contributions of Paul, Gaius, Ulpian, and Papinian were most important. *Id.* at 40-41. On the compilation of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, see generally J. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* 14 (1967); Kunkel, supra note 61; Shulz, supra note 61; Walton, supra note 61.
legal materials\textsuperscript{136} to a single code, one that would be accessible to all French citizens.\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, legal scholars and scholarship have been of such importance to the codification process that one author concluded that “codification is . . . , in large measure, \textit{la doctrine}’s daughter.”\textsuperscript{138}

\textit{La doctrine}’s contribution to the development of the civil-law tradition was not to end with the codes’ publication. As one famous French author exclaimed, a new code is an “inconvenient tool,”\textsuperscript{139} a tool whose convenience can only be revealed through intelligent and industrious interpreters. Indeed, the very nature of a civil code as a compilation of broad statements of principle entails that, following codification, much remains to be done by way of analysis, interpretation and explanation of codal provisions if these provisions are to find concrete application through adjudication.\textsuperscript{140}

The mission of bridging the gap between codal theory and judicial practice fell to the legal scholars. The justice officials of ancient Rome\textsuperscript{141} were usually not themselves jurists, and it is thus in accordance with the jurisconsults’ commentaries on the \textit{Corpus Juris Civilis}, the \textit{Jus Respondendi}, that they discharged their functions.\textsuperscript{142} Some historians concluded therefrom that the \textit{Jus Respondendi} in fact amounted to a primary source of law, on an equal footing with the \textit{Corpus Juris}

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\textsuperscript{136} See DAVID \& BRIERLEY, supra note 1, § 110.

\textsuperscript{137} It is said that Napoleon used to sit in during the codifiers’ sessions, with a view to pointing out to them the passages he, a nonjurist, could not understand and would insist that these passages be rephrased. In a similar spirit, the “common people” had been invited to comment on the first project of 719 articles presented by Cambacérès. And the reason it was finally decided to defer to a commission of philosophers was that the first project “smelled too much like the Palace man.” 2 THIBAudeau, MÉMOIRES 148 (1824).


\textsuperscript{139} E. GAUDET, \textit{L’INTERPRÉTATION DU CODE CIVIL EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1804}, at 10 (1935) (quoting Marcel Planio).

\textsuperscript{140} BRIERLEY \& MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 125 (“[Codification represents] an attempt . . . to give the law a systematic structure that, combined with its presentation in a relatively small compendium, invite[s] a commentary upon its texts that was grounded in the search for their immanent rationality.”); see also Gaudet, supra note 138, at 226.

\textsuperscript{141} Among these officials, the \textit{Praetor} was charged with devising and publishing policies concerning legal remedies, which would be granted in individual cases adjudicated by the official arbitrator, or \textit{Iudex}. See NICHOLAS, supra note 61, at 19-28.

\textsuperscript{142} R.W. LEE, \textit{THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW} § 29 (1956); NICHOLAS, supra note 61, at 28-32.
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Civillis.143 And on the continent, more than a millennium later, it was similarly to the writings of renowned legal scholars that judges, themselves high-level bureaucrats,144 were turning for guidance when interpreting codal provisions.145 It was accordingly affirmed that “[t]he great commentaries on the Civil Code are scarcely less authoritative than the Code itself.”146

In sum, “it is not too much to say that there are large and important fields of law which were created by continental jurists just as the English common law was the judges’ handiwork.”147 In other words, civilian scholars have traditionally discharged a function that by common-law standards is quasi-judicial. Inadequate scholarship would thus be to a civilian jurisdiction what inadequate caselaw would be to a common-law jurisdiction.

To be sure, a lack of scholarship is unlikely to bring about a lack of law, for other agents would probably take over the scholars’ duties. As described below, in Quebec, the void that resulted from the scholars’ idleness was filled by the judges. Still, there is cause to fear that the law’s civilian character will be lost as a result of such reallocation of duties among law-making agents. For much of what distinguishes civil-law from common-law systems lies in the different ways in which legal duties are allocated among institutional agents in these systems.148

143. MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 8; WATSON, supra note 6, at 171. Nicholas indeed refers to the Jus Respondendi as “juristic law.” See NICHOLAS, supra note 61, at 39.

144. Unlike in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, where judicial appointments are conferred upon professional jurists on the basis of experience, prestige, and competence, in civil-law jurisdictions judicial appointments are obtained automatically upon graduation from a recognized École de la magistrature and are therefore in no way honorific. Gaudet, supra note 138, at 245. Indeed, if civil-law judges in fact do no more than mechanically apply rules to facts, then no particular wisdom or expertise with respect to policy matters is necessary in order to discharge judicial duties competently.


147. VAN CAENEGERM, supra note 51, at 53-65. Similarly, Rheinstein wrote that “[w]hile the common law of England and America was essentially shaped by judges, the civil law of the Continent of Europe was built by university professors.” Rheinstein, supra note 57, at 6.

148. While the strong formalism of common-law systems is clear from these systems’ endorsement of the doctrine of precedent and consequent high regard for judges, the privileged
Therefore the civilian character of Quebec law would be jeopardized if Quebec scholars proved unable to discharge the task traditionally assigned to scholars in civil-law jurisdictions. The condition of Quebec legal scholarship is best assessed by identifying the difference between the kinds and content of traditional scholarship at civil law and at common law and then looking to Quebec scholarship to determine the extent to which, if at all, this difference has there been preserved. The remainder of this Part is structured accordingly.

2. Traditional Scholarship at Civil Law

For purpose of better underscorng the difference in the kinds and content of legal scholarship between the civil law and the common law, it seems appropriate to examine each legal culture's scholarship in relation to some common scale. I propose a strictly acultural perspective, where legal scholarship is divided into categories arranged on a spectrum in order of abstraction. At one end of the spectrum stands scholarship that is "strictly legal"; at the other end, scholarship that is "meta-legal."

"Strictly legal" scholarship is the kind of scholarship whose only object is the study of a given legal system's inner mechanics. As such, strictly legal scholarship aims to outline the internal relations, logical
ramifications, and practical implications of a discrete body of positive rules. It is alternatively labeled “doctrinal,” “analytical,” “positive,” “descriptive,” or scholarship “in law.” “Meta-legal” scholarship refers in contrast to the kind of scholarship that focuses upon a body of law’s relation to other bodies of law and/or disciplines. Accordingly, “meta-legal” scholarship may also be designated as “jurisprudential,” “theoretical,” “critical,” “normative,” or scholarship “about law.”

As this representation is a heuristic device designed to highlight certain key features of traditional civilian and common law, and contemporary Quebec scholarship, it is inevitably defective from a strict descriptive perspective. For one, the categories represented are greatly oversimplified. Indeed, while descriptive and normative forms of analysis can be distinguished conceptually, they often blend into one another in practice, with the result that little scholarship, from whichever legal system, is strictly legal or strictly meta-legal.

In an attempt to alleviate this problem, I have thus positioned these categories on a spectrum ranging from the most strictly legal to the most meta-legal. I believe this analytical framework is superior to one where the scholarship categories are taken alone, since different pieces of writing combine descriptive and normative forms of analysis in different proportions and hence necessitate some kind of middle-ground positioning. Moreover, this representation on a spectrum offers the advantage of being jurisdictionally neutral, as common-law and civil-law systems alike have generated both kinds of scholarship, albeit in different forms.

If typical common-law scholarship is to be ordered by degree of abstraction, it seems best divided into three categories. The first, “most strictly legal,” category contains work such as “codes,” “restatements,”149 traditional doctrinal treatises, and law reviews, which have for their primary object to “reduce a number of lengthy appellate court judgments to relatively canonical formulae.”150

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149. Editors’ notes or commentaries, which are often appended to the main text of these codes and restatements, are here excluded as these reach beyond the purely descriptive into the domain of personal critique and opinion and thus belong closer to the normative end of the spectrum, perhaps even in the second category described next.

150. Macdonald, supra note 52, at 578. Macdonald does not endorse the above general classification, however, for he seems to be of the view that this doctrinal category captures all of common-law scholarship.
The second category harbors work which, while doctrinal in that its focus does not reach beyond positive law, is also somewhat critical, in that it challenges positive law on its own terms. As any form of criticism entails a certain distance from the object being criticized, the scholarship of this second category is necessarily more abstract than that contained in the first and is hence closer to the “meta-legal” end of the spectrum. The contemporary law review article, which might criticize the judicial interpretation of some precedents or question the constitutionality of some statute, epitomizes the work contained in this second category. For it is by reference to the system’s own rules (the rule of precedent, the rule that unconstitutional statutes are invalid) that this system’s products (cases, statutes) are being assessed.

The third and “most meta-legal” category gathers all work that represents an a priori refusal to play by the rules. The relatively recent trend of interdisciplinary work that proposes to evaluate legal rules by standards borrowed from philosophy, sociology, economics, among other typically nonlaw disciplines, is the most obvious example of legal scholarship found in this last category. Comparative law that is not purely descriptive may be another.


155. Comparative law could hardly be purely descriptive, for the very fact of inquiring into other legal systems suggests at least minimal normative purposes, be they to find some basis upon which to improve our own system, or else to consolidate our faith in our system in view of the cultural difference observed elsewhere. Yet, much, if not most, of comparative law scholarship betrays some attempt on the author’s part to stay away from normative commentary. Such an attempt is implicit in scholarship that takes a “topical” approach to comparative law. See, e.g.,
Turning then to civil-law scholarship with a view to conducting a similar exercise in classification, one is immediately reminded of the difference that divides the civil law and the common law concerning the issue of institutional allocation of legal duties. Largely due to the fact that the active role that judges have played in the formation of legal rules at common law has, in civilian jurisdictions, been traditionally discharged instead by legal scholars, the categories used above in classifying common-law scholarship are inadequate for classifying civil-law scholarship.

A first difficulty arises which concerns the proper definition of "legal scholarship." If we define legal scholarship in accordance with its usual common-law understanding, as any form of legal writing produced by legal scholars that is not itself a primary source of law, then the first and the third of the above three categories, the "most strictly legal" and "most meta-legal" categories, are almost empty.

Except for three caveats noted below, the first category of scholarship is almost empty because the kind of writing classified above as "most strictly legal" is, at civil law, a primary, not secondary, source of law. Indeed, descriptive accounts of legal rules that, at common law, are provided in "restatements" or "codes" devoid of formal legal authority are, at civil law, found mostly in the ultimate primary source of law, the civil code.

A first caveat to this observation is that the civil code has itself historically been the work of scholars, and it would accordingly be misleading to suggest that no piece of scholarly writing is "strictly legal" at civil law. Yet, as the civil code is a primary source of law, it does not qualify as "scholarship" under the above definition, no more, at any rate, than do pieces of legislation drafted with scholars' assistance in common-law jurisdictions. Moreover, even if the code did qualify as scholarship and were consequently included in the first category, this category would still remain largely empty, for, while the code would unquestionably be highly significant scholarship, the process of its drafting has typically involved no more than a handful of civilian scholars.

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Glendon et al., supra note 6; Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 6. See also E. McWhinney's description of a Canadian program of comparative law studies in *Comparative Law and Jurisprudence at the University of Toronto*, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 99 (1956).

156. This difference was explored supra text accompanying notes 43-56 & 130-148.

157. See supra text accompanying notes 130-138. On the codification process in Quebec specifically, see Brierley, supra note 12, at 14.
Secondly, as judicial decisions of civilian courts are, at least ideally, “strictly descriptive” accounts of the law and are not themselves a primary source of law, they too would fall in the first scholarship category, if they qualified as “scholarship” at all. However, civilian judges have not traditionally been “legal scholars,” and their writings can hardly be described as scholarship for that reason.

Thirdly, some descriptive accounts of the civil law are admittedly found in the classic collections of textbooks authored by eminent civilian academics, the traités. One might accordingly want to place these traités within the most doctrinal category of legal writings, at least insofar as these traités are denied the kind of formal authority historically accorded the Jus Respondendi of Roman law, which authority would promote them to primary sources of law on a par with the civil code and would thereby take them outside our definition of legal scholarship altogether. Still, the traités are hardly “strictly” descriptive: as they embody their author’s personal attempt at reconstructing, from the starting-point of the code’s principles, what legal rules there should be, they are necessarily heavily laden with normative content. Hence, the trait of civil law differs significantly from the doctrinal treatise of common law in that the former goes beyond merely reconstituting rules

158. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
159. See supra note 53.
160. See supra note 144.
161. See, e.g., J. Carbonnier, Droit civil (16th ed. 1992); R. Demogue, Traité des obligations en général (1923) (unfinished); J. Flour & J.L. Aubert, Les obligations (5th ed. 1991); E. Gaudelet, Théorie générale des obligations (2d ed. 1965); Ghestin & Goubbeaux, supra note 146; J.L. Jossier, Cours de droit civil positif français (3d ed. 1939); Lalou, Traité pratique de la responsabilité civile; F. Laurent, Principes de droit civil français (3d ed. 1878); H. Mazeaud & A. Tunc, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle; Henri Mazeaud et al., Obligations—Théorie générale (8th ed. 1991); M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Traité pratique de droit civil français (2d ed. 1954); Rodière, La responsabilité civile; Savatier, Traité de la responsabilité civile; A. Séraux, Droit des obligations (1992); B. Starck et al., Obligations (4th ed. 1993); F. Terré & P. Simler, Droit civil—Les biens (4th ed. 1992). See also the traités mentioned at supra note 53.
162. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
163. A brief survey of the traités listed should make this clear. See supra note 161. Most of these were put together from the author’s teaching notes. See, e.g., Flour & Aubert, supra note 161, at i; G. Marty & P. Raynaud, Droit civil at preface (1st ed. 1961). In some of these, the authors are explicit about their intention to “go beyond the positive law,” Ghestin & Goubbeaux, supra note 146, at vii, or to “enlarge [students’] horizon beyond the pure juridical technique,” Marty & Raynaud, supra. That these traités would present a high normative content is to be expected in a system where the law’s authoritativeness is derived from its rational character, as explained, supra note 148.
of law from judicial decisions. If anything, it can best be compared to the contemporary law review article and thus would best be classified in the second, "internally critical," category of legal scholarship.

The third, "most meta-legal" category of scholarship is also almost empty at civil law—or at least has been, up to recently—if scholarship is defined, as above, so as to exclude writings about law produced from outside the legal academy.\textsuperscript{164} For, while continental law professors have authored much literature that is critical of the law, the critical vantage point taken in these writings has typically been internal to the law; only rarely would legal rules be evaluated against nonlegal standards.\textsuperscript{165} Certainly, common-law professors have been much more productive in this regard.\textsuperscript{166}

This may appear surprising given the historical prominence of interdisciplinary subjects in the continental curriculum.\textsuperscript{167} Yet it would be mistaken to assume that simply because law and nonlaw subjects have cohabitated in the same curriculum for so long, they have become intertwined. Unquestionably, continental law professors considered the study of nonlaw disciplines an indispensable educational complement to the study of law. But they also thought it imperative, as a precondition, that disciplinary boundaries be clearly delineated and respected. Class materials for law courses were selected among the writings of jurists; philosophy materials, among the writings of philosophers. That these boundaries might one day become blurred was then thought inconceivable, and any attempt at doing so would have been deeply resented.\textsuperscript{168}

This resistance to interdisciplinarity on the part of civilian jurists might be explained by reference to the continental vision of private law as a conceptually unified system, one that is internally coherent and comprehensive by reason of it being derived from one and the same set of

\textsuperscript{164} There may be much literature about law produced by academics outside law faculties that, given the outsider's perspective from which it is written, would fall into this third category. The review of such writings would take me beyond the purposes of the present Article, however.


\textsuperscript{166} See supra notes 151-153. This is clear from the fact that all "law and-" movements were born in schools of common law.

\textsuperscript{167} See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., Geny, supra note 88.
premises through logical reasoning. Given that conceptual unity captures the essence of civil law, civilians have traditionally been unwavering in their determination to preserve this unity in the private law of their respective jurisdictions. Moreover, I would venture to suggest that the risks which cross-pollination between law and nonlaw sciences pose for the former’s unity are greater where the two share a common methodology, as is the case for the civil law. For such commonality entails that the line between the two exchanging parties might be difficult to maintain and that one might as a result come to infiltrate the other. Thus, if reasoning at civil law is indeed indistinguishable from scientific reasoning in general, the prospects of implementing exchanges between law and nonlaw sciences without impinging upon the integrity of either seem limited. This may explain why civilians have viewed attempts at so doing with much suspicion.

Some evidence suggests that continental attitudes have been changing in this regard. More and more continental legal scholars seem indeed to be turning to nonlegal disciplines in search of novel critical insights into the law. And while this is a relatively new phenomenon, it seems appropriate to conclude that, insofar as only law professors’ writings are concerned, the third, “most meta-legal” category of legal scholarship is no longer the empty one that it has long been at civil law. It is now sparsely populated and gaining.

169. On the conceptual unity of the civil law, see supra note 10.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
171. This is perhaps what Howes has in mind when he expresses his own fear that “[‘law and-’ type courses] reduce law to other things (politics, economics, gender, etc.). By thus distributing law in every which way, they decrease rather than increase law’s intelligibility, as well as drain it of its own internal, nontechnical (albeit vestigial) powers of self-critique.” Howes, supra note 72, at 148. His proposed solution, though, differs greatly from that of traditional civil-law faculties described above. Indeed, while he suggests that “[r]ather than sacrificing law for the sake of expanding these other disciplines, what we ought to be studying is how these other domains or disciplines can be contained in and by law,” id., the solution traditionally favored among civil-law faculties was to teach, say, both “law” and “philosophy,” but not “law and philosophy.”
172. See, e.g., C. ATIAS, ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE JURIDIQUE (1985); ATIAS, THÉORIE CONTRE ARBITRAIRE (1987); J. CARBONNIER, SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE (1978); DAVID, supra note 54; P. Durand, La connaissance du phénomène juridique et les tâches de la doctrine moderne du droit privé, 1956 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique 73 (Fr.); Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 146, §§ 101-11, at 75-83, 189; C. PERELMAN, DROIT, MORALE ET PHILOSOPHIE (1968); C. PERELMAN, LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE: NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE (2d ed. 1978); R. SAVATIER, LES MÉTAMORPHOSES ÉCONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ D’AUJOURD’HUI (1964); M. Villey, LEÇONS D’HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1962).
The first and third categories of legal scholarship being thus largely empty, it is in the second that the bulk of civilian writings lies. Most of these writings were composed throughout the nineteenth century by a contingent of legal scholars known on the continent as the École de l'exégèse, whose overall scholarly production has since remained unrivaled in quantity and, some would say, in quality.173

The contribution of the exégètes to the civil-law tradition has been monumental. It is they who, through decades of collective textual analysis, interpretation, extrapolation, reconstruction, and synthesis, discharged the onerous task of erecting an entire conceptual edifice of rules on the foundation of principles exposed in the civil code,174 much like the Roman jurisconsults had done with the Corpus Juris Civilis.175 At their hand, one scholar exclaimed, "from the Civil Code, a century of efforts and controversy has gradually caused the Civil Law to arise."176 And it is this civil law that generations of civilian judges have consulted and applied in legal practice.177 In sum, the ultimate accomplishment of the exégètes has been to fill the gap between codal theory and judicial practice and thereby also fill the second category of legal scholarship at civil law.

This second, middle-category of legal scholarship is therefore undoubtedly more voluminous at civil law than at common law. This is to be expected, given the pivotal role played by the code at civil law. Indeed, the reason that civilian scholarship has tended to cluster towards the middle of the spectrum, rather than follow common-law scholarship in spreading somewhat evenly along it, lies principally in the fact that the territories of scholarly discourse are inevitably constrained by the code.


174. See supra text accompanying notes 135-146. The exégètes have often been described as adherents of narrow and unduly formalistic literalism. See BONNECASE, supra note 173, § 8, at 25; GAUDEMET, supra note 139, at 10. However, as has been noted, this description is misleading, for the large majority of them refused to restrict their analysis to the letter of the law and favored a broader interpretive approach that accounts for the words' context. Gaudet, supra note 138, at 233-341; Husson, Analyse critique de la méthode de l'exégèse, 17 ARCH. PHIL. DRT. 115 (1972); H. MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL—INTRODUCTION À L'ÉTUDE DU DROIT § 103, at 140 (8th ed. 1986).

175. See supra note 143.


177. See Gaudet, supra note 138, at 152; LOUSSOUAM, supra note 145, at 250-54; DE VRIJNS, supra note 145, at 300-03; WATSON, supra note 6, at 171.
As explained above, in its capacity as a primary source of law, the code provides most of the purely descriptive legal materials necessary to trigger the civilian legal system into operation and thereby forecloses this system’s scholarship from reaching the “strictly legal” end of the spectrum. At the same time, the code’s presence naturally serves to focus the scholarly agenda within the range of topics covered by its provisions and thus distracts scholars’ attentions away from the “meta-legal” end of the spectrum. Given the code’s constraining effect in this regard, it is not surprising that the bulk of civilian scholarship lies somewhere between these two extremes.

But it is not merely in volume that the second category of civilian scholarship differs from that of common-law scholarship. Another difference concerns their respective positions on the spectrum. At civil law, the second category of scholarship lies closer to the “meta-legal” end of the spectrum. For the second-category scholarship of civil law is more abstract than the second-category scholarship of common law. As Merryman explained:

In the civil law tradition, legal scholarship is pure and abstract, relatively unconcerned with the solution of concrete social problems or with the operation of legal institutions. The principal object of such scholarship is to build a theory or science of law. In its most extreme form such scholarship displays a detachment from society, people, and their problems that astonishes a common lawyer. On the common law side, we tend to think of the work of legal scholarship as another aspect of social engineering; it is our business as scholars to monitor the operating legal order, to criticize it, and to make recommendations for its improvement. Improvement, to us, means coping more adequately with concrete social problems. Our outlook is professional.

178. S. Normand, Une analyse quantitative de la doctrine et droit civil québécois, 23 C. DE D. 1009, 1013 (1982) ("La présentation de l’oeuvre est fortement imprégnée par l’attachement aux textes. Ainsi, les traités reproduisent-ils généralement chacun des articles du Code et les font suivre d’un commentaire didactique." ["The presentation of the work is strongly impregnated by attachment to the texts. Hence do the traités generally reproduce each of the Code’s articles and provide thereafter a didactic commentary."]); see also id. at 1015.

179. Merryman, supra note 7, at 867. Merryman’s portrayal of common-law scholarship and social engineering is doubly apposite in the present context, for it also explains why the second
As scholarship that is more abstract will necessarily generate critiques that are more expansive, the continental doctrine is, on the whole and at a theoretical level, more critical than standard doctrinal analysis at common law.\textsuperscript{180} One scholar described as follows the functions discharged by la doctrine at civil law:

It has a puzzle-solving or explicative function. It also provides a critical perspective on legal postulates in order to discern their fundamental premises. Further, la doctrine examines the evolution of both legal norms and their social functions, suggesting new formulations and unprecedented applications of existing rules. Again, it elaborates the logical and ideological structure of a given area of the law. Finally, it integrates various sources of legal justification into their political and social context.\textsuperscript{181}

From this passage, it seems clear that civilian scholars’ critiques, however abstract and profound they may be, remain internal to the law. The object of this critique is to disclose, not to challenge, the law’s “fundamental premises” and “ideological structure.” Consequently, the second category of civil-law scholarship reaches further towards the abstract end of the spectrum than that of common-law scholarship, but it does not reach so far as to merge into the third, “most meta-legal” category.

In sum, our spectral representation of the form and content of legal scholarship reveals that there are two main differences between civil-law and common-law scholarship. At civil law, unlike at common law, the first (“most strictly legal”) and third (“most meta-legal”) categories of scholarship are almost empty, and the second (“internally critical”) is more voluminous and critical.

\textsuperscript{180} V. Dalloz, Répertoire de droit civil (2d ed.); Weill & Terré, supra note 88, at 245-46.

\textsuperscript{181} Macdonald, supra note 52, at 589.
3. Legal Scholarship in Quebec
   
a. Description

It is immediately clear to anyone moving from the two traditional models of common-law and civil-law scholarship to the specific situation of Quebec as a mixed jurisdiction that “mixed” it is indeed. Like Quebec’s law curricula, Quebec’s legal scholarship partakes of both legal traditions. Moreover, the common-law component ends up overshadowing the civil-law one.

Quebec legal scholarship clearly is not lacking in volume. For, while “the volume of scholarly production in Quebec has not been as great as in many other Civil law jurisdictions,” it has been substantial. In fact, the average scholarly production of Quebec law faculties has, consistently with their active involvement in graduate education, far exceeded that of common-law schools in the other Canadian provinces.

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182. BRIERLEY & MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 127.

183. Id.

184. Quebec faculties have the largest graduate student population in Canada according to the Committee of Canadian Law Deans’ 1984-85 statistics. See supra note 16; ARTHURS REPORT, supra note 100, at 36 (“At present 13 Canadian law faculties have graduate programs. Among the 260 full-time master’s or doctoral students, 170 are enrolled at three civil law faculties (Montreal, McGill and Laval), leaving only about 80 distributed among nine common law faculties.”). This standard alone is not necessarily representative of Quebec’s relative student involvement in graduate work, however. An officer of the fellowship division of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada [hereinafter SSHRC] confirmed that, although an accurate head count is difficult, most common-law graduates who decide to pursue their studies beyond the LL.B. (the Bachelor’s degree of Legal Letters) go to graduate schools outside Canada (usually in England or in the United States) and that the proportion of civilians doing the same is comparatively lower. This could be partly due to the fact that, consistently with the professional orientation of legal education in common-law systems, Canadian common-law schools have historically expressed little interest in hosting programs of graduate studies. The same is true of the majority of English and U.S. schools; only a few of these schools have more to offer in this respect, at least in comparison with other disciplines. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, FALL 1989: LAW SCHOOL AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 65 (1989). Yet, the few existing programs are apparently both attractive and numerous enough to include Canadian graduate students. Given that, according to SSHRC statistics, more than 80% of these students return to Canada upon completing their foreign degrees, it could well be that, on the whole, the larger part of Canadian-produced graduate work comes from common lawyers, in spite of Quebec’s initial comparative advantage in terms of overall graduate involvement by law faculties.

185. See ARTHURS REPORT, supra note 100, at 89; Normand, supra note 178.
But, as should be clear from the discussion at the beginning of this Part, it is *la doctrine*'s power of influence upon the shape of legal rules and the outcome of judicial cases, rather than its quantitative importance, that has traditionally distinguished it from scholarship at common law. It thus is the content of Quebec scholarship, more than its volume, that matters if Quebec cares to preserve its civilian heritage.

The content of Quebec scholarship is worrisome. To begin with, much of it is not civilian at all: private law simply is no longer the prime area of research and publication that it once was for Quebec scholars.\(^{186}\) Currently, the larger part of Quebec scholarship takes place in fields of public law, particularly constitutional and administrative law,\(^ {187}\) and is thus common-law scholarship. As this scholarly focus merely mirrors the general trend of the increased importance of public law over private law in recent years,\(^ {188}\) which general trend I discuss elsewhere,\(^ {189}\) the present discussion will be confined to that (albeit relatively smaller) part of Quebec scholarship which does concern private law.

\(^{186}\) Normand reports that a larger proportion of Quebec scholarship was in traditional fields of civil law during the years 1765 to 1839. S. Normand, *L'histoire de l'imprimé juridique: un champ de recherche inexploré*, 38 McGill L.J. 130, 141 (1993). It could be argued that this standard for comparison is misleading since, unlike today, public law was then in a state of infancy. Yet, the immaturity of public law at the time may be viewed as a factor that, if anything, further underscores the relative importance of private law over that period. Given that legal scholars are largely responsible for shaping the law in civilian jurisdictions, indeed, the fact that public law was awaiting development in Quebec from 1765 to 1839 could have given Quebec scholars all the more reason to focus upon this last task, and thus neglect private law.


\(^{188}\) See supra text accompanying notes 96-105. Brierley offers another possible explanation for the relative scarcity of private law scholarship in Quebec. He points to the fact that many private law scholars have been "heavily engaged, through the Civil Code Revision Office, in re-thinking the basic institutions of private law, a process that continued for over a decade," and one during which they had little time left for publication. Brierley, *supra* note 12, at 14. Yet, it could be retorted that only a small proportion of Quebec's jurists were actively involved in the recodification process, and those who were must have derived tangible research benefits from the experience, at least in the later years of the process.

\(^{189}\) See Valcke, *supra* note 10.
Like their continental colleagues, Quebec scholars have left the third category of legal scholarship virtually empty: very little of Quebec scholarship is "meta-legal" in nature. Contemporary Quebec scholars have published little in the field of comparative civil/common law.

190. Legrand reports that legal history, for example, is considered the exclusive province of historians. P. Legrand, Jr., Regards sur cent quinze ans de Code civil: éléments d'une réflexion sur un nécessaire reviviscence du droit civil au Québec; 28 McGill L.J. 142, 143 (1982). See also Macdonald, supra note 52, at 607:

While sociologists, political scientists, economists and social theorists in Quebec, in greater proportion than their analogues in common law Canada, seem to be interested in legal phenomena, they apply their own research tools to the law. Legal scholars thus have an imposing threshold to traverse: the creation of an indigenous empirical methodology.

See also Howes, supra note 72, at 127:

It is remarkable how little we know about the 'basic structures' and 'mental map' of the society that produced so many texts the construction of which constitutes our daily truck and trade . . . We are familiar with the words of these acts [such as the 1866 CCLC] (and we may even know them by heart), but as for what they referred to—the reality they framed—to discover anything about that we must enter into conversations with 'aliens' from other disciplines (historians, political scientists, etc.). This is especially true of the Civil Code.

Appropriately, Quebec legal scholars once were more open to interdisciplinarity. See Macdonald, supra note 52, at 598. The founder of Quebec's first school of law, Maximilien Bibaud, has been described as "a man who moves comfortably in diversity," given the wide, interdisciplinary range of the topics, from anthropology to biography, on which he wrote. Howes, supra note 72, at 136, n.40. This is confirmed by the following account, Bibaud's own, of one of the weekly public debates which he organized for his students:

The first production was that of a report by Mr. Globensky, of the celebrated case of Simpson et al. versus the Bank of Montreal . . . Then followed the debate on the important question of usury: viz: "whether the rate of interest of the use of money lent should be restricted by law." Mr. de Bellefeuille opened in the affirmative and in an able discourse replete with logic and learning, undertook to prove that it would be beneficial to Society in general to restrict the rate of interest to a certain fixed sum: Mr. Colovin, on the negative, maintained with his usual force and eloquence that money being but a representative medium, and as such, an article of commerce, should not be restricted in the value of the use of it any more than any other commodity.

M. BIBAUD, NOTICE HISTORIQUE SUR L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU DROIT EN CANADA xxxix (1862), quoted in Howes, supra note 72, at 135.

191. Brierley, supra note 12, at 29. Macdonald concludes that "it seems that the common law and the civil law, like Law and Equity, are destined to flow side by side in the same river bed." Macdonald, supra note 52, at 606. One notable exception in this regard is the scholarly production of the Center for Research in Private and Comparative Law and of the Institute of Comparative Law established at McGill University in 1975. See, e.g., DROIT QUÉBÉCOIS ET DROIT FRANÇAIS: COMMUNAUTÉ, AUTONOMIE, CONCORDANCE (H.P. Glenn ed., 1993). Supporters of Canadian biculturalism will find it disconcerting that, however little comparative scholarship is being
and, up to recently, one would have been hard pressed to find any work at all in purely academic subjects such as legal theory, legal philosophy, and legal history. Quebec law professors on the whole have been markedly less inclined towards interdisciplinary matters than their common-law colleagues from the other Canadian provinces.

As with continental scholarship, therefore, that from Quebec has been in law, rather than about law. But here ends the similarity with continental scholarship, for a large part of Quebec scholarship in law has been of the first ("most strictly legal"), not second ("internally critical"), category. And that which does fall within the second category bears greater resemblance to the second-category scholarship of common law than to that typical of continental jurisdictions.

Indeed, although the traits of Quebec civil law are not "purely descriptive," most of them are at least as descriptive as the traditional

produced in Quebec, the sum of it still makes up the larger proportion of Canada's total production. See A. Janisch, Profile of Published Legal Research: A Report to the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (1982).


193. Brierley & Macdonald, supra note 3, at 70. The UQAM's explicit policy to promote interdisciplinary studies in law is therefore exceptional in Quebec's juridical context. See Catalogue, supra note 12. This last law faculty is dominated by public law scholars, however.

194. Arthurs Report, supra note 100, at 89.

common-law treatise, and certainly much more so than the French traités. The same is true of most articles published in Quebec law reviews. Moreover, one scholar recently concluded that, generally speaking, Quebec legal scholars do “little more than ‘cross-reference[e] codal articles.’”

Nonetheless, there is Quebec scholarship in law that is somewhat “internally critical” and that accordingly belongs in the second category. Still, this second-category scholarship on the whole remains less abstract and critical than its continental counterpart. Like the second-category scholarship of common law, it largely is informed by immediate professional concerns and consequently is more narrowly focused than traditional civilian second-category scholarship. In sum, “[Quebec civil law scholarship], regrettably, reflects the worst of [two] worlds, since it leaves unexplored the justifications for legal norms, and is content

196. For some particularly striking examples, see BAUDOUIN, supra note 195; POURCELET, supra note 195, MARTINEAU, supra note 195. But see TANCELIN, supra note 195; PINEAU & BURMAN, supra note 195.
197. See supra notes 161 and 53.
198. Howes, supra note 72, at 128, quoting Macdonald, supra note 52, at 579-80; see also Jobin, supra note 187, at 264; Normand, supra note 178, at 1016-17, 1021, 1026.
199. Jobin points to the traités of Baudouin, Mayrand, Pineau, Baudouin, and Martineau cited above, supra note 197, as examples of writings by Quebec law professors that, albeit “more ‘learned’ than those of [practitioners] . . . , are nonetheless underlain by concerns that remain largely didactic and professional.” P.J. Jobin, L’influence de la doctrine française sur le droit québécois: Le rapprochement de deux continents, in DROIT QUÉBÉCOIS ET DROIT FRANÇAIS: COMMUNAUTÉ, AUTONOMIE, CONCORDANCE 110 (H. Patrick Glenn ed., 1993). The very short life of one of Quebec’s first legal periodicals, La Revue Critique, offers a case in point. The declared purpose of this periodical was “to fight without hesitation errors and false principles, which are found in legislation and in jurisprudence, and attempt to always give the last word to Law, to logic, and to reason.” S. Normand, Profil des périodiques juridiques québécois au XIXe siècle, 34 C. DE D. 153, 165 (1993). The periodical vanished quickly, apparently because “professional men have here little taste, feel very little disposition for venturing into abstract studies.” Normand, supra, at 165 (quoting J.J. Beauchamp, Avis aux abonnés, 13 REVUE LÉGALE (NOUVELLE SÉRIE) 1, 2 (1907). Finally, Crépeau’s understanding of the term “critical” is particularly revealing in this regard. In the preface to his “Critical Edition” of the Civil Code, Crépeau explains indeed that this edition was prepared “with great care, in full respect for the legislative text as they have been enacted. Indeed, no one, except the Legislator himself . . . has the right to tamper with a text of law, even, as has often been the case, with the very commendable aim of improving it. At best, in a critical edition, one may draw the reader’s attention by appropriate observations and symbols to typographical or other errors which it may contain.” P.A. CRÉPEAU, THE CIVIL CODES AND RELATED CIVIL LAW STATUTES: A CRITICAL EDITION xiv (1991) (footnotes omitted).
with minor reformulation and restatements of codal rules, complemented by jejune attempts at exemplification.\textsuperscript{200}

b. Explanation

As a possible explanation for the emptiness of the third, "meta-legal" category of scholarship, it often has been claimed that Quebec scholars, like their continental analogues, have resisted interdisciplinary exchanges out of some concern to preserve the purity of their law.\textsuperscript{201} While this is surely a genuine concern for some Quebec scholars, and hence part of the explanation, it is indeed only part of that explanation. The complexity of Quebec's situation as a mixed jurisdiction suggests that more than just one factor is at play here.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{200} Macdonald, supra note 52, at 584.

\textsuperscript{201} Id. at 579-80; see Brierley, supra note 12, at 27. ("[There is] a fear that the 'purity' of the Civil law would be compromised if a broader view of its horizons were adopted (the theme is omni-present in the literature.").) See, e.g., the preface to the 1978 \textit{Projet de Code civil} in which the Office de révision du Code civil describes the civil code as "a fortress erected to protect the integrity of the civil law from outside influences." See also P. Azard, \textit{Le Droit Québécois, pièce maîtresse de la civilisation canadienne française}, [5] 2 C. DE D. ? (1963); P.A. Crépeau, \textit{La renaissance du droit civil canadien}, in \textit{LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE CIVIL (I) (1970); M. Tancelin, Introduction to \textsc{Walton's} Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada} (Maurice Tancelin ed., 1981).

\textsuperscript{202} Howes argues that "the transition from an oral to a textual noetic" has been one such factor. Howes, supra note 72, at 128. Clearly, a rejection of interdisciplinarity naturally would follow from a switch in the locus of law's authority from rational necessity—as was the case in the continental tradition of civil law, where the moral authority of positive law was deemed to lie in its conformity to reason—to the fact of requisite institutional sanction—as is the case in the common-law tradition, where law's authority is contingent upon its canonical form as duly formulated legislative or judicial statement. An emphasis on canonical form naturally channels inquiries concerning legal validity very narrowly, that is, such emphasis precludes inquiries into things other than the physical, institutional process and actual method of canonical formulation of any given legal enactment. If, therefore, the "transition from oral to textual noetic" is to be understood as the transition from the conceptual and rational to the physical, institutional, and canonical, then Howes' explanation seems right. But Howes apparently means something else by this expression, for he further describes the said transition as that "from a conception of law as rhetoric (a way of speaking) to the notion of law as logic (a kind of science)." \textit{Id.} (footnotes omitted). In the conception of law as rhetoric, he writes, "the main reason [history and politics] were internal to law is that they had not yet been departmentalized as autonomous branches of knowledge. Law was political history." \textit{Id.} So understood, his explanation for the scarcity of interdisciplinarity in Quebec legal scholarship is one that I would reject, as the above discussion should make clear. In the continental tradition, interdisciplinarity is important for purpose of legal education, but this is not to say that interdisciplinarity partakes of law itself. On the contrary, as a form of science, law is an autonomous discipline in that it rationally derives from first premises in a way that excludes tapping into other disciplines. Yet, since legal reasoning thus is no different from scientific
For instance, part of the reason that Quebec law faculties have produced little or no interdisciplinary scholarship lies with the fact that most of their members are themselves graduates of these faculties and have thus, in all likelihood, rarely been exposed to nonlaw disciplines.\textsuperscript{203} In some indirect way, therefore, the financial and Bar Association factors discussed above with respect to Quebec’s law curricula\textsuperscript{204} have also affected the profile of Quebec’s legal scholarship.

Another factor has, it seems, been psychological. I would argue that the “survival”\textsuperscript{205} or “ghetto”\textsuperscript{206} mentality exhibited by many Quebeckers as a result of their cultural, linguistic, and juridical marginality in the larger North American context has reached to, and perversely impacted upon, Quebec’s legal academic community. More specifically, Quebec’s marginality has induced among its legal scholars a form of academic parochialism akin to the “alienation syndrome” introduced above.\textsuperscript{207}

In his description of this syndrome, Steinberg mentions “low aspirations,” “feelings of powerlessness and fatalism,” as well as “passivity and resignation.”\textsuperscript{208} Others similarly list a “tendency to avoid intellectual engagement and competition”\textsuperscript{209} among the symptoms of this syndrome. So described, the alienation syndrome seems an appropriate diagnosis for the pervasive parochialism of Quebec’s legal scholarship, which Macdonald outlines as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item reasoning, the main task of legal education ought to be to develop basic intellectual skills—analysis, logic, judgment, and a certain form of maturity—which are necessary for proper thinking taken in its most general sense. Interdisciplinarity is important for this purpose, not because law is a hodge-podge of diverse disciplines. Hence, although I agree with Howes that interdisciplinarity is important to civilian legal education, I disagree with him on the reason that this is so and thus also reject his argument that “the transition from an oral to a textual noetic” was ever a factor in Quebec legal scholars’ neglect of interdisciplinarity.
  \item Indeed, it is no coincidence, and somewhat ironic, that most of the few Quebec scholars who have ventured beyond the legal into the meta-legal, see, e.g., supra note 192, are among the minority of Quebec law graduates who obtained graduate degrees at a foreign school of common law, where they gained some exposure to nonlaw disciplines.
  \item See supra text accompanying notes 101-124.
  \item See ATLAS, supra note 37.
  \item See TRUDEAU, supra note 37.
  \item See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
  \item STEINBERG, supra note 32.
  \item J. Howard & R. Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1985, at 17-18.
\end{itemize}
It is as if everyone implicitly accepted that empirical research and the Civil Code were incompatible. Thus, one finds that instead of empirical analyses of landlord/tenant law, there are studies of the incidence of compliance with the orders of the Régie du logement [Quebec’s administrative agency for housing]; rather than economic studies of consumer sales contracts, there are bureaucratic studies of the Consumer Protection Bureau [Quebec’s administrative agency for consumer protection]; instead of studies of the lease of work (master/servant law), there are studies of decision making within the Labour Standards Commission [Quebec’s administrative agency for labor relations].

The models and methodology of economics, sociology, and most other nonlegal sciences have been denied entry into legal academe in Quebec, because they are not culture- or Quebec-specific. As explained above, civilians in general have traditionally viewed interdisciplinary exchanges with suspicion, for they feared that the absence of a clear dividing line between legal and nonlegal reasoning would leave open the possibility that the latter undermine the conceptual unity of the former. Among Quebec civilians, this fear has been compounded by their being constantly reminded of their vulnerability in this regard, given their minority status in North America. In this sense, it may be argued that Quebec’s legal academic community is prey to an “alienation syndrome.”

Quebec’s minority position in North America is more than just an explanation for the absence of third-category scholarship; it also is the reason that Quebec needs such scholarship most imperatively. The

210. Macdonald, supra note 52, at 605.

211. Id. at 588 (“Economic analysis of property, contract and delict is not a new way of looking at the rules of the Civil Code; it is often seen as an American corruption. Empirical research and legal sociology are, whatever else, not legal scholarship. A preoccupation with history and philosophy is thought to distort writing about legal concepts and rules . . . Economics is held to be not culture specific: there are Marxists in France, in the United States, in the United Kingdom and in Quebec; the same is true of Chicago or welfare economists.”).

212. See supra text accompanying notes 169-172.

absence of third-category scholarship is not nearly as problematic on the continent as it is in Quebec. Continental legal systems are structured so as to preserve the civilian character of their private law and, in the absence of risks of infiltration by foreign legal cultures, the lack of local literature questioning, reinforcing, and defending the intellectual foundations of these systems' common private law tradition is unlikely to have catastrophic consequences, at least not for a few decades to come. In contrast, Quebec is one of only three small civilian legal systems in North America\(^{214}\) and is under constant threat of being swept under the tide of Anglo-Saxon legal culture. Inertia is most likely fatal under such circumstances.

For the sake of its livelihood as a marginal legal culture, therefore, Quebec ought to take proactive measures and bolster its legal system's intellectual premises vis-à-vis those of the dominant system. And there is no reason to believe that the civil-law tradition would not stand up to philosophical, sociological, economic, and any other interdisciplinary scrutiny in Quebec.

With respect to Quebec's scholarship in law, the main reason\(^{215}\) that it is largely descriptive and less abstract and critical than this scholarship is on the continent appears to be that in Quebec, unlike on the continent, there is a pressing need for such writings. Indeed, while

\(^{214}\) The other two are Louisiana and Puerto Rico. See supra note 1.

\(^{215}\) One fact that would explain this having been the case earlier in Quebec's legal history is that, in that province as in the Canadian common-law provinces, the first legal scholars were full-time practitioners, whose occasional writings aimed to achieve no more than resolve concrete legal questions which they or their peers would encounter in their practice. Normand, supra note 178, at 1016; Normand, supra note 76, at 154-55, 161. Quebec's academic scene has since been substantially overhauled, however, and the majority of its current scholars are full-time university professors. (This overhaul was part of the educational reform that took place in Quebec in the 1960s. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.) Yet, contemporary Quebec scholarship is not much more critical and abstract for that matter. One could then suggest that, as with Quebec legal scholars' resistance to interdisciplinarity, their uncritical attitude towards scholarship in law is due to the fact that these scholars' own legal education was obtained in an uncritical, largely professionally-oriented environment, namely, Quebec law faculties. See supra text accompanying notes 81-96. If this argument is sound, it would seem that, here again, the financial and Bar Association factors are rearing their ugly heads. This argument is much less convincing here than it was with regards to these scholars' resistance to interdisciplinarity, however: clearly, a lack of exposure to nonlegal disciplines will likely have the effect of limiting the scope of one's future research agenda as a scholar, but it seems unlikely that one similarly requires exposure to critical or abstract thinking by others in order to be able to engage in such thinking oneself. After all, one would expect that those Quebec law graduates who undertake to pursue an academic career would, from the outset, be inclined towards critical and abstract thought.
Quebec judicial decisions are no more a *formal* source of law than continental decisions,216 their persuasive power *de facto* is almost as great as if they were formally binding.217 Realistically, therefore, anyone looking to predict how a given issue of private law will be treated by Quebec courts must go beyond the texts of the Code: he or she must also consult past judicial decisions on the issue. Hence the need, in Quebec, for legal scholarship whose immediate purpose is to recount, summarize, and organize the various rules of law “made” by the courts, that is, for scholarship of the first, “most strictly legal” category.218

In sum, the traditional civilian roles of judge and scholar have come to be reversed in Quebec:219 whereas on the continent the scholar is the critical legal thinker who shapes the law through abstract reasoning and reduces it to a set of formulae that will then be applied somewhat mechanically by the judge,220 in Quebec the law effectively is shaped by judges221 and thereafter mechanically compiled by scholars.222 This has


218. Normand reports accordingly that, from 1945 and until as late as 1965, most doctrinal writings by Laval academics were in the form of short case commentaries. Normand, *supra* note 76, at 161.


220. *See supra* text accompanying notes 131-149.

221. As a corollary, the standard civil-law decision from Quebec is, in true common-law fashion, usually published together with the judge’s own elaborate, fully documented, and opinionated account of the reasons for decision. See, for example, the opinions of the civilian judges in Houle *v.* Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122 (concerning abuse of right); Laferrière *v.* Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541 (loss of chance); Laurentide Motels Ltd. *v.* City of Beauport, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 705 (civil liability of municipalities). This contrasts starkly with the standard continental judgment described above, *supra* note 52. Jean-Gabriel Castel once accordingly exclaimed: “Judges in Quebec are to a great extent the province’s jurists.” CASTEL, *supra* note 3, at 231. For a more elaborate discussion of the style and form of Quebec judgments, see Valcke, *Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism*, *supra* note 9.

222. Admittedly, doctrinal writings are sometimes cited in support of Quebec judges’ decisions. Such citations are few, however: Atias found that 26.52% of all the references made by the judges in 108 Quebec Court of Appeal decisions in 1985 were to doctrinal sources. ATIAS, *supra* note 37, at 131. Moreover, it is unclear whether these writings have any real power of influence upon these judges’ reasoning. Gaudet notes that, in France, because judges do not have
resulted in Quebec's scholarship in law being generally closer to the "strictly legal" end of the spectrum: much of it belongs to the first, "most strictly legal" category and that of the second, "internally critical" category is more narrowly focused and professional in tone than continental second-category scholarship.

The explanation for this phenomenon is unclear. One could think it is Quebec judges who, for a variety of institutional reasons, came to exceed the limited, almost bureaucratic functions typically assigned to civilian judges and usurp those traditionally reserved to scholars, thereby effectively ousting Quebec scholars from the legal scene. Yet, it may be wondered who ousted whom. Did the judges overtake functions that the scholars hitherto had been dutifully discharging or was it the scholars' inadequate production of critical private-law scholarship that induced the judges to take over?

Most likely, these causal relations coexisted and reinforced one another. Instances of Quebec courts consciously ignoring available quality scholarly writings on the issues before them are numerous, but there are also many instances of judges relying on prior judicial decisions for lack of better doctrinal guidance. The relation between excessive judicial activism and excessive scholarly idleness in matters of private law in Quebec thus seems cyclical, rather than uni-directional.

in their power to "settle" points of law, doctrinal controversies over legal issues long outlive the judicial decisions addressing them, while in Quebec such controversies come to an end as soon as a court "settles" the issue. Gaudet, supra note 138, at 245. As an example, he points to the doctrinal debate concerning the issue of loss of chance in civil responsibility. Id. at 245 n.58. In France, this debate persists to this day, despite the fact that the numerous rulings of the Cour de cassation on the issue have been consistent and unambiguous since 1965. In Quebec, the debate died soon after Canada's Supreme Court settled the issue in Laferrière v. Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541. This suggests that in Quebec, unlike in France, scholarly writings have little power over judges once cases have been decided on a given issue.

223. These reasons have been explored elsewhere. See Valcke, supra note 9.

224. See, e.g., Canadian Pacific Ry. v. Robinson, 14 S.C.R. 105, 111 (1890); see also Baudouin, L'interprétation du Code Civil québécois par la Cour suprême du Canada, 53 CAN. BAR REV. 715, 718 (1975).

225. Gaudet suggests that the current "habit" of Quebec courts to consult precedents before they consult doctrinal writings originates from a period in Quebec's history during which adequate doctrinal writings were largely unavailable. Gaudet, supra note 138, at 246. Specifically, Gaudet refers to the period extending from codification to around 1940, during which law still was taught almost exclusively by practitioners in Quebec. Id.
There is reason to hope that this cycle may be reversed in the near future.\textsuperscript{226} The recent adoption of Quebec's new Civil Code\textsuperscript{227} has created a unique opportunity for Quebec legal scholars to regain the position of prominence that is their due in a civilian jurisdiction. Since the judicial decisions rendered under the now-repealed CCLC have become obsolete, Quebec courts currently are operating in a complete vacuum of legal materials. The door thus is wide open for Quebec legal scholars to capitalize on their advantage of speed and fill the void before Quebec judges get the chance to do so.\textsuperscript{228} Whether Quebec scholars will seize upon this opportunity remains to be seen.

It thus seems that as in the case of law curricula, the profile of Quebec legal scholarship partakes of both the civil-law and the common-law tradition. The larger part of this scholarship is in fields of public law, and is thus common-law, not civil-law, scholarship. With respect to private law scholarship, Quebec academics have, like their continental analogues, seriously neglected the third, "most meta-legal" category of legal scholarship. Unlike their continental analogues, they have produced much first-category, "most strictly legal" scholarship, and their second-category, "internally critical" scholarship is mildly critical in tone and professionally oriented in content. In this respect, Quebec legal scholarship resembles that of common-law jurisdictions.

This combination of civilian and common-law elements in Quebec scholarship is due to the psychological factor directed at nonlegal disciplines and to the role reversal that has taken place between Quebec judges and scholars. The resulting body of literature fails to provide the kind of intellectual basis that Quebec needs given its jurisdictional duality.

\textsuperscript{226} Id. at 246-47.
\textsuperscript{227} Code civil du Québec, S.Q., ch. 64 (1991) (Bill 125).
\textsuperscript{228} Ironically, it then is through judicial action that \textit{la doctrine} would have been rejuvenated in Quebec. This is unknown in continental civil-law jurisdictions, where court opinions that cite doctrinal writings or prior judgments as their only basis are usually quashed on appeal for lack of proper "legal basis." MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 174, §§ 99 & 105, at 137-38, 142-43 (8th ed. 1986). Civilian courts indeed rely heavily on doctrinal writings to form an opinion about the cases before them, but this is nowhere explicit in their written decisions: it is to the relevant code provisions that they make explicit reference therein. Some authors have concluded from this that Quebec doctrine is somewhat "privileged." Gaudet, supra note 138, at 247; Jobin, supra note 187, at 275.
D. The Method of Legal Instruction

The method of instruction used in Quebec law faculties like these faculties’ curricula and scholarship, is neither authentically civilian, nor strictly Anglo-Saxon in style. In true bijurisdictional fashion, it partakes of both legal cultures. In contrast to curricula and scholarship, however, the financial and Bar Association factors have served to keep Quebec in line with the continental tradition. Yet, their contribution in this regard has proven detrimental, for a departure from civilian orthodoxy in this case is in fact advisable for purposes of fortifying civilian legal education in Quebec.

The traditional method of instruction used in continental-law faculties is commonly referred to as “didactic” or “magisterial,” in contrast with the so-called “Socratic” or “case-” method, which has long characterized common-law teaching in North America.229 These different methods are described and compared in Part 1; their combined use in Quebec law faculties and the advantages of such a combination are described thereafter in Part 2.

1. Traditional Method of Instruction at Civil Law

Since Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the Socratic method of instruction at Harvard Law School,230 common-law students throughout North America have been learning law by doing. From the first day of law school, these students find themselves engaged in the very task which their judges discharge daily in actual court proceedings. Considerable amounts of raw legal materials are given them before class, which they must read, dissect, understand, and synthesize in preparation for class discussion. Classes take the form of question-and-answer sessions on given areas of the law between the professor and a few students designated for that purpose throughout each class. Through such verbal interaction, students are put to the task of sorting the relevant from the irrelevant, making authoritative use of facts and analogies.

229. As with curricula, English law faculties seem to have adopted a continental, rather than North American, style of legal teaching. The comment offered above with respect to curricula, supra note 60, also applies here.

230. Langdell’s introduction of this method dates back to his deanship at Harvard, from 1870 to 1895. See generally A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD ch. VI (The Langdell Era) (1967). According to G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 125, n.3 (1977), Langdell’s Socratic method had been adopted in almost all United States law schools by the 1920s.
invoking and distinguishing precedents, exploring the breadth of case holdings by way of counterfactual speculation, arguing both sides of a legal issue, casting specific problems in terms of their relation to broader legal principles, just as real judges would do in similar circumstances. Summaries and reviews (other than the students’ own) are generally discouraged and “right answers” rarely given. Examinations are usually open-book, since these are viewed as another opportunity for students to carry out the above tasks, rather than as an occasion for evaluating their passive knowledge of legal rules.

Beyond conveying to students some external understanding of the mechanics of legal reasoning, it is hoped that, through this process of repeated exposure to law-making in the rough, students will develop the ability to do such reasoning on their own.231 Of course, students are also expected to gain passive knowledge of extant legal rules through this process. But that is considered an incidental, not primary, benefit of legal education. For students are considered capable of researching positive law on their own, as they will have to do after graduation. Scarce class time, it thus is concluded, is better spent honing students’ practical reasoning skills than spoon-feeding them large quantities of pre-digested, fact-free legal rules.

The Socratic method is most appropriate for purposes of common-law teaching. Learning by doing is the best way to learn that which is entirely new, since the absence of (already known) referent by definition precludes the possibility of learning by way of reference. Thus, if common-law reasoning is truly a *sui generis* form of reasoning, the most effective way to impart it to students is by engaging them into it outright. Moreover, the Socratic method represents no less than “a return to the principles of legal teaching demanded by the nature itself of the common law.”232 By replicating in the classroom the process by which the common law emerges in fact, this method outlines the judicial origin, historical character,233 and professional orientation of the common law.

231. Merryman, *supra* note 7, at 873 (“[T]he case is an example of the legal process at work . . . the emphasis is not on substance but on method.”). For a more radical version of the same, see W. Twining, *Taking Facts Seriously*, in *ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION* 51 (N. Gold ed., 1982).


233. Merryman, *supra* note 7, at 873 (“[T]he case is a piece of social history. The study of judicial decisions for 3 years builds in the student a reservoir of familiarity with incidents in our social history.”).
It is consequently uniquely suited for carrying out the main objective of legal education at common law, namely, to train professionals competent at "thinking like lawyers."

Law teaching is approached differently in civilian legal systems. The traditional method of legal instruction in continental-law faculties is called "magisterial," a reference to the prominent standing that it bestows upon professors. The magisterial method is, in many respects, the mirror opposite of the Socratic method.

As the civil code is considered the embodiment of the juridical moral order that grounds the civil-law tradition, the method of teaching civil law naturally conforms to codal method. The texts of the code, more than particular fact situations, are the primary source of materials for study. Little or no readings other than that of relevant code provisions are assigned to students prior to class, and those assigned usually consist of well-structured outlines that have, like the code itself, been carefully drained of conceptual inconsistencies and factual imperfections. Similarly purified, conceptually and factually, are the professor’s presentations in class. Indeed, very little interaction takes place between the professor and the students during class time.

[The professor lectures; the students listen. That system is clearly designed to convey information to the student. The information is substantive knowledge. There is little concern with method of the sort that preoccupies [common law] teachers.

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234. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
236. The parallel with the form of judgments at civil law, as described above, supra note 52, is evident.
237. Normand, supra note 76, at 151; M. Fontaine, Réponse à l'enquête, 1 REVUE DOMINICAINE 329, 337-38 (1934) ("Très peu [de professeurs] s'intéressent vraiment aux élèves. Le cours terminé ils s'enfuient, comme débarrassés." ["Very few [professors] take a real interest in students. As soon as the class is over, they run away, as if relieved."]). Away they run indeed, for continental law professors do not usually have an office at the university, unless they also occupy an administrative position in the faculty. P. Herzog, Education and Training of Lawyers in France, in SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 149. As a result, it is virtually impossible for continental law students to talk to professors outside class.
238. Merryman, supra note 7, at 871. To the same effect, see Geck, supra note 7, at 101 ("[I]n class, [the student] is a passive listener while the professor delivers a monologue that is but rarely interrupted.").
In each class, the professor exposes one part of the civilian conceptual edifice, presenting the rules and principles on the day’s agenda in their logical, natural, and deductive order. If illustrations of these rules and principles are at all provided, they take the form of purely hypothetical factual scenarios finely tuned to the theoretical points being made and carefully woven into a seamless web. Judicial decisions may be brought up throughout the lecture, but merely incidentally, as examples of either “right” or “wrong” applications of a given rule. Students take notes in silence, writing down the professor’s every sentence; in many cases they end up transcribing word for word the outlines contained in their class materials, with the result that there is no need for “the post-class muddle which may be consciously contrived by the archetypal ‘paper chase’ teacher of the [common-law] classroom.”

By the end of a few years of this process, the entire edifice of the civil law has been unveiled by the professor and sketched by the students in their class notes. Needless to say,

in the hands of a master, the grandly expository, continental classroom style . . . may be a brilliant and, one might almost say, aesthetic experience. In different hands, however, it can certainly be an arid exercise in doctrinaire exposition.

Once the civil law has been entirely laid out into an explicit body of rules and principles by its academic emissaries, therefore, students are left with no other task than to absorb these rules and principles as they are being described by the professor, and without discussion. Any resistance on their part would be qualified as either misguided or arrogant, for the professor’s statements are not personal opinions or subjective

239. Brierley, supra note 12, at 23.
240. Verge, supra note 107, at 893 (“[L]e professeur de la faculté dite de droit civil attache de l’importance à une certaine exhaustivité de l’exposé linéaire de ‘son’ secteur du droit.”) “[T]he professor in the faculty of so-called civil law attaches importance to a certain exhaustiveness of the linear exposition of ‘his’ field of the law.”.
241. Brierley, supra note 12, at 22.
242. Merryman, supra note 7, at 870-71 (“The truth is known by the professor and is communicated to the students. There are, of course, disputes among scholars, and on some points one can find two or more theories that are sufficiently significant to deserve mention. But on the whole, the general structure, the broad outlines, are thought to be established. There are recognized categories. The law is divided into agreed subdivisions, which are taught as courses. The area of doubt is so narrow as to be imperceptible.”).
interpretations: they are nothing but the truth. As one scholar affirmed with conviction:

Not only does the professor, who exposes the law, not stand as the defender of partisan interests; neutral like the judge, he will consider it his duty to freely criticize even the judgments of the highest instances, in the name, always, of what appears to him as juridical rectitude.243

Finally, student passivity is also reflected in the format of examinations, which are written or oral, and usually closed-book.244 Students are expected to learn rules by heart and reproduce them faithfully, rigorously organized in traditional Cartesian fashion. No extra points are gained by displaying creativity or originality.

So described, the magisterial method reiterates the view that the study of civil law is a scientific discipline.245 For if, as explained above, the civil law rests upon some immutable, universal higher moral order, there is little room left for argument once the process of its formulation is completed: whereas one may argue about the truth, one may certainly not argue against it.

In sum, the main advantage of the magisterial method for civil-law teaching is that, when used in conjunction with the civil code,246 it

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243. Verge, supra note 107, at 896 ("Non seulement le professeur, qui expose le droit, ne se présente pas comme le défenseur d'intérêts partisans; neutre comme le juge, il considérera de son devoir de critiquer librement même les jugements des plus hautes instances, au nom, toujours, de ce que lui apparaît la rectitude juridique."). In a similar vein, it has been acknowledged that "it is sometimes difficult to discover the truth and to formulate it in a simple language suitable to students." 1 H. & L. MAZEAUD, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL 11 (1965).

244. See generally L. Baudouin, Examens de droit civil dans les Universités de la Province de Québec, 7 R. Du B. 477 (1947).

245. L. LIARD, 11 L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR EN FRANCE 397 (1894) ("[La tâche des facultés de droit] est d'apprendre à interpréter la loi. Il en résulte que leur méthode est déductive. Les articles du code sont autant de théorèmes dont il s'agit de montrer les liaisons et de tirer les conséquences."). ["[The task of law faculties] is to teach legal interpretation. As a result, their method is deductive. The articles of the code are as many theorems whose ties must be demonstrated and whose consequences must be derived."]

246. Howes supplies grounds for this perception, as he argues that the style of the Code and the method of legal instruction in Quebec have historically been closely interconnected as cause and effect. Howes, supra note 72, at 141-45. However, it is argued in the next Part that, while such parallel clearly exists, it is nonetheless merely coincidental, as opposed to necessary. If this last argument is sound, then that of Howes in support of a strict causal connection seems, if not unsustainable, at least unduly categorical.
highlights "the logical and coherent character of the law." \(^{247}\) And scarce class time is considered better spent emphasizing this character of the civil law than discussing the facts of cases, developing problem-solving techniques, or debating students' personal takes on the motivations underlying judgments.\(^{248}\)

2. Method of Legal Instruction in Quebec
   
a. Description

   While the magisterial method was "in full flourish" in the late 1940s, when a full-time university law degree became a requirement for practicing law in Quebec,\(^{249}\)

   [c]onscious efforts have been made in all faculties and in all subjects over the last twenty years or so to develop a wide variety of teaching materials, to adopt les méthodes actives and to orient exams and other exercises (les travaux pratiques) towards concrete problem solving and policy issues.\(^{250}\)

   Indeed, throughout my three years of studies at one Quebec civil-law faculty in the early 1980s, student participation in class was usually solicited and obtained by professors, and a majority of students seemed to prepare for class in hour-proportions comparable to those of students in the schools of common law that I attended subsequently.\(^{251}\) Furthermore, while many civil-law lectures do take the form of reenactments by

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248. Caron, supra note 66.

249. Howes, supra note 72, at 145. Similarly, Normand writes of the teaching style at the law faculty of Laval University that it then was highly dogmatic: "Le droit, présenté comme une vérité indiscutable, paraît peu ouvert aux dérogations et aux cas d'exception. Le doute et le scepticisme sont mal vus." ["The law, presented as unquestionable truth, appears little open to derogations and cases of exception. Doubt and skepticism are seen with a bad eye."]]. Normand, supra note 76, at 154.

250. Brierley, supra note 12, at 23. See, however, Boucher's observation in 1975 that these new developments had, by then, taken place primarily in common-law courses. Boucher, supra note 14, at 147.

251. Quebec faculties currently build their curricula so as to allow students to put in an average of two hours of preparation per hour of class time. See CATALOGUES, supra note 12. From conversations with Canadian and other American colleagues, as well as from personal experience as a graduate law student at two United States institutions, it appears that students' time is allocated similarly throughout North America.
professors of the course screenplays handed to students beforehand, it no longer is uncommon to see civil-law professors assigning pre-class readings from less directive collections of legal materials and expanding on these materials in class.\textsuperscript{252} Class discussion in private-law courses does focus upon code provisions, but relevant judicial decisions and doctrinal commentaries form an integral part of this discussion.\textsuperscript{253} Finally, examinations are more often open-book than not, and students always have access to their civil codes and sometimes also to a table of cases.

On the whole, the classification of teaching methods as magisterial or Socratic does not match invariably the classification of Quebec law courses as civil (private) law or common (public or statutory) law. While common-law classes indeed are often conducted in a more or less Socratic fashion, it is not rare to see civil-law courses being taught that way as well.\textsuperscript{254} And conversely, some Quebec law professors readily adopt a magisterial style when teaching common-law courses.\textsuperscript{255}

At any rate, Quebec law students generally seem unaware of the traditional distinction between the magisterial and Socratic methods of law teaching. From personal experience, it appears they rather attribute differences in teaching styles to differences in professors' individual preferences, not noticing that different teaching patterns may recur in their common-law and civil-law courses, respectively.

It may therefore be concluded, with respect to civil-law courses specifically, that the combination of Socratic and magisterial elements in

\textsuperscript{252} Boucher, supra note 14, at 138; Geck, supra note 7, at 90; Ledain, supra note 7; Ledain, The Theory and Practice of Legal Education, 7 McGill L.J. 192 (1960-61).

\textsuperscript{253} Verge, supra note 107, at 894.

\textsuperscript{254} Brierley, supra note 12, at 23. Boucher relates that this is particularly true at McGill, where both common-law and civil-law degrees are offered. Boucher, supra note 14, at 140, 145.

\textsuperscript{255} The courses that formed the Bar Association's pre-1987 professional training program followed one and the same format, regardless of the area of law covered in each. All these courses were taught in a didactic manner, lectures usually restated the content of the materials, and students participated in class, although to a modest extent. The Bar Association thus seemed to have settled for a compromise between Socratic and magisterial teaching methods. Yet, since this format is apparently somewhat standard across professional training programs offered in the other Canadian provinces and is also that used by private providers of bar examination preparation services in various U.S. states, it may be that professional programs have grown so independent from academic legal education as to disregard entirely the academic objectives of their respective jurisdictions. As such, they would be unhelpful in assessing whether and to what extent teaching methods in civil-law and common-law systems have converged.
the method of instruction adopted in Quebec faculties reflects a marked departure from traditional continental law teaching.

b. Explanation

Whereas the departure from civilian orthodoxy has impoverished civilian legal education in Quebec in the cases of curricula and scholarship, it is at least unclear whether such departure in the case of methods of instruction has been similarly harmful. Indeed, the historical connections between the common law and Socratic method, on the one hand, and the civil law and magisterial method, on the other hand, are not necessary: they have occurred not so much as a matter of principle as from a combination of various pragmatic considerations. And since these pragmatic considerations seem, on balance, to favor the Socratic over the magisterial method as the more effective way to teach law, be it civil law or common law, the decline of the magisterial method in Quebec faculties in fact should be extolled.

The two teaching methods are deemed to reflect the different emphases that has been placed upon abstract principles and concrete cases in the two legal traditions. The magisterial method is thought to reflect the civilian emphasis upon abstract principles; the case method, the greater focus placed upon concrete cases at common law. The distinction loses potency, however, when one considers the fact that the two legal systems have, after all, one important feature in common: they both aim at solving real-life problems. Since any form of problem-solving proceeds, at the level of reasoning, from a constant interplay between the abstract and the concrete, the abstract/concrete dichotomy drawn between the civil law and the common law can only be tenable at a systemic level. That is, one may well assert that the civil law, as legal system, is more abstract than the common law because the civil law was mainly developed by academics (presumably abstract thinkers), while the common law emerged mainly out of court practice (and hence practical minds), and because civilians have consequently traditionally accorded greater persuasive value to abstract arguments of principle than to more concrete arguments about the fairness or unfairness of deciding actual

256. See supra text accompanying notes 234-248.
257. Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2 ("[T]he essence itself of the [case] method . . . remains purely inductive . . . or more exactly a purely empirical method."); see also Twining, supra note 231.
cases one way or the other. Yet, it would not follow from this assertion that the reasoning process of civilian jurists engaged in such rule- or argument-formulation necessarily is more abstract than, or even qualitatively different from, that of common lawyers preparing for a court appearance. Even the most abstract form of scientific reasoning involves a concurrence of facts and theory. Scientific hypotheses are first posited as a result of some intuition that scientists develop from their exposure to real-life phenomena, be that three angles holding together to form a triangle, starlight fading or intensifying, animals manifesting pain, or whatever other phenomenon may trigger scientific inspiration. These hypotheses are then formulated by reference to other, already established, scientific theories, but only to be subsequently brought back to the facts by way of testing. It is in turn by appeal to test-results that hypotheses and their supporting scientific theories are refined, revised, or discarded altogether. Thus, even the most abstract form of scientific reasoning is hardly purely abstract; rather, it involves a circular, mutual feedback mechanism between fact and theory.

Even if it were accepted that civilian legal reasoning is indistinguishable from abstract scientific reasoning, therefore, it would have to be concluded that it cannot but involve a large measure of factual observation. And indeed, the great civilian thinkers could not have dreamed up some abstract notion of contract or delict without having first been acquainted with real-life contractual and delictual encounters. Moreover, the fact that, once formulated, these abstract notions still underwent two thousand years of revisions, reformulations

258. For a more theoretical account of this epistemological phenomenon as it applies to the scientific method, see K. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach 153-91 (1972).

259. Id. at 143-44 ("The a posteriori evaluation of a theory depends entirely upon the way it has stood up to severe and ingenious tests. But severe tests, in their turn, presuppose a high degree of a priori testability or content. Thus the a posteriori evaluation of a theory depends largely upon its a priori value: theories which are a priori uninteresting—of little content—need not be tested because their low degree of testability excludes a priori the possibility that they may be subjected to really significant and interesting tests."); see also id. at 162-68. Similarly, see Eisenberg’s discussion of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 78.

260. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
and modifications suggests that their initial formulations simply did not stand up to the test of their judicial application in concrete cases.261

Conversely, common-law reasoning is hardly purely factual.262 It is common knowledge that only a limited proportion of legal disputes in fact are litigated in every legal system, that in turn only a small number of litigated cases are ever reported, and finally that an even smaller number of reported cases are pursued far enough to acquire substantial precedential value as high appeal cases. Deliberate or not, some kind of mechanism for selecting cases worthy of special juridical attention thus is in operation in all legal systems. At common law, as at civil law, the cases that rise to public attention arguably are those whose resolution is uncertain at the outset, presumably because it is found that the requisite rules and principles either have yet to be established, or demand further elaboration, or else, are in apparent conflict. And such findings can only be arrived at by judges and lawyers engaging in a form of reasoning that involves concrete facts and abstract principles.263 Within each common-law case, finally, the style of argumentation adopted by all agents, be they litigants or judges, is also partly abstract. Indeed, even the process of arguing by way of analogies, the epitome of common-law reasoning, in part proceeds from an appeal to the abstract principles shared by otherwise factually distinct cases.264

261. Alternatively, it could be argued that the need for revising the principles of the civil law over time emerged from the fact that civilian societies themselves evolved over time. But this explanation clashes with the view that the civil law embodies some higher juridical moral order that is both transcultural and transhistorical. For a more elaborate account of the process of legislative modification under a universalist conception of the civil law, see Valcke, supra note 10. If the above argument that civil-law reasoning is not purely deductive holds under the strictest, most dogmatic conception of civilian reasoning as scientific reasoning, then it a fortiori will hold under more fluid conceptions of civil law as an evolving social phenomenon.

262. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 76-83; Levi, supra note 40, at 1-19.

263. Eisenberg refers to this reasoning as that which is "replicable by the profession, so that the courts' use of that process enriches the supply of legal rules and thereby makes planning on the basis of law more reliable and dispute-settlement on the basis of law easier." Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 96.

264. Eisenberg's critique of Levi is instructive in this regard. According to Levi, "the basic pattern of legal reasoning [at common law] is reasoning by example," Levi, supra note 40, at 1, which he describes as "a three-step process ... similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case." Id. at 2. Moreover, "[t]he finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process." Id. Levi here borrows from Aristotle, who wrote of the process of arguing by example that it is "neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part." Aristotle, Analytica Priora 69a (McKeon ed., 1941). Eisenberg retorts,
That civil-law and common-law reasoning alike combine factual observation and abstract conceptualization is furthermore confirmed by the fact that the methods of instruction traditionally adopted in the two systems have not been purely magisterial or Socratic: there are Socratic elements in continental-law teaching and magisterial elements in North American common-law teaching.

Socratic elements in civilian teaching in fact are many. To begin with, the objectives of legal education in civil-law systems are not entirely disconnected from the eminently practical, dispute-resolving purpose for which these systems have been designed in the first place. As Ledain explained:

[Providing students with an] overall view or synthesis [of the law] is only one objective of civil-law teaching; the ultimate objective is to train minds capable not only of producing this kind of synthesis themselves, but of applying it to the analysis of particular, concrete legal problems. There is, then, first of all the need to acquire as great a mastery as possible of the body of general principles, the organic core, which in theory at least is supposed to contain within itself the means of development and the germ of all needed solutions.... Secondly, [the student] must be trained to use this legal system for the purposes for which it was developed. He must learn to diagnose or express factual problems in civil-law terms, to discover within the body of the civil-

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In a normative context, justificatory reasoning can proceed only from standards, and 'reasoning by example,' as such, is virtually impossible. Reason cannot be used to justify a normative conclusion on the basis of an example without first drawing a maxim or rule from the example.

EISENBERG, supra note 40, at 86. In the same vein, Brett, M.R., wrote that "the logic of inductive reasoning requires that where two propositions lead to exactly similar premises there must be a more remote and larger premise which embraces both of the major propositions." Heaven v. Pender, 111 Q.B.D. 503, 506 (Brett, M.R., concurring). Indeed, Aristotle similarly believed that reasoning "from part to part" could only take place "when both particulars are subordinate to the same term and one of them is known." ARISTOTLE, supra, at 69a. In Popper's words, "the epistemology of induction breaks down even before taking its first step. It cannot start from sense data or perceptions and build our theories upon them, since there are no such things as sense data or perceptions which are not built upon theories." POPPER, supra note 257, at 146. See generally Becker, *Analogy in Legal Reasoning*, 83 ETHICS 248 (1973); M. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 44-49, 102-11 (1984); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 201-06 (1979).
law not merely the solutions which have been applied to old problems, but by analogical reasoning the principles to govern new problems. He must learn to relate what has been decided in particular cases to the rest of the law and to fit it into the overall structure, so that the development of the law is orderly, logical and harmonious. Thus we return to the process of synthesis once more.265

The fact that judicial decisions have traditionally formed an integral part of class lectures at civil law, even if only for their illustrative value as examples,266 suggests that Ledain’s description of civilian educational objectives is accurate. Moreover, there are examples of civil law being taught with much success in a thoroughly Socratic fashion. Student debates on pre-assigned topics apparently are considered an appropriate format for teaching German civil law, among other fields of German law, for such debates have long been held in German universities.267 And it was said of similar pedagogical initiatives in Quebec,268 which took place long before the magisterial method became the dominant method of legal instruction,269 that they had been equally fruitful.270 Finally, the Quebec civil code itself was once published in a discursive, question-answer

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265. Ledain, supra note 7, at 502-03.
266. See Verge, supra note 107, at 895 (“L’accent est surtout mis ici sur l’étude du cas-limite. Sauf dans quelques cours qui paraissent exceptionnellement s’adresser à de tels facteurs, il y a relativement peu de place pour l’insertion d’aspects plus contingents—mais non moins réels pour le justiciable—reliés à la teneur des dossiers, ou encore au processus même de l’administration de la justice, ses caractères plus ou moins expédiifs ou coûteux en particulier.” (“The emphasis is here placed mainly on test-case study. Except in a few courses which, exceptionally, appear to address such factors, there is relatively little room for including more contingent—yet no less real for the litigant—aspects regarding the holding of files, or else the very process of justice administration, its more or less expedient or costly characters in particular.”)).
268. Informal gatherings at which students engaged in open discussions of subjects covered in class during the preceding week were held weekly or monthly at Quebec’s first École de droit, founded as an affiliate of Montreal’s Collège Ste. Marie by Maximilien Bibaud in 1851. See L. Lortie, The Early Teaching of Law in French Canada, 2 DALHOUSSIE L.J. 521, 529 (1975); R.H.J. Macdonald, Maximilien Bibaud, 1823-1887: The Pioneer Teacher of International Law in Canada, 11 DALHOUSSIE L.J. 721 (1988). More formal and public debates—some kind of precursors to modern “moot courts”—were also occasionally organized where students would stand before professional panels to make presentations and be examined on given topics. See Bibaud, supra note 192, at xxxix.
269. See supra note 249.
270. Howes reports that Bibaud’s students systematically scored at least 50% better on professional entrance examinations than McGill students, who were taught by way of lectures and written examinations exclusively. Howes, supra note 72, at 134-35.
form, reminiscent of Socrates’ own Dialogues,271 and another early edition was explicitly designed as a compilation of the “principal discussions on each article of our Code.”272

It should thus be no surprise that one civilian scholar could maintain both that “[t]he pure jurist is a geometer,” and that “purely juridical education is purely dialectical.”273 Nor should it be surprising that two other scholars concluded that “when the case method consents to cooperate with didactic instruction, and to become its loyal auxiliary, it can easily take root in the field of the civil law.”274 Hence, the historical connection between civil law and the magisterial method is not necessary.

That the same can be said of the connection between the common law and the Socratic method is suggested by the fact that, conversely, many magisterial elements are present in traditional common-law teaching. For one, the adoption of the Socratic method in North American schools of common law hardly is uniform.275 In fact, my experience as a student at some of these schools suggests that Socratic and magisterial methods are combined very much as they are in Quebec: some courses are taught didactically, others socratically, and which method is used in which course seems determined by professors’ leanings more than by the nature of the subject matters.276 In those courses where

271. E. BEAUDRY, LE QUESTIONNAIRE ANNOTÉ DU CODE CIVIL DU BAS-CANADA (1872), quoted in Howes, supra note 72, at 137-38.
273. LJARD, supra note 245, at 397 (“Le juriste pur est un géomètre; l’éducation purement juridique est purement dialectique.”).
274. Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 16. Lambert and Wasserman offer the following observation in support of their conclusion:

The fact that the first casebook published in England, to be used to experiment with the case method at Cambridge, Finch’s Cases on Contract, was re-edited, in association with Mr. R.T. Wright, by Professor W.W. Buckland, a jurisconsult destined to become one of the greatest authorities of the world in the science of Roman law, and whom several continental universities are honored to count among their doctors honoris causa, caused this eventuality to be anticipated ever since 1896. Since this time the case method has become effectively acclimated to several law countries.

Id. See also Merryman’s own conclusion that “[t]he active method does not necessarily presuppose the doctrine of stare decisis or the study of judicial decisions.” Merryman, supra note 7, at 875. Curiously, see on the other hand Lambert & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 11.
275. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 205-16; Merryman, supra note 7, at 871.
276. The law schools in question are those of the University of Toronto, University of Chicago, and Columbia University. From discussions with some of my colleagues, moreover, this
it does predominate, moreover, the Socratic method is usually diluted considerably. Proponents of the Socratic method nowadays begin and/or end their courses with expository introductory and/or review sessions, and doctrinal accounts of the law, which are necessarily somewhat abstract, are made available to students everywhere, if they are not directly provided.

Apparently, legal education at common law is not entirely a-conceptual, just as educational objectives at civil law are not entirely devoid of a practical dimension. It was asserted that the case-method shares the intellectual vocation of “the much more sophisticated and articulated tradition of European legal science”. Indeed, Langdell himself viewed law as a science. Quite literally so, it seems, given that he once declared that

all the available materials of [law] are contained in printed books. . . . [T]he library is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists.

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description of teaching styles applies apparently to many other North American law schools, including Harvard University, University of Michigan, Stanford University, Yale University, University of Virginia, and Cornell University.

277. Valeur points out that Langdell ended his first casebook with a dogmatic synopsis of the law of contracts. R. Valeur, L’enseignement du droit en France et aux Etats-Unis 200 (1928); see also Larson, supra note 249.

278. Merryman, supra note 7, at 873. Elsewhere, Merryman reiterates:

[W]e read cases for reasons analogous to the assumptions of traditional continental legal science: that one can abstract legal principles from specific legal rules, extract even broader principles from those derived by the first level of abstraction, and, by continuing the process, eventually produce a “general theory of law.”

Id. at 872; see also Redlich, supra note 234, at 37.

279. C.C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L. Q. Rev. 123 (1887), quoted in Sutherland, supra note 232, at 175. Gilmore argues that the scientific conception of the common law prevailed in the United States “roughly from the Civil War to World War I,” the period in American legal history which he calls “the age of faith.” Gilmore, supra note 230, at 41-67. For other common-law writings representative of this “age of faith,” see C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (2d ed. 1879), and Williston on Contracts (1920). Not surprisingly, Williston came to be the Chief Reporter for the U.S. Restatement of Contracts, a task which he discharged admirably, if Gilmore’s assessment is to be believed. Gilmore, supra note 230, at 134, n.12 (“[He] was one of the best statutory draftsmen who has ever worked at that mysterious art.”).
The gap between the objectives of legal education at common law and at civil law hence is not as wide as it first appears to be, given the historical connections civil law/magisterial and common law/Socratic. While these two systems may differ in the respective emphases they place upon abstract principles and concrete factual observation as systems, they share the same problem-solving epistemology, an epistemology which combines abstract and concrete forms of reasoning.

But, it may be asked, if use of the magisterial method is not demanded by the nature of civilian legal reasoning, how did it come to be the preferred method of teaching law in civilian jurisdictions? The answer to this question lies, it seems, in pragmatic considerations. The magisterial method allegedly presents three main advantages from a pragmatic standpoint. First, the lecture format of this method allows for greater substantive coverage of any given subject matter.280 Second, as professors resorting to the magisterial method are not expected to involve students in class discussion, there are virtually no upper limits on the size of the classes they teach.281 Third, and perhaps less overtly, as professors need not know much beyond their own lecture notes (since use of the magisterial method reduces the risk that students will ask unforeseen questions), class preparation is less onerous for professors.282

If real, these advantages are particularly significant in Quebec, where the financial and Bar Association factors have given rise to an acute need for money- and time-saving measures in legal education.283 Increasing class sizes is an obvious way for universities to save money. Similarly, limiting professors’ working hours may obviate a need to increase their salaries. And enlarging substantive coverage of the areas of law included in the curriculum is likely to please Bar-driven law students,

280. See supra note 242.
281. In Paris, class sizes in basic courses may exceed one thousand students. Herzog, supra note 237, at 149; see also Geck, supra note 7, at 93.
282. Normand describes the professorial mind-set in the following fashion: “[L]es professeurs considèrent [la méthode Socratique] inconciliable avec l’esprit civiliste. De plus, elle exige trop de temps de préparation pour les praticiens fort occupés.” [“Professors consider [the Socratic method] to be incompatible with the civilian spirit. Moreover, it requires too much preparation time from very busy practitioners.”]. Normand, supra note 76, at 152. This last point is reiterated by Howes, supra note 72, at 143 n.69.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 11-31.
who see comprehensive substantive legal knowledge as the key to passing the Bar Association examinations. 284

Civilians' traditional policy of devoting scarce class time to "the logical and coherent character of the law," 285 rather than to law's practical applications, therefore is based in expediency. As between spending much time and money training students to resolve concrete legal problems, and spending little time and money providing them with substantive, theoretical, legal knowledge, the latter was deemed preferable. Allegedly, whereas skill training is bound to take place eventually—if not before graduation, at least over the first few years of practice—acquiring a theoretical understanding of the law can only be done at university. 286

This assessment seems misguided, however, for it rests upon the erroneous assumption that the passive acquisition of theoretical knowledge and the active application of this knowledge to the resolution of concrete problems constitute two distinct educational alternatives. It should indeed be clear from the above reflections concerning the nature of the scientific reasoning process 287 that acquiring theoretical knowledge and applying this knowledge to practical problems are not two alternative educational objectives, but rather two necessary elements of one and the same learning process: it is not possible to acquire theoretical knowledge without applying it, nor is it possible to apply knowledge without some theoretical understanding of what is being applied. With respect to the impossibility of acquiring theoretical knowledge without applying it, it is worth remembering what was argued above, namely, that even the most theoretical form of scientific knowledge cannot possibly be acquired

284. While North American professors enjoy complete freedom to design their research agendas as they please, supra note 128, their freedom to choose a teaching style is more limited. Indeed, any student dissatisfaction with a professor's teaching style will no doubt appear on course evaluation forms, which students complete at the end of each course in all North American schools and faculties, and hence appear in professors' files. Continental professors are not similarly evaluated, nor would such evaluations be given such serious consideration should they in fact take place: this process indeed would violate the strict hierarchy that divides professors and students on the continent. M.C. Simoneau, Les étudiants, les dirigeants et l'université: doctrines éducatives et doctrines universitaires, 13 RECHERCHES SOCIOLOGIQUES 350-51 (1972) ("Seul et unique détenteur du savoir, il est dans une situation de domination sur son assistance." ["Being the only knowledge holder, [the professor] is in a position of domination over his audience."]).

285. See supra note 247.


287. See supra text accompanying notes 258-259.
without due consideration of the practical problems that such knowledge is ultimately designed to elucidate and resolve. Attempting to demonstrate the coherence of legal rules without looking into these rules’ concrete applications hence makes no more sense than providing the mathematical formula of the law of gravity without ever applying it to falling objects. Accordingly, the civilian policy in favor of the magisterial method is misguided insofar as it assumes that it is possible to impart knowledge properly now and apply it only later.

The above argument concerning the scientific reasoning process also underscores the impossibility of applying knowledge without some theoretical understanding of what is being applied. Theoretical scientific knowledge emerges from a need to explain and resolve real-life phenomena, not the other way round. Thus, resolving concrete legal problems without some theoretical understanding of the rules used in that resolution process is like predicting the speed at which certain objects will fall without knowing anything about the law of gravity: neither is possible. As a result, the civilian policy in favor of the magisterial method also is misguided insofar as it assumes that teaching law by way of active problem-solving rather than passive lecturing would have the consequence of depriving university law students of their one and only opportunity to gain a theoretical understanding of the law.

And indeed, common-law students taught socratically are not being deprived of such theoretical understanding. In this respect, the only difference between traditional continental and North American common-law teaching is that, while continental students effectively are given a choice between acquiring theoretical knowledge of the law by reading their course outlines or else by going to class, North American common-law students traditionally have had to master such knowledge on their own and then go to class in order to practice applying this knowledge to the resolution of concrete problems. In other words, whereas theoretical legal knowledge is spoon-fed to continental students during class, the same knowledge traditionally has been acquired by North American common-law students outside of class.

Thus, while law students taught Socratically will graduate with both a theoretical and practical understanding of the law, students taught magisterially end up graduating with an understanding of the law that is

288. Cohen, supra note 16, at 284; Herzog, supra note 237, at 149; Ledain, supra note 7, at 511; SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 166.
professed to be theoretical, but is in fact poorer than that of Socratic graduates. Even if the civilian objective of providing students with theoretical knowledge of the law were accepted as the main objective of legal education, therefore, it is highly questionable whether the magisterial method of law teaching represents the most promising strategy for implementing this objective.\footnote{Howes, \textit{supra} note 72, at 143 ("[It is not clear which of the magisterial or the Socratic method] is most likely to inculcate an analytical/critical ability, or to promote ‘humanistic values’ in the student.")} As Lambert and Wasserman explain:

Without doubt the general principles of law do not reveal themselves to [the student] with the same rapidity, and in the same logical harmony, [with Socratic teaching] as with the doctrinal teaching by lectures. But the effort made to discover them will fix them more deeply in his mind, and give him a more exact idea of their meaning and their nuances.\footnote{Lambert \& Wasserman, \textit{supra} note 7, at 2-3.}

A less genteel version of the same would be that students taught Socratically tend to work harder than students taught magisterially.\footnote{In all the institutions I have attended, students would systematically work much harder in those courses which were taught Socratically. This was confirmed by Columbia LL.M. students holding civil-law degrees from continental universities. They admitted being baffled by the important discrepancy between continental and North American law student workloads. One legal historian moreover relates that Quebec literature professors used to advise their students to go study law if they had no intention of working hard. G. Trudel, MÉMOIRES D’UN AUTRE SIÈCLE 130 (1987) ("Si vous ne voulez pas travailler, allez en droit!"). Similarly, Normand reports that student workloads at Laval were very light in the heyday of the magisterial method in Quebec. Normand, \textit{supra} note 76, at 165.}

In sum, the departure from civilian orthodoxy with respect to teaching styles that has been taking place in Quebec faculties since the 1940s seems to have benefited civilian legal education in Quebec. Since the choice of a method of instruction is a pragmatic decision, using the Socratic rather than the magisterial method to teach civil law in no way betrays the civilian spirit. From a pedagogical perspective, moreover, the Socratic method seems a superior method overall: students simply get more out of it. Insofar as the financial and Bar Association factors might have forestalled the movement away from the magisterial method towards the Socratic method, therefore, these factors would, here again, have impacted adversely on civilian legal education in Quebec.
IV. CONCLUSION

Civilian legal education in Quebec fails to provide students with the skills and formation required to mend and preserve the province's civilian heritage. This state of affairs was effected largely by three factors, the financial, the Bar Association, and the psychological factors, whose joint influence have caused legal education in Quebec to be generally incoherent: in true bi-jurisdictional fashion, elements of both traditional continental and traditional North American legal education are present in Quebec, but the resulting piecemeal combination is inferior to either model.

The financial and Bar Association factors have impacted primarily upon the profile of Quebec's law curriculum, which, by continental standards, is inadequate in two ways. First, law is in Quebec, like on the continent, studied as a first university degree. Unlike the continental curriculum, however, that offered in Quebec faculties lacks the solid nonlegal component which forms an essential part of general university education: nonlaw courses and courses about law (as opposed to courses in law) are nonexistent or very few in Quebec's law curriculum. Secondly, within the legal component of this curriculum, the relative importance of traditional fields of civil law has been declining steadily due to the corresponding increased attention accorded to fields of public and statutory law.

In addition, the financial and Bar Association factors have impeded Quebec professors' departure from civilian orthodoxy with respect to teaching styles, which, perhaps surprisingly, has further impoverished civilian legal education in Quebec. While the civil law has traditionally been taught magisterially, this didactic method is not required by the nature of civil-law or civilian reasoning as a matter of principle and in fact is less effective, pragmatically speaking, than the Socratic method used in North American jurisdictions of common law. Therefore, despite the clear advantages which the magisterial method presents with respect to reducing costs and increasing Bar-driven students' satisfaction, civilian legal education in Quebec would be well served by moving further towards the Socratic method of instruction.

Quebec legal scholarship, finally, has been primarily affected by the psychological factor and to a lesser extent by the financial and Bar Association factors. As with continental legal scholarship, that of Quebec is narrowly focused within strictly legal topics; within this limited range,
moreover, it is less critical and abstract than its continental analogue. The paucity of meta-legal writings from Quebec scholars is due, first, to the fact that most of these scholars have little interdisciplinary experience, given that they are themselves graduates of Quebec’s professionally-oriented legal education system; second and primarily, it is due to what seems an exaggerated sense of the threat that foreign and nonlegal influences pose for the integrity of Quebec law. Similarly, the fact that the scholarship in law produced by Quebec law faculties is only mildly critical and abstract mainly stems from the reversal of judicial and scholarly roles in Quebec. While both these problems must be redressed for Quebec to fortify its distinct juridical identity and resist foreign infiltration, only the latter seems on the verge of immediate redress.

Whether or not Quebec graduates are skilled common-law players, therefore, they clearly lack the tools to play the civilian game competently. It thus seems unlikely that they will ever be capable of “mending the damage caused by those before them who proved unable to juggle with the two sets of rules without confusing them.”292 Accordingly, it can only be concluded that Quebec has, to date, failed to meet its onerous educational challenge as a “mixed jurisdiction.”

292. See supra text following note 10.