

# Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion of African Marginalization

Philip C. Aka\*

*This Article presents an analysis of the place of Africa in the new world order. It is a role or position marked by the kind of heterogeneity and complexity conceivable of a continent of fifty-three states, over forty of them from sub-Saharan Africa alone. There are three aspects to the analysis. First is a theoretical statement on the concept of a new world order. Second is an outline and discussion of the trouble with marginalization as applied in the analysis of Africa. Among these troubles is that the concept depicts Africa as sui generis, when most of the problems Africans face are global features of underdevelopment common to the developing world as a whole. Third, the Article suggests several strategies for combating African marginalization in the new world order. Some of the suggested strategies are options addressed to developed countries in testimony to the reality of complex interdependence and in the interest of a legitimate international order. The overall result is a comprehensive critique of marginalization as an intellectual tool for the understanding of Africa and African realities in the new world order.*

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	188
II.	DEFINING A NEW WORLD ORDER .....	189
III.	TROUBLE WITH THE NOTION OF AFRICAN MARGINALIZATION .....	191
	A. <i>The Political-Strategic Irrelevance Argument</i> .....	192
	B. <i>The Economic Marginality Argument</i> .....	195
	C. <i>Not All African States Are Marginal(ized)</i> .....	200
	D. <i>Marginality Is an Attribute Africa Shares with Other Third World Regions</i> .....	202
	E. <i>African Marginalization Is a Perception, Not a Process</i> .....	205
	F. <i>The Notion of African Marginalization Is Misleading</i> .....	206
IV.	STRATEGIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER.....	208
	A. <i>Democracy</i> .....	210
	B. <i>Increased Experimentation</i> .....	211

---

\* Associate Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; B.A. *magna cum laude*, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania; M.A., University of North Texas; Ph.D., Howard University; J.D., Temple University School of Law. Dr. Aka's works have appeared in the Journal of Third World Studies, Midsouth Political Science Review, New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, Perspectives on Political Science, and Temple International & Comparative Law Journal. The author most gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Esq., on an earlier draft of this Article.

C.	<i>Increased Regional Economic Integration</i> .....	212
D.	<i>More Even-Handed Use of the United Nations by     the Great Powers</i> .....	214
E.	<i>More, Not Less, Attention to Third World     Development</i> .....	216
V.	CONCLUSION .....	220

## I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of the post-Cold War era, many writers have used the term *marginalization* when referring to Africa.<sup>1</sup> Today, this term is used so frequently to describe the continent that a real danger exists. Marginalization may assume notoriety as another despicable byword for Africa, comparable to the term “The Dark Continent.”<sup>2</sup> To support their negative characterization of the region, marginalization “analysts” all too readily cite the alleged strategic irrelevance of the continent and its peripheral economic situation in the world.

The debate about Africa’s marginalization originated in the late 1980s before the fall of the Soviet Union and the advent of the new world order. In the late 1980s, with the attention of western countries and international aid donors focused upon Eastern European reforms, some African leaders feared that Africa’s needs were becoming secondary to those of Eastern Europe on the global agenda.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. Africa as used in this study denotes Black or sub-Saharan Africa and excludes North or Arab Africa.

2. There are people, even from Third World regions, who view Africa and Africans as synonymous with marginalization. One Latin analyst wrote about the “Africanization” of Latin America in the new world order. Kurt C. Campbell & Thomas G. Weiss, *The Third World, in the Wake of Eastern Europe*, 14 WASH. Q. 91, 99 (1991) (citing Jorge G. Castaneda, *Latin America and the End of the Cold War*, 7 WORLD POL’Y J. 469, 477 (1990)).

3. Jane Perlez, *Africa Fears Its Needs Will Become Secondary*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1989, at A6. A Kenyan diplomat Perlez quoted in her article was reported to have used the imagery of an unattractive woman in referring to Africa. According to the diplomat, “Eastern Europe is the most sexy beautiful girl, and we are an old tattered lady.” *Id.* (quoting B.A. Kiplagat). For more sample commentaries on African marginalization, see Paul Kennedy, *Countering Sub-Saharan Africa’s Relative Marginalization in the New World Order: Globalization as Current Foe but Potential Ally?*, at 3. Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting, Association of Third World Studies, Hartford, Conn., Oct. 9-11, 1997 (noting that from “being a relatively peripheral region in the 1960s, much of Sub-Saharan Africa sunk still further” becoming “a virtual backwater in the global order” and maintaining that today’s “relative marginalization,” if left unchecked, “may degenerate into absolute marginalization, or something dangerously close to it”); see also Timothy M. Shaw, *Africa in the Global Political Economy at the End of the Millennium: What Implications for Politics and Policies?*, 42 AFR. TODAY 7, 8 (1995) (stating that African political economies defy contemporary political and ideological norms, but, assuming that the political economies are categorizable, they belong largely to the Fourth and Fifth Worlds rather than to the Third).

Marginalization cannot represent a satisfactory depiction of Africa in the post-Cold War era. The point is not that the terminology is inaccurate; factual accuracy in and of itself is beside the point. Rather, a term like marginalization, as applied to Africa, obscures much more than it informs. This Article analyzes the trouble with marginalization as a concept applied in serious analysis of Africa and African events in the new world order. Marginalization is, as this Article shows, a concept so simplistic that it does not capture the complexity of African reality, and so static that it fails to encapsulate the dynamism and richness of Africa's position in the post-Cold War period. First, the Article gives a brief word of definition on the new world order. The remainder of the Article elaborates on the marginalization argument.

## II. DEFINING A NEW WORLD ORDER

Hedley Bull defines a world order as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”<sup>4</sup> Joshua Goldstein portrays such an order as “a set of norms” for international behavior in the world at a given historical point in time.<sup>5</sup> More specifically, a world order is a collective security arrangement in which great powers “develop common expectations about the rules for their behavior.”<sup>6</sup> For Goldstein, every world order is motivated by the need and necessity “for common expectations of all parties.”<sup>7</sup> In particular, the great powers established “the rules and standards to be followed” in the conduct of international relations.<sup>8</sup> According to Henry Kissinger, although world order “has a ring of eternity about it[,] . . . the elements which comprise [such an order] are in constant flux.”<sup>9</sup>

Present-day reference to a new world order is traced to former U.S. President George Bush.<sup>10</sup> Although there is disagreement as to whether a new world order exists today,<sup>11</sup> this Article adopts the position of

---

4. HEDLEY BULL, *THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY* 8 (1977).

5. See JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* 287-89, 333 (3d ed. 1999).

6. *Id.* at 107.

7. *Id.*

8. *Id.*

9. HENRY KISSINGER, *DIPLOMACY* 806 (1994).

10. *Id.* at 804-05; *Transcript of President's State of the Union Message to Nation*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A12.

11. See Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sørensen, *Introduction: What Has Changed?*, in *WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR* 3, 15, 233 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sørensen eds., 1995) (arguing that “[t]he putative new order, when viewed from different regions of the globe is not really new, is hardly global in scope, and is anything but orderly in its development”); see GOLDSTEIN, *supra* note 5, at 45, 46, 186 (opining that the existing order does not pass the test of collective security; wondering whether the talk of

scholars—like the late Claude Ake—that a new world order exists and that it came into existence lockstep with the post-Cold War era, replacing the Cold War alignment.<sup>12</sup> Skepticism towards the existence of this new order is associated with the political motivations of the American leadership which proclaimed the order.<sup>13</sup> However, as Ake points out, such skepticism has little to do with reality.<sup>14</sup> The end of the Cold War removed Africa “from the zero-sum strategic calculations of the superpowers.”<sup>15</sup> This offers a tremendous opportunity for a wide variety of international actors, including nongovernment organizations (NGOs), international institutions, late-industrializing states, and “medium” powers, such as Canada, to recognize Africa as a continent coming to terms with two principal burdens—the challenges of building a post-Westphalian nation-state on terms imposed arbitrarily by the Bismarckian legacy and the complexities of cultural and technological modernity.<sup>16</sup>

Along with globalization, the end of the Cold War has “unleashed forces that are reshaping the world and our consciousness.”<sup>17</sup> These events “reinforce each other in reconstituting the world and the way we relate to it.”<sup>18</sup> Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen focus upon the “transformations in the international system”<sup>19</sup> that the end of the Cold War and globalization are producing, yet argue that a new world order does not exist “in the normative sense of the term.”<sup>20</sup> However, “[t]he changes [these events] are introducing are so far-reaching that we can properly speak of the constitution of a new world order.”<sup>21</sup>

Great powers like the United States seek to create a new world order built on collective security—one that, as Kissinger notes, applies

---

a new world order is not a rationalization for pursuit of U.S. national interest; and calling President Franklin Roosevelt the “prime architect” of the proclaimed new order). Kissinger’s take is that a new world order, assuming it exists, “is still in a period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the [twenty-first] century.” KISSINGER, *supra* note 9, at 806.

12. Claude Ake, *The New World Order: A View from Africa*, in WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR, *supra* note 11, at 19.

13. See Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 3; see also KISSINGER, *supra* note 9, at 805. Kissinger notes that “for the third time in the [twentieth] century,” America, under three different leaderships, “proclaimed its intention to build a new world order by applying its domestic values to the world at large.” *Id.*

14. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 19.

15. Timothy M. Shaw & Clement E. Adibe, *Africa and Global Developments in the 21st Century*, 45 INT’L J. 1, 21 (1995-96).

16. *Id.*

17. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 24.

18. *Id.* at 19.

19. Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 4.

20. *Id.* at 3.

21. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 24.

American “domestic values to the world at large.”<sup>22</sup> The major powers want a new order based on collective security, while the developing world seeks an order based on “the development agenda of the 1960s and 1970s.”<sup>23</sup> Africa, on the other hand, craves a new order “characterized by inter-regional cooperation, self-reliant development and democracy rather than conflict, dependency and authoritarianism.”<sup>24</sup> Specifically, with the rest of the developing world, Africa seeks a new order built on partnership and equity “in which *every* region shall be empowered to develop its potentials and play a complementary role in sustaining world peace, security, and prosperity.”<sup>25</sup>

These two positions, at first sight, contrast starkly, but the concepts are reconcilable. One way to achieve that reconciliation is to keep in mind, as Goldstein states, that new orders start with raw military powers but need the legitimacy, along with the power, that comes from broad acceptance within the international system to endure.<sup>26</sup> The challenge for great powers, like the United States, who seek to build a new order of collective security is how to match the exercise of power within such a system with the legitimacy (achieved, for example, through some attention to issues of Third World development) necessary for that system to endure—what Ake calls building peace/order on justice.<sup>27</sup> Such legitimacy is achievable in a truly collective system in which every region feels a sense of ownership and belonging.

### III. TROUBLE WITH THE NOTION OF AFRICAN MARGINALIZATION

The notion of African marginalization is laden with a multiplicity of troubles. This Part deals with six of these problems. First, there is important information that the strategic irrelevance argument does not reach. Second, a problem exists regarding Africa’s economic

---

22. KISSINGER, *supra* note 9, at 805. Focusing on the Arab world, one analyst calls the new world order “the old one minus the Soviet superpower,” alleging:

There is no evidence of any dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy . . . [America] is showing a desire to pursue past policies without the restraints that were imposed by the Cold War . . . . The real change in the ‘new world’ has been mostly in the realm of American official rhetoric.

See As’ad AbuKhalil, *A Viable Partnership: Islam, Democracy, and the Arab World*, in *ALTERED STATES: A READER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER* 239-40 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabeck eds., 1993).

23. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 106.

24. Edmond J. Keller, *Toward a New African Order? Presidential Address to the 1992 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association*, 36 *AFR. STUD. REV.* 1, 2 (1993).

25. Adoga Onah, *Africa’s Role in the New World Order*, in *AFRICA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER* 1, 5 (Michael O. Anda ed., 1996) (emphasis added).

26. GOLDSTEIN, *supra* note 5, at 288-89.

27. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 30, 35.

marginality. Third, the marginalization concept lumps together, rather than distinguishes between, marginal and nonmarginal African states. Fourth, it treats Africa as *sui generis*, whereas marginality is an attribute the continent shares with other Third World regions, some of which, like South Asia, are only a little better off than Africa. Fifth, Africa's marginalization is a perception, not a process. Finally, the notion of African marginalization is plainly misleading.

A. *The Political-Strategic Irrelevance Argument*

During the Cold War, major powers were strategically attracted to Africa. However, Africa lost attractiveness with the end of the Cold War and the advent of the post-Cold War era.<sup>28</sup> A 1996 *Economist* survey of the continent reported that:

Nearly all the former colonial powers now regard Africa as marginal to their own well-being and security. So does Russia. America has all but disengaged. It resolutely refused to lift a finger to help the West African peace-keeping effort in Liberia, the nearest thing it ever had to a colony in Africa.<sup>29</sup>

The report cited a 1995 U.S. strategic assessment on Africa released by the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. The assessment states, "The US has essentially no serious military/geostrategic interests in Africa any more, other than the inescapable fact that its vastness poses an obstacle to deployment in the Middle East and South Asia, whether by sea or air."<sup>30</sup> According to the report, France alone among European countries "seems willing to go on providing military and financial aid at current levels to its former possessions."<sup>31</sup> Even so, this commitment could change under the new conservative government in France.<sup>32</sup> The outside world is disengaging in Africa because it is dismayed with the region's "post-colonial performance," characterized by countless coups, political violence, desperate straits of potentially important countries like Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaïre, and disintegration or near-disintegration of states like Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda.<sup>33</sup>

---

28. See Thomas M. Callaghy, *Africa and the World Political Economy: More Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, in *AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: THE AFRICAN STATE SYSTEM IN FLUX* 43, 44 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2000).

29. Tony Thomas, *Africa for the Africans: So Little Done, So Much To Do*, *ECONOMIST*, Sept. 7, 1996, at 3.

30. *Id.* at 3 (quoting U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies report).

31. *Id.*

32. *Id.*

33. *Id.* (citing U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies report).

Much of this evidence in support of irrelevance is accurate. However, the contention of strategic irrelevance misses a number of important points, which, if nothing else, exaggerates the degree to which Africa has become strategically irrelevant for major powers at the end of the Cold War and questions the marginalization thesis.

The first point is the nature of the major powers' engagement in Africa. According to Edmond Keller, the "preferred mode" major powers choose for their intervention in Africa "has been through support of UN operations."<sup>34</sup> "Except for France, extra-African actors have generally shied away from unilateral intervention in modern Africa."<sup>35</sup> If much of the engagement these powers had with Africa was through U.N. operations (or proxies, Keller should have added), then there is little for Africa to miss in these major powers now disengaging themselves.

During the period of original engagement, the attention bestowed on Africa was not based on any earned or inherent importance African countries possessed for engaging major powers. Rather, these countries received incidental attention from being made a pawn in the ideological struggle between East and West. Africa will not likely miss such incidental attention if it is taken away. It should be a matter of gratitude, not of bemoaning, that the post-Cold War period removed such incidental attention. For example, the trouble with American engagement in Africa is not that the United States is now disengaging or that its relations with African countries were unproductive;<sup>36</sup> rather, there has historically been too little of that engagement to begin with.<sup>37</sup> Although ironic, the claim by the Institute for National Strategic Studies that the United States "has essentially no serious"<sup>38</sup> interests in Africa, as opposed to being figurative, is literally accurate. Consequently, American post-Cold War disengagement is not based upon African

---

34. Edmond J. Keller, *Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order*, in *AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY* 1, 11 (Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild eds., 1996).

35. *Id.*

36. Under President Clinton, Washington acknowledged that its policies in Africa during the Cold War were "often determined not by how they affected Africa, but by what advantage they brought to Washington or Moscow," and had pledged its resolve to pursue "a productive new relationship" with the continent. See Warren Christopher, *U.S.-Africa: A New Relationship*, in *AFRICA REPORT* 36 (July/Aug. 1993).

37. See Peter J. Schraeder, *Removing the Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the Cold War*, in *AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY*, *supra* note 34, at 187.

38. Thomas, *supra* note 29, at 3.

misperformance. America's engagement in Zaïre under Mobutu took place *despite* the country's poor performance.<sup>39</sup>

Second, contrary to reports such as the one in the *Economist*, not all major powers consider Africa as marginal to their political-strategic interests. Using Russia as an example, Jeffrey Lefebvre writes that Russia's policy in Africa is not based on the balance of power, but rather is motivated by business opportunity and a desire "to act as a benevolent great power."<sup>40</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev's New Thinking concept initiated a "policy of constructive participation" by Russia in Africa.<sup>41</sup> The disengagement of the Soviet Union "from troublesome and/or strategically marginal African clients" afforded it the opportunity, which the Russians wasted no time in seizing, for a "positive-sum game" in Africa involving the development of profitable economic ties,<sup>42</sup> particularly with South Africa.<sup>43</sup> Russia's new policy in Africa, notes Lefebvre, "seeks to account for Russia's national interests while weighing Africa's political clout, economic potential, and the specifics of African countries."<sup>44</sup> Much of modern Russian engagement in Africa is motivated purely by economic calculation: "Russia's Africanist policymakers, like their U.S. counterparts, see Africa as a market of the future that should not be abandoned or forgotten in the present."<sup>45</sup> But some engagement, contrary to the strategic irrelevance thesis, is political-strategic. Africa's fifty-three states, the largest collection of independent countries in any single continent of the world, comprise an invaluable wellspring of political, strategic, and diplomatic support both within and outside the U.N. system that major powers will always seek to tap into.<sup>46</sup> As Lefebvre states with respect to Russia, "Moscow . . . appreciates the political weight that Africa carries by its sheer numbers in international organizations."<sup>47</sup> The country's present engagement, unlike during the

---

39. See Osita G. Afoaku, *The U.S. and Mobutu Sese Seko: Waiting on Disaster*, 14 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 65-90 (1997).

40. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, *Moscow's Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa*, in AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY, *supra* note 34, at 222.

41. *Id.* at 220.

42. *Id.* at 221-22.

43. See *id.* at 218-20 ("[T]he Post-Cold War and post-apartheid foreign policies of Moscow and Pretoria are motivated by international economics, which will sometimes make them partners and sometimes competitors.").

44. *Id.* at 220-21.

45. *Id.* at 222.

46. See NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 505-25 (3d ed. 1999) (giving basic political data on each of these fifty-three countries).

47. Lefebvre, *supra* note 40, at 220.



Cold War, is a positive one based on substantive mutual needs where the attention Africa has received is earned and deserving, not gratuitous.<sup>48</sup>

Third and finally, marginalization is a concept that can obscure efforts aimed at combating the disengagement by the major powers. Some African countries made alternative plans from the very moment they got wind of the projected disengagement of the major powers. The *New York Times* reported that African leaders feared that their needs would be neglected because of a perceived shift in attention to Eastern Europe. The article also conveyed that “[t]o compensate for an expected disengagement of the Soviet Union and the United States, some African nations [were] scrambling for new allies, with Israel emerging as one of the countries most politically active in Africa and Japan as the continent’s new foreign economic power.”<sup>49</sup>

#### B. *The Economic Marginality Argument*

With the end of the Cold War and the relative evaporation of the threat of security associated with that war, issues within the global economy are beginning to assume center stage.<sup>50</sup> The economic marginality argument portrays Africa as “a marginal player in the global economy, pushed and shoved by the whims of industrial powers, MNCs [Multinational Corporations], and IFIs [International Financial Institutions],”<sup>51</sup> and holds that the continent “is no longer very important to the major actors in the world economy . . . and in its changing international division of labor.”<sup>52</sup> Proponents of this marginality worry that “[i]n a high-tech world, with increasingly global finance and banking, with information technology expanding rapidly, and with talk of a shrinking globe and end of geography[,]” Africa could become not just marginal but “increasingly irrelevant.”<sup>53</sup> Numerous indicators are cited to support this marginality.<sup>54</sup> Such indicators include (but are not limited to):

---

48. For more rebuttal of the political-strategic irrelevance argument, see the analysis in Part III.F, particularly the argument of Professor Timothy Shaw.

49. Perlez, *supra* note 3, at A6.

50. Stephen Wright, *Changing Context of African Foreign Policies*, in *AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES* 1, 9 (Stephen Wright ed., 1999).

51. *Id.*

52. Callaghy, *supra* note 28, at 44.

53. Wright, *supra* note 50, at 9 (citation omitted).

54. See, e.g., Callaghy, *supra* note 28, at 44-49.

- Africa's decreasing share of global trade. This share dropped from 2.5% in 1970 to little more than 1% in 1990.<sup>55</sup>
- Africa's share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This share was a mere 3% in 1995, compared to 20% for Latin America and the Caribbean; and as much as 59% for East Asia and the Pacific.<sup>56</sup> In 1987, Singapore alone attracted more FDI than all of Africa.<sup>57</sup>
- Africa's dwindling Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, Africa's GDP is less than Belgium's, a country with only about 2% of Africa's population of over half a billion people.<sup>58</sup>
- Manufacturing represents only 11% of Africa's economic activity (only two percentage points up from 9% in 1965). 12% of the continent's exports involve manufactured products—compared, for example, with a manufacturing figure of 90% for Korea.<sup>59</sup>
- Few, if any, states in Africa have adapted themselves positively to the microchip revolution. Africa is the one continent in the global South with no Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), compared to Asia with four (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and Latin America with two (Brazil and Mexico).<sup>60</sup> Except perhaps for South Africa, the continent does not even have a near-NIC of the likes of Malaysia and Thailand in Asia.<sup>61</sup> Whereas the New International Division of Labor (NIDL) has spawned NICs in Latin America and Asia, Africa remains agrarian.<sup>62</sup> Timothy Shaw describes Africa as the "'Fourth World' continent in the

---

55. Winrich Kühne, *The Changing International Environment of African Politics*, in *AFRICA AND EUROPE: RELATIONS OF TWO CONTINENTS IN TRANSITION* 1, 3 (Stefan Brüne et al. eds., 1994).

56. Thomas, *supra* note 29, at 4.

57. Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 3.

58. *Id.*

59. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the 21st Century: Winners and Losers*, in *GLOBAL ISSUES* 19 (Robert M. Jackson ed., 14th ed. 1998).

60. Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E. Okolo, *African Political Economy and Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Toward a Revisionist Framework for ECOWAS States*, in *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY IN ECOWAS* 1, 3-4 (Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E. Okolo eds., 1994).

61. *Id.*

62. Julius E. Nyang'oro & Timothy M. Shaw, *Introduction: African Development in the New International Division of Labor*, in *BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUSTAINABLE AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT* 1, 4-5 (Julius E. Nyang'oro & Timothy M. Shaw eds., 1992).

New International Division of Labor and Power at the end of the twentieth century.”<sup>63</sup>

- Several decades after attaining political independence, Africans still remain “poor and deprived.”<sup>64</sup> Except for countries like Botswana and Mauritius, residents are generally no better off today than they were at independence.<sup>65</sup> The World Bank projected that virtually every region in the world but Africa would experience a decline in poverty by 2000.<sup>66</sup>
- Even small shifts and instabilities from the industrialized world can wreak disastrous consequences on Africa, whereas industrialized countries are so “self-centered in their economic activities” that anything the continent does to them is “just an unpleasant ‘hiccup’ . . . but [poses] no vital threats to their economies.”<sup>67</sup>
- “[C]onsiderable power over African agendas . . . lies with the international financial bodies [such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank] and large bilateral aid agencies.”<sup>68</sup>

This evidence is sometimes accompanied by pithy statements conveying the magnitude of Africa’s economic marginality. One observer states that there is no surprise about Africa being underdeveloped since such was only to be expected: “[T]he surprise is discovering just how underdeveloped [the continent] is.”<sup>69</sup> An African leader remarked that when one compares developmental events in Africa with occurrences in the rest of the world, “it is difficult to believe that we inhabit the same historical time.”<sup>70</sup> Yet another African leader, Adebayo Adedeji, former Executive Secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), sadly noted that the only area in which Africa has scored a significant increase is in its “share of global population and

---

63. Timothy M. Shaw, *Revisionism in African Political Economy in the 1990s*, in *BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUSTAINABLE AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT*, *supra* note 62, at 50.

64. John Mukum Mbaku, *Africa After More Than Thirty Years of Independence: Still Poor and Deprived*, 11 *J. THIRD WORLD STUD.* 13-58 (1994).

65. Kennedy, *supra* note 59, at 19.

66. *Id.* at 17-18.

67. Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 4.

68. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 3 (citing Jane Guyer, *African Studies: A New Tradition?*, 23 *ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION* 13 (1995)); *see also* Callaghy, *supra* note 28, at 47-49.

69. Keith B. Richburg, *Why Is Africa Eating Asia’s Dust?*, in *COMP. POL.* 98/99, at 198 (Christian Sjøe ed., 1999).

70. Kennedy, *supra* note 59, at 17 (citing Nigerian leader, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo).

official development assistance.”<sup>71</sup> He compared the economic devastation and deprivation Africa is enduring to Europe’s after World War II, but noted that Africa’s devastation is unalleviated by any Marshall Plan.<sup>72</sup> Finally, Sadig Rasheed writes that “[a]t a time when developed countries are racing towards the twenty-first century, hotly pursued by a number of developing countries, Africa has been sliding backward into a Fourth World of its own . . . . How can a continent with such attributes *not* be marginalised?”<sup>73</sup>

The trends and statistics set out here are, as far as they go, factually correct. But there are real problems with the economic marginality argument. First, Africa did not become suddenly marginalized with the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the post-Cold War era. Rather, African marginality in the world economy progressively preceded the advent of the new world order. The continent’s decreasing share of global trade; its declining GDP; the share of manufacturing in its economic activity remaining virtually stagnant since 1965; its enormous deprivation and impoverishment; its known susceptibility to an economic cold anytime the industrialized western world sneezes; its laggard placement in the international division of labor and power; and the IMF-World Bank influence over the economies of countries in the continent—all of this predated the end of the Cold War.

Contrary to its depiction as an occurrence of the post-Cold War, Africa’s marginality is not new. Naomi Chazan and her colleagues, in their work on politics and society in contemporary Africa, identified poverty, structural transformation, and dependence as three challenges of economic development that “African countries, regardless of regime type or ideology, have confronted” *since* independence.<sup>74</sup> Stephen Wright voices “reservations regarding the concept that the 1990s environment within which policy is made [in Africa] is completely new,”<sup>75</sup> and he argues that the weaknesses of African states today are “more a matter of continuity than novelty.”<sup>76</sup> Wright explains that Africa has long been a marginal continent “through the slavery and colonial periods, at the

---

71. Adebayo Adedeji, *Introduction: Marginalization and Marginality: Context, Issues and Viewpoints*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE* 1, 5 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1993).

72. *Id.*

73. Sadig Rasheed, *Africa at the Doorstep of the Twenty-First Century: Can Crisis Turn to Opportunity?*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at 55.

74. CHAZAN ET AL., *supra* note 46, at 239-40.

75. Wright, *supra* note 50, at 7.

76. *Id.*

periphery of the strengthening global capitalist economy.”<sup>77</sup> He cites Adedeji<sup>78</sup> approvingly and supports the view that marginalization simply signifies a process of devaluation which, for African countries, results in ever-diminishing freedom to act and space to move within the environment of the international political economy.<sup>79</sup> Wright further states that most African nations have never had much capability in their foreign policies, and their role in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has falsely exaggerated their influence.<sup>80</sup> The Cold War then played to their advantage because neither of the superpowers wished to embarrass and expose these states’ weaknesses for fear of nudging them to the other ideological camp.<sup>81</sup> Marginalization portrays Africa’s dismal economic position as something “caused primarily by its relationship to the world economy or to dominant countries or actors in the international system,”<sup>82</sup> whereas the forces here at work are much more complex. According to Thomas Callaghy, Africa’s dismal economic condition is “the *combined* result of the effects of the world market forces, the international state system and its international financial institutions, African socioeconomic structures, and the nature and performance of African state structures.”<sup>83</sup>

Second, the economic marginality argument overlooks important changes in the economic sphere that are taking place in Africa. These changes include occurrences arising from the renewed engagement by major powers. As previously indicated, Russian recent relations with Africa encompass the evolution of mutually beneficial economic ties.<sup>84</sup> In the aftermath of the Cold War, many countries in the continent are seeking new foreign allies. Some of these new allies include economic powers like Japan and the newly industrializing countries in Asia.<sup>85</sup> Third, with the end of the Cold War, African countries are changing their entire approach to development, with increasing attention being paid to human rights issues.<sup>86</sup> There is also an acknowledgment of the role of

---

77. *Id.*

78. See Adedeji, *supra* note 71 and accompanying text.

79. Wright, *supra* note 50, at 7.

80. *Id.*

81. *Id.*

82. Callaghy, *supra* note 28, at 49.

83. *Id.* at 49 (emphasis added).

84. See Lefebvre, *supra* note 40, at 221-22.

85. See Perlez, *supra* note 3, at A6.

86. See, e.g., U. OJI UMOZURIKE, *THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS* (1997); CLAUDE E. WELCH JR., *PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ROLES AND STRATEGIES OF NGOS* (1995); BRENDA LYN P. AMBROSE, *DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS* (1995).

popular participation in development.<sup>87</sup> These are concerted efforts designed to contain or minimize marginalization that the economic marginality notion glosses over. As one official of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)<sup>88</sup> puts it, Africa “is a viable partner of strategic economic importance in the world order . . . poised to contribute to the world economy of tomorrow.”<sup>89</sup>

### C. *Not All African States Are Marginal(ized)*

Many African states are badly managed. However, there are also African countries, like Botswana and Mauritius, that are well managed. The trouble with marginalization is that it lumps marginal and nonmarginal African states together, rather than making a distinction between the two. Rather than being generalized, African marginalization is differentiable; as Shaw says, Africa’s place in the new world order is marked by “differentiated links to international chains of production.”<sup>90</sup> Contemporary Africa has been a social laboratory for strategies of economic and political change.<sup>91</sup> The result is continuities, discontinuities, and massive differentiation among groups, countries, and regions.<sup>92</sup> In short, “poles of growth as well as poles of stagnation” characterize Africa,<sup>93</sup> and analysts need to approach their analysis of the continent with “a sense of heterogeneity.”<sup>94</sup> Africa’s place in the new

---

87. See AMBROSE, *supra* note 86, at 195-206 (giving the text for the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (ACPPDT) adopted in Arusha, Tanzania, on Feb. 16, 1990). Other regional documents with a similar theme but less pronounced than the ACPPDT and less well known include the Strategic Agenda for Development Management in Africa, adopted in March 1993; and the Declaration of OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, adopted in Addis Ababa in July 1990. The text of the Strategic Agenda is reprinted in DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA: TOWARD DYNAMISM, EMPOWERMENT, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 246-72 (Sadig Rasheed & David Fasholé Luke eds., 1995); the text of the Declaration is reprinted in P. OLISANWUCHE ESEDEBE, PAN AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT, 1776-1991, at 259-63 (2d ed. 1994).

88. The OAU is an association of independent African countries committed to the complete eradication of foreign rule in Africa and to international cooperation among countries of the continent, among other objectives. A text of the Charter of the organization is reproduced in ESEDEBE, *supra* note 87, at 249-57.

89. Pascal Gayama, *Africa’s Marginalization: A Perception, Not a Process*, in AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE 73, 76 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1993).

90. Timothy M. Shaw, *State of Crisis: International Constraints, Contradictions, and Capitalisms?*, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 307, 308 (Donald Rothchild & Naomi Chazan eds., 1988).

91. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 21-22; Shaw, *supra* note 3, at 8-9.

92. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 21-22.

93. *Id.* at 24.

94. *Id.* at 6; see also CHAZAN ET AL., *supra* note 46, at 33 (contending that “[h]eterogeneity and complexity in conditions of uncertainty have marked the recent history” of

international division of labor, generally speaking, is “highly peripheral,” but “some states and classes are less peripheral than others.”<sup>95</sup> Countries like Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, which Shaw classifies as “Third World,” continue to be important markets, producers, and regional centers.<sup>96</sup> Any gain by these Third World states is likely to be at the expense of less key states—supposedly the rest of the continent—which Shaw labels “Fourth World.”<sup>97</sup> Major powers may be uninterested in reconnecting with the Fourth World but have, as Shaw says, never really withdrawn from the Third; “despite austerity in Nigeria, inflation in Kenya or decline in Senegal,” these international capitalist centers “hang on anticipating better times.”<sup>98</sup> The new era therefore serves to magnify and perpetuate the contrast between Third and Fourth Worlds.<sup>99</sup>

This element of differentiation is one of a multiplicity of “novel factors” Shaw and others argue must accompany any productive discussion regarding Africa in the new international order.<sup>100</sup> Particularly, state and nonstate actors outside the continent need to keep in mind Africa’s “renewed role” as an elaborate social-political experiment. Additionally, features like increasing internationalization of the state, the diminution of the traditional powers of the state, and the rise of sub- and supra-state actors from internal as well as international civil society should be considered.<sup>101</sup> Outside actors must recognize the new realities of Africa and respond to those realities with “appropriate empathy, creativity, and sensitivity.”<sup>102</sup> The challenge of foreign policy for outside actors will be “to avoid the fatalistic assumptions of Afro-pessimists and the possible illusions that can result from unguarded

---

Africa). Chazan adopts a *political interaction framework*, “multi-disciplinary in conception and multilayered in design,” in an attempt to reflect this reality. *Id.* at 31.

95. Shaw, *supra* note 90, at 308.

96. *Id.*

97. *Id.*

98. *Id.* at 311; *see also* Wright, *supra* note 50, at 8 (contending that the new era affords “potential regional powers” like Nigeria and South Africa “more scope to develop stronger regional presences with less fear of outside intervention” compared to “weaker states” who could “have less scope beyond their regions and might become virtual nonplayers even inside their own regions”).

99. Shaw, *supra* note 90, at 311.

100. *See* Timothy M. Shaw, *Africa in the New World Order: Marginal and/or Central?*, in AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE, *supra* note 71, at 79 [hereinafter Shaw, *Africa in the New World Order*]; Timothy M. Shaw, *The South in the ‘New World (Dis)Order’: Toward a Political Economy of Third World Foreign Policy in the 1990s*, 15 THIRD WORLD Q. 17, 18 (1994); Shaw, *supra* note 3, at 9-10; *see also* Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E. Nyang’oro, *Conclusion: African Foreign Policies and the Next Millennium: Alternative Perspectives, Practices, and Possibilities*, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, *supra* note 50, at 242.

101. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 22-23.

102. *Id.* at 23.

optimism regarding Africa's future."<sup>103</sup> The sensible choice for them "lies in a thorough and realistic evaluation of the African condition in the context of worldwide political and economic trends."<sup>104</sup> Rather than being marginal or peripheral, as Shaw and others contend, "Africa may well be avant garde as it confronts the new range of global issues."<sup>105</sup>

*D. Marginality Is an Attribute Africa Shares with Other Third World Regions*

Another trouble with the marginalization concept is its tendency to treat Africa as *sui generis* when marginality is an attribute the continent shares in common with other Third World regions. Shaw argues that the issues African states confront today are not unique to the continent, but are problems within a global context emanating from the globalization of the world economy.<sup>106</sup> He advises that "the rest of the world needs to start thinking about Africa in terms of what is really happening there and elsewhere"<sup>107</sup> and chastises the "prevalent tendency to discuss Africa and its problems as *sui generis*, independent of the wider and stronger dynamics of global political economy."<sup>108</sup> Even more importantly, Shaw notes that the Third World (or global South) as a whole, not just Africa, occupies a "precarious" position in the new world order.<sup>109</sup>

Authorities such as Holm and Sørensen, Campbell and Weiss, Cardoso, and the Non-Aligned Movement all share a similar view of the Third World as a whole. In Holm and Sørensen's work analyzing the effects of the forces of globalization and the end of the Cold War on international relations, they describe a "new system of dominance" "with a new twist added" to "the conventional element of economic dominance of a center over a periphery" that encompasses all of the South:<sup>110</sup>

The centers . . . have less economic need for large parts of the periphery; less need for raw materials because they are increasingly insignificant for advanced economic growth; less need for cheap labor outside a small number of countries in the "near peripheries" of South Asia, Eastern Europe, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; and a lack of interest in large parts of the periphery as concerns direct investment because the

---

103. *Id.* at 24.

104. *Id.*

105. *Id.* at 23.

106. *See generally id.* at 1-26.

107. *Id.* at 21.

108. *Id.* at 20.

109. Shaw, *Africa in the New World Order*, *supra* note 100, at 79.

110. Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 16.



markets are uninteresting, undynamic, with no purchasing power and high political risks.<sup>111</sup>

Campbell and Weiss analyze the lower diplomatic priority that the Third World now receives from the West relative to Eastern Europe. They depict all Third World countries, not just African states, in the wake of Eastern Europe, as undergoing “benign neglect.”<sup>112</sup> They maintain that developing countries need “a collective strategy to prosper under conditions of benign neglect,”<sup>113</sup> and need to take advantage of the “increased margin for experiment” that the end of the Cold War affords.<sup>114</sup>

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, noted for his work on dependency,<sup>115</sup> writes about the changed nature of dependency and its effect on the global South.<sup>116</sup> He pinpoints a phenomenon which has become “crueler.” The new system, imposed on the South as a whole, requires nations to enter “the democratic-technological-scientific race, invest[] heavily in R&D [Research and Development], and endure[] the ‘informational economy’ metamorphosis” or failing that, to risk becoming “unimportant, unexploited, and unexploitable.”<sup>117</sup> Finally, the Non-Aligned Movement,<sup>118</sup> at its thirtieth anniversary meeting held in Accra, Ghana in 1991, dealt with the problems of the South as a whole, not just the problems of Africa. Delegates at the meeting viewed the struggle against marginality and oppressive poverty as a necessary step in the building of a truly new world order,<sup>119</sup> suggesting that no new

---

111. *Id.*

112. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 91-108.

113. *Id.* at 101.

114. *Id.* at 102.

115. For a brief explanation of dependence and the application of the theory and the related theory of underdevelopment to Africa, see CHAZAN ET AL., *supra* note 46, at 18-21.

116. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *North-South Relations in the Present Context: A New Dependency?*, in *THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: REFLECTIONS ON OUR CHANGING WORLD* 149, 156 (Martin Carnoy et al. eds., 1993).

117. *Id.*

118. The Non-Aligned Movement describes a coalition of Third World countries who have refused to align themselves either with the capitalist West or the (then) socialist East. Although its formation coincides with the decolonization of formerly dependent areas of Africa and Asia, the movement boasts among its important members countries like Cuba and the former Yugoslavia that are neither newly independent nor Afro-Asian. From a simple refusal to join alliances of big powers, the movement evolved over time to embrace the orientation of “an active and assertive policy directed toward independence, world peace, and justice.” Among its achievements is a sense of “purposeful policy and a positive diplomatic identity” the organization afforded smaller states. During the Cold War, the movement often acted as a veritable “third force” in world politics, but has seen its role diminish significantly following the end of the Cold War. See BRUCE RUSSETT ET AL., *WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE* 76-77 (6th ed. 2000).

119. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 25.

world order could exist unless a resolution was found to the problems of political marginality and oppressive poverty in the South.<sup>120</sup>

Some of the trends in Africa, such as severe deprivation and poverty, hyper-sensitivity from activities emanating from developed economies, and surrender of power over economic policy to the IMF and the World Bank in the name of structural adjustment, are attributes Africa has in common with other global South regions. Of the more than one hundred countries in the global South, only six (four from Asia and two from Latin America) are NICs. Rasheed notes that the number of developing countries “hotly pursu[ing]” the “racing” developed countries<sup>121</sup> are very few indeed. Many of the remaining Third World countries are still mired in poverty and deprivation.

One perceptive scholar’s recent analysis of the exclusion of Africa in international relations theory<sup>122</sup> notes that exclusion can be traced to “the conceptual limits of traditional IR [international relations] theory.” Specifically, he notes the field’s “inability to adequately conceive and explain African realities,”<sup>123</sup> that has little to do with an alleged uniqueness of the African context (so-called African exceptionalism).<sup>124</sup> The analysis should have been on IR’s exclusion of the global South as opposed to just Africa. The analysis correctly points out that modern IR is “a field whose primary focus has always been on the so-called great powers.”<sup>125</sup> The concept of African marginalization is a notion inconsistent with the long-standing practice in academic literature treating the regions and peoples of the Third World (or global South) as offspring of European colonialism bound together by a shared destiny. And in the twentieth century, such regions confront the common difficult problems of nation-building and development.<sup>126</sup>

---

120. *Id.*

121. Rasheed, *supra* note 73, at 55 and accompanying text.

122. Kevin Dunn, *Tales from the Dark Side: Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*, 17 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 61-90 (2000).

123. *Id.* at 82; *see also* Stuart Croft, *Review Article: International Relations and Africa*, 96 AFR. AFF. 607-15 (1997) (arguing that “the state of scholarship in IR has itself made a major contribution to the marginalization of Africa”).

124. *See* Dunn, *supra* note 122, at 62, 82.

125. *Id.* at 82; *see also* CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, *AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL* 3 (1996) (conveying that most of modern international relations is, but should not be, about how capitalist major powers can be helped to manage the demands of a complex international system through war avoidance, control of the global economy, and other means).

126. *See* JOSEPH N. WEATHERBY ET AL., *THE OTHER WORLD: ISSUES AND POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD* (3d ed. 1997).

*E. African Marginalization Is a Perception, Not a Process*

Another trouble with the notion of African marginalization in the new world order is a view taken from Pascal Gayama, an official from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Gayama argues that African marginalization is a perception rather than a process.<sup>127</sup> This position is instructive, but also very intriguing, arising during a conference designed to respond to “Africa’s growing marginalization in the new world order” and to “explore strategies to reverse” marginalization.<sup>128</sup> Gayama highlights several important developments which will contribute to the shaping of the world order and the role of Africa as a continent in each occurrence. These developments include peace and security, “multipolar” world economic order, economic regionalization, political democratization, environmental concerns in the new world order, reduced resource flow to Africa, the emergence of NGOs, and conflict resolution in Africa.<sup>129</sup> Some of these occurrences, like peace and security, Gayama states, are “indivisible and non-marginalisable.”<sup>130</sup> Others, such as political democratization, are areas where “plainly Africa cannot be said to be marginalized in,”<sup>131</sup> the reason being that “[t]hroughout the continent, the demand for democratic elections, for greater democratisation of institutions, and for popular participation in decision making are clear manifestations of Africa’s role in the shaping of the new world democratic order.”<sup>132</sup> On conflict resolution, Gayama states that the advent of the post-Cold War era affords African countries opportunities begging to be seized in the interest of peace, security and development, and conflict prevention for “the democratic settlement of conflicts.”<sup>133</sup> Now that the Cold War has ended, there can be no further excuse for African countries to resort to the use of sophisticated arms, as they did in the past, to resolve conflicts. Rather, African countries need to rely on “democratic means or negotiations.”<sup>134</sup> Even with respect to diversion of western resources away from Africa, Gayama focuses on opportunity, not marginalization:

[G]iven the availability and abundance of natural resources in Africa, and the emergence of a democratic culture, the continent is a viable partner of

---

127. See Gayama, *supra* note 89, at 73-77. Gayama is Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU.

128. Adebayo Adedeji, *Acknowledgement*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at vii.

129. Gayama, *supra* note 89, at 74-77.

130. *Id.* at 74.

131. *Id.* at 75.

132. *Id.*

133. *Id.* at 77.

134. *Id.*

strategic economic importance in the world order. Africa's population is dynamic and cannot allow itself to be marginalized. It is poised to contribute to the world economy of tomorrow.<sup>135</sup>

*F. The Notion of African Marginalization Is Misleading*

Lastly, the notion of African marginalization is very misleading. To facilitate elaboration of this last problem, this Article draws on the ideas of Timothy Shaw and the late Claude Ake relating to the debate on African marginalization. Shaw calls the notion of African marginalization "rhetoric"<sup>136</sup> and believes the notion is misleading. He adopts the position that "rather than being peripheral, in terms of confronting the new range of global issues, Africa may be in the avant garde, in part because it is especially vulnerable."<sup>137</sup> This position originated in 1989, and is a theory that he has consistently developed. In a 1989 analysis, Shaw argued that Africa is

apparently faced with a stormy future, yet one which will continue to command some analytic, diplomatic and strategic attention:

The region with the most states, particularly that with the most impoverished states, cannot be completely dismissed, in either academic or economic terms, even if it is increasingly marginal. Furthermore, the decay and pathos, juxtaposed with occasional elements of optimism and expansion, will continue to demand attention and explanation. . . . Marginalisation means minimal intervention . . . an occasion for social and intellectual creativity which will go beyond orthodox focii on coups and crises and draw attention to and determination from structural conditions and contradictions.<sup>138</sup>

Shaw, in explaining why the marginalization notion as applied to Africa is misleading, states:

It suggests that somehow Africa is outside the orbit of the global political economy. But . . . Africa is and will remain an active participant in the global political economy. At present, it is probably the main engine of activity for the majority of the world's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international financial institutions (IFIs). It also features prominently in discussions of the new security relations of the twenty-first century . . . . The notion of Africa's marginalisation, while stemming from the concrete reality of super-power disengagement, is facile.<sup>139</sup>

---

135. *Id.* at 76.

136. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 21.

137. *Id.* at 23.

138. Timothy M. Shaw, *Conclusion: The Political Economy of Africa in the World System, 1965-85*, in *AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: INTO THE 1990s*, at 212, 229 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Timothy M. Shaw eds., 1989).

139. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 21 (internal quotes omitted).

Most recently, Shaw writes that “research on and in today’s periphery can illuminate emerging issues for” “comparative studies of the foreign policy of both state and nonstate actors and in the North as well as the South.”<sup>140</sup> With particular reference to Africa, he conveys: “As in the nationalist/independence era of the 1960s, African studies contain lessons for the world, especially in terms of new foreign policy issues of human security/humanitarian interventions. The widespread assumption that the continent is marginal . . . could not be further from the truth.”<sup>141</sup>

Like Shaw, Ake believes the debate on African marginalization is wrong-headed:

Strangely enough, the discourse about the fate of Africa focuses on non-Africans. It orchestrates concerns about non-Africans not taking enough interest in Africa, not doing enough with it or for it, not giving it consideration. It worries about external social forces being allowed to complicate or even defeat Africa’s bid to escape from underdevelopment. And it encourages non-Africans to pay more benevolent attention to Africa. Somehow the discourse manages to forget that it is natural and appropriate that Africa should be marginal to non-Africans, just as it should be primary to Africans. Worse still, it represents the development of Africa as being not so much what Africans do as what is done by outsiders about Africa.<sup>142</sup>

Ake contends that marginalization, to the extent it exists, may in fact be beneficial for Africa.<sup>143</sup> First, marginalization may facilitate the evolution of an endogenous development agenda in Africa, an agenda that embodies the aspirations of the masses and has their support. Second, marginalization could produce a system sensitive to social needs because the people are then enabled to develop themselves rather than having outsiders, especially external “development” agencies, interfere.<sup>144</sup>

Ake further argues that

---

140. Shaw & Nyang’oro, *supra* note 100, at 247.

141. *Id.* at 246 (internal quotes omitted).

142. CLAUDE AKE, *DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA* 116 (1996).

143. *Id.* In addition to Ake, other proponents of this “marginalization is good for you” thesis include Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who remarked that “[a] little neglect would not be bad [for Africa] . . . . The more orphaned we are, the better for Africa. We will have to rely on ourselves.” Keller, *supra* note 24, at 8. Campbell and Weiss, focusing on the Third World as a whole, argue that “perhaps some benign neglect by the industrialized world would not be such a bad thing for the Third World after all” given the “increased margin for experiment” the end of the Cold War affords. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 102. Wright argues that the post-Cold War era “presents new opportunities for African states to pursue more autonomous foreign policies, especially within their own subregions, though sometimes still in line with U.S. or European wishes.” Wright, *supra* note 50, at 8; *see also infra* Part III.B.

144. AKE, *supra* note 142, at 118.

if Africa is marginal to the rest of the world, that is as it should be. The problem is not, as is often imagined, Africa's marginality to the rest of the world but the marginalization of Africans in the development of Africa . . . . Development is something that people do by themselves and for themselves, or it does not happen.<sup>145</sup>

Ake's thesis is that political conditions in Africa pose the greatest impediment to development in the continent. Through their politics, African elites marginalized the African role in African development. According to Ake, the problem is not that development has failed in the continent, but rather that it was never on the agenda.<sup>146</sup> This may sound incredulous, but it is a position scholars like Christopher Clapham appear to corroborate. According to Clapham, during the Cold War, African leaders used any domestic or external issues they could find, including "development," as a disguise for personal survival.<sup>147</sup>

#### IV. STRATEGIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Marginalization does not represent an adequate concept for serious analysis and an understanding of Africa and African events in the new century and world order. Yet Africa's future is, as Timothy Shaw put it years ago, "stormy."<sup>148</sup> An analysis on marginalization in Africa needs to incorporate proposals on how Africa can move forward in a new world order. Numerous strategies, in the literature relating to Africa, have been proposed for combating or minimizing African marginalization. A review of this literature, including works from three conferences in Africa and abroad,<sup>149</sup> resulted in the following strategies:

- democracy and democratization;
- political stability;
- self-reliance;

---

145. *Id.* at 122-23.

146. *See generally id.*

147. CLAPHAM, *supra* note 125, at 5-6. The finding also calls to mind Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo's statement at a conference on Leadership in African Development lamenting African leaders' insipidness with respect to economic issues. "When African leaders talk among themselves they fire the imagination and really applaud on political matters," he said. "But when it comes to economic issues . . . [these leaders] are not nearly as enthusiastic as they are about political issues." Philip C. Aka, *Leadership in African Development*, 14 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 213, 229 (1997).

148. Shaw, *supra* note 138, at 229.

149. *See* AFRICA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Michael O. Anda ed., 1996); AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY (Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild eds., 1996); AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1993). Contributions from all of these works have been referenced in this Article.

- collective self-reliance/regional economic integration;
- more attention to agriculture;<sup>150</sup>
- effective conflict management/resolution;
- accountability and reducing political corruption;
- genuine commitment to economic development;
- political unification into a Federation of African States (FAS);<sup>151</sup>
- reducing poverty, deprivation, and inequality;
- clear-headed domestic and foreign policies;
- respect for human rights and personal security;
- a sustainable development sensitive to environmental concerns;
- revisionism in the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies;
- promoting pan-Africanism that draws on African history and culture;<sup>152</sup>
- greater devotion to education and human resource development;
- improved rationalization of available labor resources;<sup>153</sup>
- industrialization and technological development;
- improved health care and a more effective response to the AIDS epidemic;
- increased attention to rural development;
- addressing the problem of the debt crisis;
- regaining autonomy and sovereignty lost to the IMF and the World Bank from Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs);<sup>154</sup>
- implementation of a dialogue between Africa and the industrialized world designed to ensure that the peace dividend arising from the end of the Cold War is shared by all regions, including Africa, redressing the excessive diversion of aid to Eastern Europe;<sup>155</sup>
- entrepreneurship and inculcation of a good work ethic;<sup>156</sup>

---

150. Thomas, *supra* note 29, at 8.

151. Bade Onimode, *The Imperatives of Self-Confidence and Self-Reliance in African Development*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at 192, 195.

152. See Basil Davidson, *For a Politics of Restitution*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at 17-27.

153. See Hassan Sunmonu, *Mobilizing Africa's Human Resources*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at 197-201.

154. See Onimode, *supra* note 151, at 191-92.

155. See *id.* at 194.

156. Nthato Motlana, *Five Imperatives and a 'Quadrance'—A Guide to Prosperity in Africa*, in *AFRICA WITHIN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE*, *supra* note 71, at 204.

- an economic bill of rights;<sup>157</sup>
- increased South-South trade;
- barter agreements and trade cooperation between the global South and Eastern Europe;<sup>158</sup>
- true collectivity in managing international affairs;
- reducing the enormous gap in wealth between developed countries (global North) and developing countries (global South); and, on a general level, increased attention to issues of Third World development.

Many of the initiatives, such as South-South trade, are strategies African countries can pursue individually or collectively. These collective initiatives reinforce the argument about the collective nature of the problems developing countries are facing in the world, and the limitation of a term like marginalization, as it has been applied in the depiction and analysis of Africa. Yet other issues, like true collectivity and increased attention to Third World development, are initiatives for developed countries in the interdependent world in which “the end of geography” is taking place.<sup>159</sup> The following focuses on certain key strategies, some of them among the initiatives enumerated above.

#### A. *Democracy*

Democracy is a political system that meets a set of pluralistic conditions, including the existence of political parties, basic fundamental guarantees like free speech and free press, accountability to the electorate, and regular elections.<sup>160</sup> Given the mixed result of democratic experimentation in post-colonial Africa,<sup>161</sup> the term as used here, is a substantively qualitative notion,<sup>162</sup> progressively dynamic in its application,<sup>163</sup> and must spawn a measure of economic well-being that can form the basis for support of the government and democratic

---

157. *Id.* at 205.

158. *See generally* Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 102.

159. RICHARD O'BRIEN, *GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY* (1992).

160. *See* Larry Diamond et al., *Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?*, in *POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY* 1, 6-7 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).

161. *See, e.g.*, the case studies of various African countries collected in *DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: VOL. 2, AFRICA* (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1988).

162. *See infra* Part IV.D (focusing, in particular, on the remarks by Professor Claude Ake).

163. Philip C. Aka, *Education, Economic Development, and Return to Democratic Politics in Nigeria*, 18 *J. THIRD WORLD STUD.* 21, 27 (2001).



politics.<sup>164</sup> Democracy affords the best hope for progress in Africa in the new era as well as the best hope for weathering globalization.<sup>165</sup>

Beginning with progress, more than the Cold War period, the current era calls for good leadership in African and other global South countries.<sup>166</sup> Such leaders are more likely to emerge under democratic than under authoritarian political structure.<sup>167</sup> More than authoritarianism, democracy also stands a good chance of producing policy that can minimize the harmful effects of globalization. Globalization is “the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders.”<sup>168</sup> The forces of globalization can wreak deleterious consequences on national autonomy and decision making,<sup>169</sup> but good policies matter.<sup>170</sup> States are not “merely passive objects exposed to the swell of globalization[,]” and globalization does not “automatically lead[] to the demise of the state.”<sup>171</sup> Democracy, more than authoritarian rule, affords an environment for good policies necessary to maintain autonomy and hold globalization at bay.

### B. *Increased Experimentation*

Another strategy African countries could use to combat marginalization in the new world order is increased experimentation. In the post-Cold War era, established African responses to problems of

---

164. *Id.* at 22.

165. See Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 5 (quoting Anthony Lake, U.S. Support for Democracy in Africa, U.S. Dept. of State, 6 DISPATCH 19 (Jan. 9, 1995)) (arguing that democracy is the best hope for peaceful coexistence in Africa, given the continent’s complex diversity and multiethnic character).

166. Richard H. Ullman has contended that the Cold War “was a great simplifier, and so were most of the politicians” of the period. See Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 106 (quoting Richard Ullman, *Enlarging the Zone of Peace*, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 120 (1990)).

167. Desirable leadership qualities by Southern leaders called for by the new era include a good understanding of “the emerging international order” and the ability to “turn the new situation to [an affected country’s] advantage”; the ability to “understand complexity” and a willingness to explain it to the people of a population involved, the ability “to negotiate and enter into complex relations between nations of the advanced industrialized West and the industrializing as well as the poorer South”; the ability to embrace “novel approaches to old problems”; the ability to navigate the “new type of cooperation among developing countries” with the North; the ability to embrace new ideas and technology and a willingness to exploit these resources in the process of development. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 101-02, 104, 106; Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 5; Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 14.

168. Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 4.

169. *Id.* at 7.

170. *Id.* Globalization may “entail a movement toward a single, unified global economy [but] states may push, resist, attempt to circumscribe or twist, this process to their own advantage.” *Id.*

171. *Id.*

underdevelopment have become inadequate and need transcending.<sup>172</sup> Forces of change in the world today, like globalization, present “serious challenges to the ways in which states have traditionally pursued economic, political, and social goals.”<sup>173</sup> They render established explanations and prescriptions invalid and necessitate increased experimentation.<sup>174</sup> Africa must continue its “search for viable independence”<sup>175</sup> aided and abetted by greater experimentation and within the facilitating context of a progressively value-added democracy. In the new century and world order, African problems will “have to be addressed and solved one by one”<sup>176</sup> and “within the world,”<sup>177</sup> not outside it.<sup>178</sup>

### C. *Increased Regional Economic Integration*

In addition to democracy and creative experimentation, African nations, as well as the rest of the global South, need increased regional economic cooperation to promote development in the new century and world order. Stephen Wright asserts that “regional cooperation seems . . . to be an essential step for African states to take.”<sup>179</sup> Unfortunately, regional cooperation is still an issue in Africa that has not received the kind of focused attention it deserves. Official intra-regional trade in the

---

172. Timothy M. Shaw, *The Revival of Regionalism: Cure for Crisis or Prescription for Conflict?*, in *AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: INTO THE 1990S*, *supra* note 138, at 106. The established responses Shaw identifies are advocacy of nationalism at the state level, pan-Africanism continentally, and nonalignment at the Third World level. The problem, he said, is that these responses call for a redistribution of authority and resources but preclude real transformation in the continent's global position.

173. Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 4.

174. See Shaw & Nyang'oro, *supra* note 100, at 241; TIMOTHY SHAW, *REFORMISM AND REVISIONISM IN AFRICA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1990S: THE DIALECTICS OF ADJUSTMENT* (1993); Shaw, *supra* note 63, at 50-51; Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 101; Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 3. According to Shaw, the new era affords Africans a precious window of opportunity needing to be seized to creatively redefine their own development. Sustainable development in the continent must, at a minimum, “recognize the resilience of informal sectors, the imperative of popular participation, the ubiquity of female production, and the fragility of continental ecology.” Shaw, *Africa in the New World Order*, *supra* note 100, at 82.

175. *Introduction: African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years*, in *AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS*, at xi (Gwendolen M. Carter & Patrick O'Meara eds., 1985).

176. Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 3. Kühne maintains that the older order afforded African foreign policy “a clarity and consistence of orientation” that no longer exists. He argues that basing politics on “past, simplistic slogans” or dogmas will not do today, advising that Africans engage in “realistic and differentiated assessment of the dynamics of global politics.” *Id.* at 3; see also *id.* at 4, 19, 21.

177. See *supra* note 71 and accompanying text.

178. See Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 4. Kühne calls the notion that Africa forget the world “a dangerous illusion” in which Africans should not engage.

179. Wright, *supra* note 50, at 19.

continent continues to remain low.<sup>180</sup> For both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) the figure is less than five percent of total trade.<sup>181</sup> The fact is that “at a time when the world’s political economy has become profoundly regionalized, . . . very little emphasis has been placed on African integration.”<sup>182</sup> The “key challenge for [the continent] in the twenty-first century . . . is how Uganda, Zaire, Gambia, or Lesotho could independently negotiate with the European Union or the states of the North American Free Trade Agreement on access to the world economy.”<sup>183</sup> Many scholars, including Campbell and Weiss, and Mazrui, in separate works, have come to a similar conclusion regarding regional cooperation.

According to Campbell and Weiss, focusing on the global South as a whole, much lip service has been paid to the need for increased regional cooperation among developing countries, and for new forms of South-South trade and investment.<sup>184</sup> The dominant patterns of economic relations for Third World countries remain focused on advanced industrialized countries and developing countries vying with one another for economic and investment opportunities.<sup>185</sup> Despite the “development decades” of the past era gone by, and in spite of numerous resolutions by U.N. organizations and regional commissions, precious little progress has been registered in regional cooperation.<sup>186</sup> The hope is that the new experience of benign neglect will force these countries to rely more upon their own collective initiatives.<sup>187</sup>

Mazrui argues that Africa should unite for internal development.<sup>188</sup> He writes about the “dialectic between the pan-Africanism of liberation (basically a success story) and the pan-Africanism of integration and development (still basically an elusive dream.)”<sup>189</sup> This distinction means that Africans have no difficulty in uniting for liberation, but have difficulty uniting for political and economic development. Mazrui states, “The shock of colonialism and imperialism [has] awakened Africans to the fact that in relation to the Western oppressors, Africans were *one*.

---

180. *Id.* at 12.

181. *Id.*

182. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 20.

183. *Id.*

184. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 102.

185. *Id.*

186. *Id.*

187. *Id.*

188. See Ali A. Mazrui, *Introduction*, in *GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA, VIII: AFRICA SINCE 1935*, at 1, 13 (Ali A. Mazrui ed., 1993).

189. *Id.*

But shared exploitation was not enough as a basis of enduring African solidarity."<sup>190</sup> The challenge now for Africans is to remove this undesirable dialectic by uniting for internal development.

Africa's problem of regional integration is not as intractable as it appears at first sight. As Nyang'oro and Shaw point out, Africa is more productive and cohesive than any official data admit, if only African countries can creatively adopt new forms of regionalism "built on established informal sector and civil society connections."<sup>191</sup> As they explain it, two regionalisms exist in Africa: informal exchanges and orthodox/formal regionalism. The former is burgeoning and flourishing, while the latter is not. Informal exchanges are comprised of unrecorded and untaxed economic activity, often unregistered and illegal, and small in scale and capital.<sup>192</sup> This form of regionalism was historically female-dominated and concentrated in food production and distribution, but has since diversified into small-scale manufacturing and related activities, including repairs, and cross-border trade in a variety of products, particularly high-value electronics, and, most recently, drugs.<sup>193</sup> Informal exchanges exist in both economies in the North and the South but have prospered in Africa. As formal employment and production have stagnated and regressed, informal exchanges make up a larger percentage of economic transactions than formal exchanges, particularly in countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zaïre.<sup>194</sup> Africans will go a long way in promoting their economic well-being in the new century simply by capitalizing on the tremendous flows of unofficial cross-border trade.<sup>195</sup>

#### D. *More Even-Handed Use of the United Nations by the Great Powers*

A strategy focused on the developed world that can alleviate Africa's and other developing regions' marginalization in the new world order is a more even-handed use of the United Nations by the great powers.<sup>196</sup> During the Cold War, these major powers used the United

---

190. *Id.*

191. Nyang'oro & Shaw, *supra* note 62, at 7.

192. Shaw, *supra* note 63, at 60.

193. *Id.*

194. *Id.* Shaw predicts that "until the formal sectors are large and dynamic enough to absorb growing generations of school-leavers . . . their informal counterparts will flourish." *Id.*

195. Wright, *supra* note 50, at 12.

196. The great powers are the seven most powerful countries in the international system: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Germany, and Japan, the first five of which are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. For a basic description of the political, economic, and other features of these countries, see GOLDSTEIN, *supra* note 5, at 81-83.

Nations as an arena in the ideological struggle between East and West,<sup>197</sup> or otherwise showed little interest in the organization. With the end of the Cold War, this attitude has changed for the better and the United Nations is now getting more positive attention from the great powers.<sup>198</sup> However, the stress has been on collective security at the expense of the development agenda of the past.<sup>199</sup> The relative inattentiveness to developmental issues is spawning a great deal of concern in the developing world. Specifically, there is a concern that the rising effectiveness of the Security Council could diminish further the already limited ability of developing countries to push their causes in multilateral forums.<sup>200</sup> Campbell and Weiss state that this concern dictates the need for trade-offs on issues of mutual primary interest to the North and the South. To facilitate such trade-offs, the major powers must participate fully in multilateral diplomacy within the U.N. system, not just in the Security Council.<sup>201</sup>

However, there are some observers who advocate changes more far-reaching than the multilateral diplomacy Campbell and Weiss propose for major powers. These changes include the “enthronement of genuine international democracy,” through enlargement of the U.N. Security Council to allow for the allocation of permanent seats for regions like Africa without a permanent seat on the Council.<sup>202</sup> Ake argues for all parties developed and developing to take democracy seriously, as well as for order based on justice, in the new world order.<sup>203</sup> Otherwise, he warns, “collective security on a global scale is impossible.”<sup>204</sup>

The crucial point is that international relations are still about great powers, particularly the major capitalist states. But for the sake of legitimacy in the conduct of international affairs in a changed and

---

197. See JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS: UNITED STATES-SOVIET INTERACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS*, at viii-ix (1965).

198. One study of changing American attitude toward the United Nations is ROBERT W. GREGG, *ABOUT FACE?: THE UNITED NATIONS* (1993). Part of the reason for the increasingly positive attention is the UN's ability to help bring peace and stability to formerly dangerous regions.

199. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 106.

200. *Id.*

201. *Id.*

202. Onah, *supra* note 25, at 2; see also GOLDSTEIN, *supra* note 5, at 301-02.

203. Ake, *supra* note 12, at 29, 42. Ake defines democracy broadly beyond liberal democracy. See *id.* at 35-42 (outlining his many quarrels with this democracy); see also Ake, *supra* note 142, at 139-42. Ake sees little future for ongoing democratic reforms in Africa based on multiparty elections. According to Ake, these “democratic elections can only decide who control, to their own benefit, an unreformed and inherently oppressive colonial state. The people can choose between oppressors and by the appearance of choice legitimize what is really their disempowerment.” *Id.* at 40.

204. *Id.*

interdependent world, it is increasingly imperative to accommodate countries like those in Africa "at the bottom of any conventional ordering of global power, importance, and prestige."<sup>205</sup> It is hypocritical and amoral for industrialized countries to advocate for and insist on democracy for developing countries while at the same time resisting the application of democratic principles at the international level in institutions like the Security Council. Democracy in our time is so important for human survival that its cultivation should not stop at cultural boundaries, but rather should also suffuse international relations and organizations. Democracy cannot be at once desirable at the national level and not needed in international institutions.

*E. More, Not Less, Attention to Third World Development*

The end of the Cold War has served to relegate the developmental needs of Third World countries to the margin of western security and political calculations.<sup>206</sup> But industrialized countries need to pay more, not less, attention to issues of Third World development than they did during the Cold War. Recent momentous events have fundamentally altered world politics, but relations between North and South in the new era will become more salient.<sup>207</sup> Unless the developmental problems of Third World countries are tackled "with the intensity, creativity, and sacrifice that marked the confrontation of the Cold War," there is little hope of the end of the Cold War securing a lasting peace.<sup>208</sup> Industrialized countries need new policy shifts to be able to "avoid a new North-South polarization" capable of replacing the East-West divide of

---

205. CLAPHAM, *supra* note 125, at 3.

206. Evidence of that relegation includes the facts that Southern issues like debt, falling raw material prices, developmental aid, trade preferences, and refugee problems are being effectively displaced by industrial world priorities like environmental protection, human rights, democracy, and the drug war; and assistance to most developing countries is dwindling steadily while net transfer of financial resources from the West to many of these countries has actually been reversed to the West's benefit. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 91, 98, 101-02. As Campbell and Weiss indicated, until the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, the Third World virtually disappeared from the foreign policy agenda of major Western states. *Id.* at 91.

207. *Id.* at 92.

208. *Id.* at 91. According to Campbell and Weiss, one lesson of the Gulf War against Iraq is that the end of the Cold War will not preclude religious and ethnic tensions and access to national resources from sowing new seeds of conflict and competition. *Id.* As opposed to any displacement of Southern issues, Campbell and Weiss recommend bargains on trade-offs on issues of primary concern to the North (e.g., the environment, human rights, democracy, increased migration from developing countries, even a Third World "less violent and volatile") and those of the South (e.g., development, welfare). They advised that national and international security are sometimes better preserved using economic rather than military techniques or means. *Id.* at 96, 98, 104, 106.

the Cold War era.<sup>209</sup> Therefore, they must adopt “a more comprehensive conception of international security” that, for example, “recognizes the importance of interdependence and the varying priorities of countries at different levels of development.”<sup>210</sup> Similar “please don’t forget the Third World” appeals to industrialized countries have been made by Third World politicians, among them Hissene Habré, former Chadian President.<sup>211</sup>

There are some who maintain that the West could not succeed in deflecting attention completely away from matters of Third World development, even if it tried. Most Third World countries view the growing disparity in wealth between the industrialized world (the global North) and developing countries (the global South) as “the most conspicuous failure of the international community over the years.”<sup>212</sup> Western countries have a responsibility for the exploitation that came with colonization, and for some of the economic inequalities seen today in developing countries.<sup>213</sup> Within Africa, a call has been made for reparations in response to the damage and devastation by European slavery and colonization.<sup>214</sup> Mazrui explains that such an agenda for reparations should be multifaceted and include “Western direct support for African democracy” and “direct support for institutionalized African leverage in the world system.”<sup>215</sup> An issue not explicitly mentioned, that could form a part of that agenda, is payment to cover the “enormous reconstruction needs” in places like the Horn of Africa and southern Africa “where the superpowers played out their rivalries.”<sup>216</sup>

As Ronald Cruikshanks and Earl Huff point out, a persistent question industrialized countries have faced, going back to the days of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), is what economic concessions industrialized countries are willing to make to help developing countries “achieve their economic independence”<sup>217</sup> and not whether any economic concessions need to be made. The struggle by developing countries for a more equitable international system is not likely to cease until some of the worst inequities of the international

---

209. *Id.* at 92.

210. *Id.*

211. *Id.* at 95 (quoting CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 10, 1990, at 18).

212. *Id.* at 106; see Ake, *supra* note 12, at 24 (demonstrating the magnitude of this gap).

213. Randal L. Cruikshanks & Earl D. Huff, *Prospects for the Future, in THE OTHER WORLD: ISSUES AND POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD*, *supra* note 126, at 288.

214. Ali A. Mazrui, *Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists*, 37 AFR. STUD. REV. 1-18 (1994).

215. *Id.* at 8.

216. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 95.

217. Cruikshanks & Huff, *supra* note 213, at 288.

economic system are remedied. Branislav Gosovic, in analyzing the NIEO demands, speaks about “collective political measures that continue to chip away at the post-World War II liberal international economic order.”<sup>218</sup> Those measures will not abate unless the international order becomes more equitable. In pleading for a more equitable international political and economic system, developing countries have done nothing more than try “to assert collective political authority over transnational economic forces.”<sup>219</sup> This is nothing new as industrialized countries assert themselves in the same manner.<sup>220</sup> As Christopher Clapham argues, major powers need to be concerned about the impact of the global system on weak states least able to resist it—states which, like those in Africa, are of recent origins; among the poorest; and were, in the great majority of cases, created by international action in the form of European colonialism which left them with artificial boundaries that had little bearing on pre-colonial geographical and social identities.<sup>221</sup> Also regarding Africa, extra-continental powers should keep in mind the ramifications derived from the continent’s position as a social laboratory for strategies of change, while responding to the realities in the continent with sufficient empathy, creativity, and sensitivity.<sup>222</sup>

Developing countries increasingly will have to fend for themselves rather than rely on outsiders for their own development. As Campbell and Weiss state, “sulking” and bemoaning of western reduced interest in the South must be replaced by “a creative effort to understand[] the emerging international order and to turn the new situation to the South’s advantage.”<sup>223</sup> However, developed countries can help “get developing nations on their feet.”<sup>224</sup> One editorial, coming on the heels of the protests in Washington, D.C. by students and environmental groups over World Bank and IMF developmental policies in Third World countries, recommends more aid to these countries. The editorial also recommends that developed countries engage in further trade liberalization, through the World Trade Organization (WTO), that is aimed at reducing barriers

---

218. Branislav Gosovic & John G. Ruggie, *On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly*, 30 INT’L ORG. 309, 344 (1976).

219. *Id.*

220. *Id.* (arguing that it is the same assertion of authority over transnational economic forces that the United States engages in when it “seeks guaranteed access to sources and supply of raw materials . . . [or] proposes international insurance for private foreign investment”).

221. CLAPHAM, *supra* note 125, at 4.

222. Shaw & Adibe, *supra* note 15, at 23; Shaw, *supra* note 3, at 8-9.

223. Campbell & Weiss, *supra* note 2, at 106.

224. *Misguided Protest*, PINE BLUFF COM., Apr. 24, 2000, at 6A.



to imports from these countries.<sup>225</sup> But a problem urgently needing attention is the deteriorating terms of trade with respect to raw materials. As Kühne states, “the question of how to help the raw material producing countries to adjust to . . . changing terms of trade is a real one.”<sup>226</sup> He points out that deteriorating terms of trade have had a “devastating effect . . . on African perspectives for development.”<sup>227</sup> From 1986 to 1988 alone, declining terms of trade cost Africa an estimated \$50 billion, which in real terms put commodity prices at virtually half their 1979 to 1981 average levels.<sup>228</sup> Kühne attributes the deteriorating terms of trade to “a direct and bitter consequence of technological innovation.”<sup>229</sup> Much more than the end of the Cold War, technological innovation is the factor responsible for African marginalization today.<sup>230</sup> Technological innovation devalued the only two commodities—cheap labor and raw materials (minerals and agricultural products)—African countries, along with other developing states, have for competing in the world market.<sup>231</sup> Developed countries can deal with this marginalization of agriculture coming from technology through protectionist policies including the heavy subsidization of their farmers, yet advocate free market and free trade for developing countries.<sup>232</sup>

---

225. *Id.* The WTO is a global, multilateral inter-governmental organization that promotes, monitors, and adjudicates international trade. It is the successor organization to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created in 1947 to facilitate freer trade on a multilateral basis. The GATT became the WTO in 1995. The organization has 132 members, among them all of the world’s major trading states but China and Russia (as of 1997). GOLDSTEIN, *supra* note 5, at 369-71.

226. Kühne, *supra* note 55, at 16.

227. *Id.*

228. *Id.*

229. *Id.*

230. *Id.*

231. *Id.*

232. *See id.* at 17. While acknowledging the negative effect arising from deterioration in developing countries’ term of trade, Kühne sees nothing unjust about it. “There is nothing immoral about technological innovation and its logical consequences on the world market. . . . At the end of the day there are no just prices, only competitive ones.” *Id.* at 16. He writes about the “low credibility of moral arguments in this context.” *Id.* But in discussing the “clusters of factors” responsible for the divide between industrialized and developing countries, Kühne identifies the existence of “unfair and disfunctional[sic] world market structures” as one of those important operative factors increasing the disparity between the South and industrialized countries. *Id.* He calls the industrialized countries’ huge subsidies on agriculture and textiles “a scandal,” arguing in language so apt it should be quoted in full and unabbreviated:

These and other protectionist measures cost the developing countries about [\$100 billion] of export earnings annually which is about twice the sum of ODA (Official Development Aid). The subsidies in the rich countries cheat the producers in the poor ones of one of their few . . . advantages: cheap labour. Moreover, they are an expression of dishonest double standards by the industrialized countries, who preach free market and free trade policies to the developing countries as part of structural

## V. CONCLUSION

As shown in this Article, numerous troubles beset marginalization. The concept is not an adequate intellectual tool for serious analysis of Africa in the new world order. For one thing, the literature makes a connection, which not everyone agrees exists, between what is believed to be the marginalized position of Africa in the international system, and the proclaimed arrival of a new world order.<sup>233</sup> Second, marginalization “does much injustice to the breadth and nuance of African experience”<sup>234</sup> at the end of the Cold War. Like dependency theory before it, the approach “reduces Africans to mere objects of external domination rather than treating them as subjects and agents of their own history.”<sup>235</sup> This was probably what the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania meant when he stated that only chickens, not people, and certainly not half a billion people, are marginalizable.<sup>236</sup> Finally, marginalization depicts Africa’s present history as predetermined. It unwisely takes the continent’s current position in the global political economy as a

---

adjustment policies. They are also dysfunctional in terms of a balanced global economic development, based on the comparative advantage of producers. Together with the fact that African countries . . . (in 1990) had to pay [\$500 million] more back than they received in terms of new credits and grants, it is difficult to see how they will ever be able to overcome the techno-economical divide. These structural distortions will simply have to go.

*Id.* at 17. Scholars are not in agreement as to which single factor poses the most severe handicap for Africa in the world economy. For Holm and Sørensen, looking at developing countries as a whole, it is not so much protectionism or trade barriers as that the industrialized world has a decreasing need for developing countries, either as sources of raw materials, as markets, or as cheap labor. What developing countries really need to reap maximum benefits from integration into the global economy, they argue, is domestic political and economic reform, but which reform, unfortunately, may not be forthcoming. Holm & Sørensen, *supra* note 11, at 201. For James Mittelman, the difficult problem to overcome is globalization. “Globalization debars the bulk of Africa from gaining access to world society’s productive processes,” he contends. “For the countries of Africa, the greatest challenge is to demarginalize when national options are severely constrained by the forces of globalization.” Wright, *supra* note 50, at 12 (citing James H. Mittelman, *The Dynamics of Globalization*, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 18 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996)).

233. Africa did not become suddenly marginalized because the Cold War ended and a new world order set in. Rather, as Stuart Craft argues, the “crisis in African statehood” “was not caused by the end of the Cold War, but came to the fore alongside the collapse of the bi-polar structure.” Croft, *supra* note 123, at 613. The notion of Africa’s marginalization in the new world order suggests that Africa has a role about to be lost in the emerging world order. But the fact of the matter, as Gayama states, is that Africa did not, “at any point in time, play a significant role in any world order.” Gayama, *supra* note 89, at 73.

234. CHAZAN ET AL., *supra* note 46, at 244.

235. *Id.*

236. See Keller, *supra* note 34, at 2.

concluding, rather than as a starting point in the explanation of present policies and strategies.<sup>237</sup>

---

237. See Timothy M. Shaw, *Introduction: Toward a Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*, in *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS* 1, 12 (Timothy M. Shaw & Olajide Aluko eds., 1984) (advising, among other things, against adoption of a predeterministic mind frame when approaching the study of foreign policy in Africa).